0388 I conclude this examination of Gustavo Caetano-Anolles’ chapter with a brief discussion on the third item appearing in section 10.3, titled, “Communication”.
0389 The first item that the author mentions is Peirce’s tradition of inquiry. Peirce’s three categories offer a variety of ways to portray triadic relations.
Biosemiotics is all about triadic relations. This examination has shown that secondness tends to associate to phenomena. Thirdness and firstness tends to associate to what models need to explain.
0390 The second item that the author mentions is Shannon’s information theory.
I wonder about the implications of the virtual nested form in the realm of secondness that Shannon’s information theory generates.
What if the associations are more than mere analogy?
What if my neighbor, getting that new-fangled lumber treatment and all, is not sending me a message through a channel2b that conducts wood-eating insects that are not happy, and frankly, fed up with the wooden food-fare that my neighbor’s shed now offers?
How weird and disturbing is that?
0391 The third item that the author mentions is Chomsky’s hierarchy of formal languages. Formal language consists of operations within a finite symbolic order.
0392 Finite symbolic order?
Think of how Charles Peirce might rebrand Ferdinand de Saussures’s key term, system of differences.
0393 Ultimately, symbols enter into a picture of the evolution of biomolecular communication.
And, when they do, they seem to associate to “a receiver2c” in Shannon’s virtual nested form in secondness.
0392 Here is a picture.
0393 But that is not all, in the evolution of biomolecular communication, symbols overflow destination2c and cascade down into the bucket that the transmitter2a works from.
The author spends sections 10.4 through 10.8 discussing the implications of this imaginary overflowing, which reminds me of a Tarot card, the ace of cups, where a hand appears out of cloud overhanging an idyllic landscape.
The hand holds a water-filled cup that overflows, in a very biomolecular-cascading fashion, from a perspective-level that associates to love. Is love an empedoclement? Only after the empedoclements (which are the inverse of impediments) come together, in the right sort of way, does strife arrive to both hone and diversify the new creation.
0001 The book before me is Semiotic Agency: Science Beyond Mechanism, by biosemioticians Alexei Sharov and Morten Tonnessen. The book is published in 2021 by Springer and logs in at volume 25 of Springer’s Series in Biosemiotics. Series editors are Kalevi Kull, Alexei Sharov, Claude Emmeche and Donald Favareau. These editors have Razie Mah’s permission for use of the following disquisition, with attribution of said blogger.
Points 0001 to 0226 cover Parts I and III of this book. These Parts are titled, (I) Overview and Historiography and (III) Theoretical Considerations. These two sections set forth the rationale for scientific inquiry into semiotic agency.
0002 Chapter one begins with a question.
Can agency be a scientific subject?
To me, the question, “What is science?”, must be addressed.
0003 Scientific inquiry involves a judgment within a judgment.
0004 Okay, then what is a judgment?
A judgment is a triadic relation containing three elements: relation,what is and what ought to be. When each of these three elements uniquely associates to one of Peirce’s categories, then the judgment becomes actionable. Actionable judgments unfold into category-based nested forms.
What am I talking about?
Consult A Primer on The Category-Based Nested Form and A Primer on Sensible and Social Construction, available at smashwords and other e-book venues.
0005 Here is a diagram of judgment as a triadic relation.
A relation (belonging to one category) brings what ought to be (belonging to another category) into relation with what is (belonging to the one remaining category). Peirce’s three categories are firstness, secondness and thirdness. Firstness is the monadic realm of possibility. Secondness is the dyadic realm of actuality. Thirdness is the triadic realm of normal contexts, mediations, judgments, sign-relations, and so forth.
0006 If scientific inquiry involves a judgment within a judgment, then the larger judgment is called the Positivist’s judgment. A positivist intellect (relation, thirdness) brings an empirio-schematic judgment (what ought to be,secondness) into relation with the dyad, a noumenon [and] its phenomena (what is, firstness).
Here is a diagram.
0007 In regards to the relation, the positivist intellect has a rule. Metaphysics is not allowed.
0008 What is “metaphysics”?
Aristotle proposes four causes: material, efficient, formal and final. The first two are (more or less) physical. The second two are (more or less) metaphysical. So, the second two causes are ruled out in the seventeenth century by the mechanical philosophers of northern Europe.
0009 Of course, ruling out formal and final causes truncates material and efficient causalities. Imagine a material cause (such as the flow of ink onto a piece of paper) without its formal cause (the piece of paper will then be folded and put into an envelope). Imagine an efficient cause (the role of glue in sealing an envelope) without its final cause (the envelope will be put in the mail).
So, the rule of the positivist intellect has the effect of truncating physical material and efficient causalities from their metaphysical companion causalities. The positivist intellect is assigned to the category of thirdness, the realm of normal contexts.
0010 In regards to what ought to be, the empirio-schematic judgment belongs to the category of secondness (the realm of actuality), even though it obviously belongs to the category of thirdness, because judgments are triadic relations. In other words, to think in terms of the Positivist’s judgment, one must disregard the obvious and regard the empirio-schematic judgment as an exercise in the realm of actuality, if that makes any sense.
0011 It may help to consider the empirio-schematic judgment as a tool for producing scientific models. Disciplinary language (relation, thirdness) brings mathematical and mechanical models (what ought to be, secondness) into relation with observations and measurements of phenomena (what is, firstness).
Here is a picture.
These figures are initially constructed in Comments on Jacques Maritain’s Book (1935) Natural Philosophy, by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues.
0201 The book before me is Semiotic Agency: Science Beyond Mechanism, by biosemioticians Alexei Sharov and Morten Tonnnessen. The book is published in 2021 by Springer and logs in at volume 25 of Springer’s Series in Biosemiotics. The editors of this series have Razie Mah’s permission for use of following disquisition, with attribution of said blogger.
Part III concerns theoretical considerations, addressing the headliner question.
Here is a list of the chapters, along with their titles.
Each title labels a labor of biosemioticians.
0202 So far, from Part I, Sharov and Tonnessen propose a philosophical dyad that serves as an overlay for the noumenon of biosemiotics. The authors’ proposed noumenon constitutes what is for the Positivist’s judgment and contains what all biosemiotic phenomena have in common.
This is significant.
0203 The Positivist’s judgment is constructed, starting in the 1600s, by mechanical philosophers. Mechanical philosophers aim to bracket out metaphysics, in favor of models based on observations and measurements.
So, what is science?
0204 Comments on Jacques Maritain’s Book (1935) “Natural Philosophy” shows that the scholastic ideation of three styles of abstraction comes close to a satisfying answer. But, no one can capitalize on that answer until a hidden knot is unraveled. A knot? Two judgments are entangled. This becomes clear when the abstractions are pictured as elements of judgment.
0205 The following diagram of the Positivist’s judgment is a satisfying way to portray what the mechanical philosophers created in the 1600s and what Kant corrected in the late 1700s.
In 2025, no definition of science compares to this diagram.
0206 In the Positivist’s judgment, the positive intellect (relation, thirdness) brings the empirio-schematic judgment (what ought to be, secondness) into relation with the dyad, a noumenon [cannot be objectified as] its phenomena (what is, firstness).
In the empirio-schematic judgment, disciplinary language (relation, thirdness) brings mathematical and mechanical models (what ought to be, secondness) into relation with observations and measurements of phenomena (what is,firstness).
0207 Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) forces natural scientists to concede that they investigate the observable and measurable facets of the thing itself. Plus, their observations and measurements cannot fully objectify the subject of inquiry.
0208 Over the next two centuries (1800s and 1900s), scientists promote their successful models, saying, “Our models are more illuminating than the thing itself. Indeed, our models can take the place of the noumenon. Once that happens, then our models can be objectified by their phenomena. Observations and measurements validate the successful model.”
The academic laboratory sciences are born. For example, a chemistry laboratory and its accompanying lecture belong to the laboratory science of chemistry. In contrast, the science of chemistry is the study of natural processes, that is, things themselves. The key to science is to make an observation and then explain it. The model is an explanation, rather than the thing itself.
0222 With that said, here is a quick wrap-up of the four chapters in Part III.
For chapter six, Sharov and Tonnessen’s noumenal overlay conceptualizes semiotic agency.
For chapter seven, semiotic agency is considered an actuality2. In order to understand an actuality2, the actuality2 must have a normal context3 and potential1.
0223 Here is the nested form for semiotic agency2.
Semiotic agency2 presents a sign-relation as a dyadic actuality. This is shown in Part I.
Semiosis2 does not occur without an agent3 and the possibility of ‘significance’1.
0224 For chapter eight, the evolution of agents3 and the possibility of ‘significance’1 proceeds in tandem with the evolution of semiotic agency2.
0225 For chapter nine, phenomenology serves as a precursor to biosemiotics, just as the social sciences of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries serve as intimations of phenomenology.
0226 Without a doubt, Sharov and Tonnessen build upon the insights of philosophers writing a century earlier, as seen in two of Razie Mah’s e-books: Comments on Jacques Maritain’s Book (1935) Natural Philosophy and Comments on Nicholas Berdyaev’s Book (1939) Spirit and Reality. Both Maritain and Berdyaev are interested in understanding the nature of scientific inquiry. And now, their works inform biosemioticians.
0001 In 2017, the author publishes a book, in Polish, with the English title, “The Metaphysics of Relation: At the Basis of Understanding the Relations of Being”. This article slices out one topic among many.
Thomas Aquinas uses the Latin term, relationes secundum dici, in ways that lead to a variety of interpretations. Consequently, the complete title of this work is “The Specificity of Secundum Dici Relations in St. Thomas Aquinas’ Metaphysics”. The article appears in Studia Gilsoniana 12(4) (October-December 2023), pages 589-616.
0002 I know that this article is scholarly, because the summary (abstract) appears at the end of the text.
0003 Why does this article capture my attention?
The term translates into relations (relationes) according to (secundum) speech (dici)… er… talk (dici).
I don’t think the Romans have a word for forms of talking other than speech.
They are so civilized.
0004 The term applies to various questions, such as when a pagan calls his god, “Lord of the heavens”, as well as the relation between matter and form, the relation between accident and substance, qualities of things, one’s orientation in labeling one side of an auditorium “right” or “left”, and so. These are just samples. Duma presents five cases in detail.
0005 The dici term contrasts to a similar term, relationes secundum esse.
The latter translates into relations (relationes) according to (secundum) existence (esse)… er… esse_ce (esse).
Esse_ce?
Esse_ce is a written play on the Latin term, esse.
Esse_ce is the complement to essence.
Whatever has esse_ce also has essence. Whatever has essence also has esse_ce.
0006 Those two statements sound like relationes secundum esse even though they may be relationes secundum dici.
Why?
The relation between esse_ce and essence is another way to state the relation between matter and form.
0007 Plus, the relation between matter and form is an exemplar of Peirce’s category of secondness, the dyadic realm of actuality (that contrasts with thirdness, the triadic realm of normal contexts, and firstness, the monadic realm of possibility).
Secondness consists of two contiguous real elements. For Aristotle’s hylomorphe, the real elements are matter and form. The contiguity is not named. However, a name stands ready-at-hand. That name is “substance”. So, I can take the word, “substance”, and place it in brackets (for notation), to arrive at the following figure.
0008 Now, my interest in Duma’s article begins to clarify.
The relation between matter and form is a relation where the terminus of the relation is a word, so to speak, that denotes either the presence (matter) or the shape (form) of a thing. But, it does not denote a thing (which expresses both esse_ce and essence).
The same goes for the creature calling his creator, “master”.
When I watch the ritual proclamation, I encounter two real elements, the creature and the proclaimed word. I must figure out the contiguity between these two real elements. Both real elements are locked in a literal relationes secundum dici (a relation according to talk).
So, I place my guess into the slot for contiguity.
0009 Because Aristotle’s hylomorphe is a premier example of Peirce’s secondness, the creature [calling Creator] aspect of the dyad carries the feel of matter [substance], esse_ce, or “existence”. Also, the [calling Creator] “Master” aspect carries the feel of [substantiating] form or essence.
May I go as far to say that much of Aquinas’s philosophy carrries the feel of matter [substance] form, even as Aquinas transcends the esse_ce and essence of Aristotle’s philosophy in an intellectual flight towards a recognition that is so… so… divine?
God is Substance.
God is the contiguity between all real elements in Peirce’s secondness.
0010 According to John Deely’s massive book, Four Ages (2001 AD), Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) is an important waystation between St. Augustine (354-430), who poses the question of sign-relations, and John of St. Thomas (John Poinsot (1589-1644)), who finally and correctly identifies signs as triadic relations.
Aquinas mentions relatives in his discourses on various theological and philosophical questions and disputes. The diciand esse relations stand out. They are are similarly worded. The formula is relationes secundum X, where X is either esseor dici. Esse relations pose few difficulties. Dici relations lead to confusion and debate.
0011 Here is a table listing some of the characteristics of each.
0012 In this examination, I have already brought Duma’s article into relation with one aspect of Peirce’s philosophical schema.
I hope that no one is surprised.
The next step adds another layer and that may take the reader off guard.
0119 The conceptual-flow apparatus of A,B,&C also applies to Peirce’s category of firstness as explicit matter (A).
0120 An explicit definition of firstness (B) stands as form in the dicey bucket, then as matter in the esse bucket.
In the esse bucket, dici (speech-alone talk acting as hand-talk) relates to whatever follows the logics of inclusion and allows contradictions.
0121 Rather than giving another example, I proceed to section four, where the author formulates how we should understandrelationes secundum dici.
Since this examination is already disruptive, let me proceed to some suggestions that sort of correspond to the author’s points and some that do not.
0122 First, let go of the distinction between categorical and transcendental. Even though the distinction is helpful, it does not appear to be critical to the speculations at hand.
0123 Second, all dici relations have two termini, the relation itself (portrayed as a hylomorphic dyad consistent with Peirce’s definition of secondness) and the elements that go into the relation (for Aristotle’s hylomorphe, “matter” and “form”, and for the dici relation, “dici” and “relationes“).
0124 Third, as soon as relationes secundum X (where X = esse or dici) is formulated as a dyad in the realm of actuality, the relation is subject to the laws of contradiction and noncontradiction. The label for the contiguity is placed within brackets for clear notation. The contiguity’s label is selected on the basis that [it] minimizes contradictions between the two real elements.
[Secundum] may be regarded as a contiguity that minimizes contradictions.
0125 Fourth, relationes secundum X (where X = esse or dici) is an actuality2. A normal context3 and potential1 are required to attain understanding. An entire (filled-in) category-based nested form associates to understanding. Understanding encompasses the three distinctly different logics of thirdness, secondness and firstness.
In hominin evolution, our genus adapts to the potential of triadic relations, including “understanding”, defined as “the completion of a category-based nested form”. Implicit abstractions produce complete nested forms holistically (that is, without explicit articulation of the three elements). Hand-talk favors implicit abstraction.
Explicit abstractions may articulate elements within a relation, by using the purely symbolic labels of speech-alone talk. At the same time, the conceptual-flows of A,B,&C suggest that speech-alone talks engages implicit abstraction (and visa versa).
Nonetheless, A and C are not precisely the same relationes, even though they are contiguous with B, dici.
Nor, are A and C the same dici, even though they are contiguous with B, relationes.
0126 Fifth, what does [secundum] (translated as [according to]) in relationes secundum X (where X = esse or dici) imply?
Secundum compares to substance, in Aristotle’s hylomorphe of “matter [substance] form”.
Secundum also associates to either implicit abstraction or explicit abstraction, depending on the dyad.
Secundum entangles the distinction between categorical and transcendental relations, for those who cannot let go (see first point).
0127 Sixth, Peirce’s diagrams allow an inquirer to consider labels (from explicit abstractions) within a visual framework (that coheres with implicit abstraction).
0128 This examination adds value to Tomasz Duma’s contribution to our current appreciation of relationes secundum X,by suggesting that the philosophies of Aristotle, Aquinas and Peirce are (1) congruent and (2) illuminate cognitive features of both our current Lebenswelt as well as the Lebenswelt that we evolved in.
0129 Furthermore (3), this congruence allows contemporary philosophers to consider the difference between explicitly abstracted relations that act as matter to dici (speech-alone talk)as form and implicitly abstracted relations that act as form to dici (hand talk)and esse asmatter.
Now, that is one complicated “furthermore”.
0130 Oh, one more “furthermore”!
Recall that Duma gives five cases where relatives appear in the writings of Thomas Aquinas.
In this examination, I also provide five examples for relationes secundum X.
The Oldowan stone tool is a case for X=esse.
The hand-talk gesture-word, [RAVEN], is a case for X=dici (hand talk).
[WOLF][FINGER] is a case for X=dici (hand talk) and then X=dici (speech-alone talk).
“Ravenous chairperson”, “cushy job” and “drought” are cases for X=dici (speech-alone talk).
“A bridge that meets code” is a case for X=dici (speech-alone talk).
0131 Is this what the author anticipated when he sent his article for publication?
I suppose not.
0132 Okay, the author may chuckle during the course of this examination, as it tracks from Aquinas’s relatives straight into a key question concerning human evolution.
Why is our current Lebenswelt not the same as the Lebenswelt that we evolved in?
Are relationes secundum dici integral to an answer to this question?
What if.
0133 Indeed, laughter is an appropriate response.
Who would have guessed that Aristotle, Aquinas and Peirce, all strangely brilliant yet incomplete philosophers, are (inadverently) in the business of illuminating differences between who we are and who we evolved to be?
0134 My thanks to Tomasz Duma for his article on this very intriguing topic.
0001 On August 14, 2024, Razie Mah, the blogger and author of The Human Niche, An Archaeology of the Fall and How To Define the Word “Religion, releases an e-book, titled “Exercises in Artistic Concordism“.
Concordism is harmony between religion and science, particulary, the biblical origin stories and evolutionary history. Concordism attempts to build a bridge. But there is always a problem.
0002 According to current interpretations of these matters, either religion or science has to give.
Enter semiotics. Semiotics is the study of sign-relations. Sign-relations are triadic relations. Triadic relations? Thirdness (the triadic realm of normal contexts) brings secondness (the dyadic realm of actuality) into relation with firstness (the monadic realm of possibility).
0003 What if Genesis One is a sign of the evolutionary record?
If one reads the Creation Story through the lens of Charles Peirce’s typology of natural signs, then each day of creation offers icons, indexes and symbols of a corresponding epoch. The days, like pearls, string perfectly onto the evolutionary record. The aesthetic correspondence is beautiful to behold.
0004 What has to give?
The interpretation that the Creation Story is itself the revelation? Perhaps, Genesis One records a revelation. That means there is a visionary, which brings up the question. How do we (as the ones who will hear the words of the vision) evolve to be who we are created to be? We are created to recognize the signs of God. What does this mean?
And, what if the stance that the Creation Story is a vision gives us ways to answer these questions?
0005 What else has to give?
Our theoretical formulation of human evolution? Yes, there is more to our evolution than fossils and genetics. What if, as the Genesis text indicates, our current Lebenswelt is not the same as the Lebenswelt that we evolved in? What if there is a cultural twist in recent prehistory?
0006 If one reads the awkward textual transition between the Creation Story and the stories of Adam and Eve as discontinuity, then one may wonder why all the written origins stories of the ancient Near East portray the origin of humans as a recent event. Humans are created, de novo, by differentiated gods.
Why can’t any of the civilizations of the ancient Near East see past a time horizon that an anthropologist may place, say, at the start of the Ubaid archaeological period of southern Mesopotamia?
Why can’t these ancient civilizations see the Lebenswelt that we evolved in?
These queries lead to a much more inflammatory question. Why is our current Lebenswelt not the same as the Lebenswelt that we evolved in?
Imagine the answer to that one!
0007 Today, civilized folk are abuzz about the coming singularity. What if it is not the first?
Uh oh, the first singularity is a scientific hypothesis that harmonizes a cultural twist in human evolution with the stories of Adam and Eve.
0008 Both religious appreciations of the text and scientific blind-spots must transform if there is to be concord.
Plus, that concord will be neither religious nor scientific.
0644 The full title of the book before me is Theistic Evolution: A Contemporary Aristotelian-Thomistic Perspective(Cambridge University Press: Cambridge: UK). The book arrives on my doorstep in October 2023. The copyright is dated 2024.
How time flies.
0645 This examination builds on previous blogs and commentaries.
Here is a picture.
0646 A quick glance backwards is appropriate.
Tabaczek’s story begins in the waning days of the Age of Ideas, when the Positivist’s judgment once thrived.
0647 The Positivist judgment holds two sources of illumination. Models are scientific. Noumena are the things themselves. Physics applies to models. Metaphysics applies to noumena. So, I ask, “Which one does the positivist intellect elevate over the other?”
The answer is obvious.
So, the first part of the story is that the positivist intellect dies, and lives on as a ghost (points 0001-0029).
0648 Tabaczek buries the positivist intellect and places the two sources of illumination against one another. It is as if they reflect one another.
But, the two sources also have their advocates.
In Emergence, Tabaczek argues that models of emergence require metaphysical styles of analysis.
In Divine Action and Emergence, he sets out to correct metaphysical emanations reflecting scientific models of emergence. It is as if these emanations are reflections of science in the mirror of theology. Intellectuals inspired by science want to see ‘what is’ of the Positivist’s judgment in the mirror of theology. But, note the difference between the picture of the Positivist’s judgment and the two hylomorphes in Tabaczek’s mirror (points 0039-0061).
0649 Why do I mention this?
In the introduction of the book before me, Tabaczek discusses his motivations. He, as a agent of theology, wants to exploit an opportunity. That opportunity is already present in the correction that he makes to what an agent of science sees in the mirror of theology (pictured below).
0650 What an opportunity!
Tabaczek offers the hope of a multidimensional, open-minded, and comprehensive (say nothing of comprehensible) account of evolutionary theory.
How so?
The positivist intellect is dead. The positivist intellect ruled the Positivist’s judgment with the maxim, “Metaphysics is not allowed.”
0651 Now that the positivist intellect is dead, the two illuminations within the former Positivist’s judgment may transubstantiate into the realm of actuality and become two hylomorphes, standing like candles that reflect one another in Tabaczek’s mirror.
Tabaczek, as an agent of theology, witnesses how a scientist views himself in the mirror of theology. The scientist sees the model as more real than the noumenon (the thing itself, which cannot be objectified as its phenomena). Indeed, the scientist projects ‘what is’ of the Positivist’s judgment into the mirror of theology.
0652 Tabaczek wants to project his philosophical construction of the noumenon (in concert with its dispositions and powers, as well as its matter and form) into the mirror of science.
But, I wonder whether any agent of science is willing to stop listening to the ghost of the positivist intellect long enough to discern what theologians project into the mirror of science.
0653 Yes, Tabaczek’s inquiry is all about optics.
0654 So, who are the players involved in the intellectual drama of Tabaczek’s mirror.
Tabaczek identifies three.
To me, there must be four.
0655 The first is the agent of science. The scienceagent is the one that makes the models. Two types of scienceagent stand out in the study of biological evolution: the natural historian and the geneticist.
0656 The second is the agent of theology. Tabaczek limits theologyagents to experts in Aristotle (384-322 B.C.) and Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274 A.D.).
In a way, this self-imposed limit is a handicap, since Aristotle and Aquinas philosophize long before Darwin publishes On The Origin of Species (1859).
In another way, this self-imposed limit is a blessing, since it provides me with an occasion for examining his argument from the framework of Charles S. Peirce (1839-1914). According to the semiotician and Thomist John Deely (1942-2017), Peirce is the first postmodern philosopher. Peirce is also a co-discoverer of the triadic nature of signs, along with the Baroque scholastic (that is Thomist) John Poinsot (1589-1644), otherwise known as John of Saint Thomas.
Peirce’s semiotics begins where Baroque scholasticism leaves off.
0657 The third is the image that the scientist projects into the mirror of theology. I label this image: theologymirror, in contrast to scienceagent. The theologyagent can see the image in theologymirror, but is not the source of that image. I have already shown the initial image that the agent of science sees in the mirror of theology. I have also noted that Tabaczek aims to correct that projection.
0658 The fourth is the image that the theologian casts into the mirror of science. I label this image: sciencemirror, in contrast to theologyagent. The scienceagent can see the image in sciencemirror, but is not the source of that image. I have already indicated that the scienceagent (more or less) does not care what is in sciencemirror, because the ghost of the positivist intellect whispers in the ear of scienceagent, “All that metaphysical stuff is completely unnecessary.”
0331 My sudden turn to semiotics does not occur in Tabaczek’s text.
Such is the examiner’s prerogative.
At this point, I stand at the threshold of section 1.3.4, almost precisely in the middle of the book.
My commentary on this book is significant.
Shall I review?
I represent the Positivist’s judgment as a content-level category-based form and discuss how it might be situated (points 0155 to 0184).
I suggest how reductionists can game emergent phenomena. Plus, I follow Tabaczek back to the four causes (points 0185 to 0239).
I present a specific example of an emergent phenomenon, building on the prior example of a hydrogen-oxygen fuel cell. Then, I return to Deacon’s general formula for emergence (points 240 to 0276).
Finally, I examine Tabaczek’s “philosophical history of panentheism” up to the section on Hegel (points 0277 to 0330).
0332 These are notable achievements.
But, my commentary is not more significant than Tabaczek’s text.
At this point, it is if I look through Tabaczek’s text and see something moving, something that catches my eye. It is not for me to say whether it is an illusion or a registration. It is enough for me to articulate what I see.
0333 At this point, I draw the veil on Razie Mah’s blog for April and May of 2024 and enter the enclosure of Comments on Tabaczek’s Arc of Inquiry (2019-2024), available at smashwords and other e-book venues. Comments will cover the rest of Part Two of Divine Action and Emergence. June 2024 will look at the start of Tabaczek’s next book, Theistic Evolution and Comments will complete the examination.
My thanks to Mariusz Tabaczek for his intellectual quest.
0334 But, that is not to say that I abandon Tabaczek’s text.
No, my slide into sign-relations is part of the examiner’s response.
This occurs in Comments.
There is good reason to wonder whether the response is proportionate.
0001 Philosophers enamored of Aristotle and Aquinas tend to make distinctions. So, what happens when such philosophers wrestle with modern science as it confronts the realness of apparently irreducibly complex systems, such as um… hydrogen-fuel cells and the Krebs cycle, which serves as the “fuel cell” for eukaryotic cells?
On the surface, Tabaczek fashions, yet does not articulate, a distinction between… hmmm…
0002 Consider a sentence, found on page 273 of Emergence, midway in the final chapter, seven, saying (more or less), “I hope that my re-interpretation of downward causation and emergent systems, in terms of old and new Aristotelianism, will help analytical metaphysicians sound more credible to scientists and philosophers of science, who employ, analyze and justify methodological reductionism.”
….what?
Philosophers of science and analytialc metaphysicians?
0003 Philosophers of science attempt to understand the causalities inherent in the ways that each empirio-schematic discipline applies mathematical and mechanical models to observations and measurements of particular phenomena. In terms of Aristotle’s four causes, their options are few. Science is beholden to material and efficient causalities, shorn of formal and final causation. So, they end up going in tautological circles. What makes a model relevant? Well, a model accounts for observations and measurements of phenomena. What are phenomena? Phenomena are observable and measurable facets of their noumenon. What is a noumenon?
Ugh, you know, the thing itself.
If I know anything about the Positivist’s judgment, then I know this. Science studies phenomena, not their noumenon.
Everybody knows that.
Except, of course, for those pathetic (analytical) metaphysicians.
0004 …what?
A noumenon and its phenomena?
0005 Tautologies are marvelous intellectual constructions.
In a tautology, an explanation explains a fact because the fact can be accounted for by the explanation. For modern science, mathematical and mechanical models explain observations and measurements because observations and measurements can be accounted for by mathematical and mechanical models.
Scientific tautologies are very powerful. Important scientists ask for governments to support their empirio-schematic research in order to develop and exploit such tautologies… er… technologies. Philosophers of science tend to go with the flow, so they end up employing, analyzing and justifying the manners in which mathematical and mechanical models account for observations and measurements, along with other not-metaphysical pursuits. One must tread lightly. First, there is a lot of money on the line. Second, the positivist intellect has a rule. Metaphysics is not allowed.
0006 …hmmm…
Does Tabaczek offer a way out of the rut of not-metaphysics, without noticing that the rut is what distinguishes scientific inquiry from experience of a thing itself? Aristotle will tell me that the rut is not the same as the world outside the rut. The scientific world is (supposedly) full of mind-independent beings. Ours is a world of mind-dependent beings.
0007 …aha!
Now, I arrive at the yet-to-be-articulated distinction between what science investigates and what we experience.
For the modern philosopher of science, models are key. Disciplinary language brings mathematical and mechanical models into relation with observations and measurements of phenomena.
For the estranged modern metaphysician, the thing itself is key. The thing itself, the noumenon, gives rise to diverse phenomena, facets that are observable and measurable.
Consequently, the distinction that Tabaczek does not name looks like this.
