[Both existence (as something independent of my thoughts)1V and my mind (as a container of thoughts)1H belong to the realm of possibility.
They have the same structural character.
They have different normal contexts.]
Summary of text [comment] pages 83 and 84
[My speculation, of course, stands outside of Descartes’ Age of Ideas.
Both something independent of what I think1V and myself as a container of thoughts1V belong to the realm of possibility.
That means that they are upwellings in a monadic sea.
These upwellings are like two ends of a string that tie together into a knot.]
[So what is the single actuality that is the intersection of Descartes’ determination2V and his thoughts that situates himself as a container of doubt2H?
It is the heart of Descartes.]
[Can Descartes’ formula be framed as an intersection with the same structure as the thought experiment where ‘I choose something’?
The fact that I think serves as a thought experiment3H.
What I think2H emerges from and situates my potential as a container of thoughts1H.
I am3V is the seat of what I think, which, in the case of Descartes, is doubt3V.
My determination of myself, as the seat of ‘what I think’2V, both emerges from and situates a possibility that is independent of myself as a container of thoughts1V.]
[In scholastic terms, the thinker–container belongs to ens reale (mind-independent realness) even though ‘thinking itself’ goes with ens rationis (mind-dependent realness).
Yet, the mind-independent-ness of the thinker as container is different than what the scholastics understood ‘ens reale’ to be.]
Summary of text [comment] pages 83 and 84
[The prior blog reminds me of the quandry posed by Decartes’ formula, “I think, therefore I am”.
“I think” goes with ideas inside of me. “Therefore, I am” asserts the existence of the thinker (as a container of I think).]
[If I can compare this nested form to the one derived from ‘the thought experiment where ‘I choose ‘something’‘ …
… then consciencespecified1V matches something1V in the potentials inherent in something that I may choose1V.
Something1V corresponds to value1V.]
Summary of text [comment] pages 83 and 84
[What is the categorical nature of this term “free will”?
Consciencefree and conscienceunfree appear as competing potentials in the intersecting nested form that describes the message underlying the word, “religion”.
To me, these seem to correspond to the label “free will”.]
