Summary of text [comment] page 35

Perhaps, we can label the gradation for sin: “grades of disgrace”; and the gradation for virtue: “grades of grace”.

Such grades may serve as models for human relationships.

[For example, the grades of disgrace for the relationship of matrimony might be “acting cold or quarreling” (venial); “adultery or public humiliation of partner” (mortal); and “divorce” (irreversible, the relationship is damned, leaving an undead remainder of legal action).

For example, the grades of grace for the same relationship may be “patience and attention” (inspiration); “having children” (co-creation with God); and “growing old together” (irreversible, the two are one flesh, leaving a living remainder of family).]

Summary of text [comment] page 35

Just as there is a gradation of venial, mortal, and impenitent (irreversible) for sin, there appears to be a gradation for freely accepting the covenant of God.  Basic moral acts accept an increase in grace.  Grace triumphs in the act of love that resembles the final option, the entrance to a mystical and supernatural life.

[Note the word “earn” is not used for grace.  One does not “earn” a particular will, unless “habituation” is “earning”.   For virtue, one struggles and accepts whatever inspiration comes along.  Grace may inspire conscience^free and train the dispositions.  In order to do so, it seems like grace would be an action, or an actuality inherent in action.

At the same time, the intersecting nested forms show that grace is not an actuality like money. Grace is not a commodity that can be earned and spent.  Thus, it seems that grace operates within the realms of mediation and possibility.  Grace inspires us to judge our acts according to think^divine.  Grace calls conscience^free.  In this, grace increases the likelihood of acts of virtue.

So far, the term “grace” is perplexing.]

Summary of text [comment] page 33 and 34

[Allow me to summarize.

Knowledge and will are categorical but cross the boundaries of the intersecting nested form.

Knowledge₃ encompasses both think^{group_or_divine}₃and law^essential₃.

Will₁ covers both conscience^specified₁ and dispositions₁.

Knowledge₃ may train the will­₁ through sinful or virtuous actions₂.

Knowledge₃ contextualizes action₂.  Action₂ situates the will₁.

“Knowledge₃^“ brings “action₂” into relation with “the possibilities inherent in the will₁”.  Action₂ emerges from will₁.

Knowledge of what is proper to partial goods comes from “think^divine and law^{see_the_consequences}” or “think^group and law^{explain_away_the_consequences}”.

The will that aids the training of the dispositions answers to a conscience^specified.

Training requires human action.]

Schoonenberg wrote that during this life, we grow interiorly and live deeper within the direction of our decisions, whether toward “love unto life” or “sin unto death”.  Yet, the influences of circumstances and the body cannot be dismissed, even in old age, even in dying.

Summary of text [comment] page 33 and 34

Schoonenberg emphasized that both knowledge and will are involved in the grade from venial sin, to mortal sin, and to final impenitence.

[Knowledge is not limited to think^{group_or_divine}, because, it may also be found on the natural philosophical axis.  Knowledge includes law^essential.

However, the gradation is important.

The interpellation of think^divine is still heard when the person commits venial sins.

The interpellation of think^divine becomes either a shout or a whisper when the person commits mortal sins.

The interpellation of think^divine is either soul-crushing thunder or a tiny gnawing whisper at the final impenitence. ]

Summary of text [comment] page 33 and 34

[Let me repeat that: Even though actuality has constrained possibility to the point where a disinterested observer may objectively label the person’s subjective patterns of behavior, the subject’s will cannot be completely determined.

By the way, this is the fatal flaw of Modern Identity Politics.

Identity politicians label a person’s conscience according to certain criteria (the expectation of objective patterns of subjective behavior).  They believe that identifying the “specified” in conscience^specified is all they have to do.  Once they know what think^group the person belongs to, that is all there is.

But that does not define the person, because there is always another think that interpellates the person.  Maybe, it is another think^group.  Maybe, it is think^divine.   The person is always divided until, of course, the final impenitence or the moment of total self giving.]

[Without a doubt, Schoonenberg wrestled with something that he could not fully explain. He did not have the categorical tools that I have 50 years later.

What was that something?

It was the way that parallel nested forms of the vertical axis of the intersecting nested forms address one another.

The nested forms of think^divine and think^group exclude the other.  At the same time, each nested form interpellates – calls – the person habituated to the excluded nested form.  Even though actuality has constrained possibility to the point where a disinterested observer may objectively label the person’s subjective patterns of behavior, the subject’s will cannot be completely determined.]

Summary of text [comment] page 33 and 34

[Eventually, a person habitually coheres to either think^group(sin(conscience^lacking)) or think^divine(virtue(conscience^free)).

At this point, we encounter an objective aspect in Schoonenberg’s argument.

Actuality (sin or virtuous acts) has constrained possibility (conscience) to a particular specification.  Technically, conscience^specified is possibility^{constrained_by_actuality}.

Conscience^specified is subjective^objective.]

Summary of text [comment] page 33

[Schoonenberg addressed two facets of sin and virtue.

The “subjective” facet concerns the habituation of the will. This calls to mind conscience and disposition in the intersecting nested forms.

Conscience^free and conscience^lacking associates to the “will” in the moral and religious sense of the term.

Dispositions also appear “willful” in the natural philosophical sense.

The human “will” then, broadly describes both aspects of possibility in the intersecting nested forms.

Actions emerge from the will.  Human actions situate the will (conscience^specified and dispositions).

Habitual actions change the will by increasing the likelihood of a particular configuration of conscience^specified and dispositions.  We become accustomed to certain environmental triggers.  We may seek out those circumstances because they tell us what we want to hear (for sin) or challenge us to overcome our selfish habits (for virtue).

In time, we may adopt a think^group or think^divine that consistently puts our actions into context and further habituates the will.]

Summary of text [comment] page 33

Let us look at those spontaneous appetites [dispositions] more closely.  They may be sensual (material) or spiritual (immaterial).  They substantiate the person as a mediating creature.

Mediation changes both the outside world and the creature.  So human action, as sin or virtue, changes both our world and our own persons.

How does human action change the world?

Every action is an event on its own, that is, an objective actuality independent of the mediator.  Every action occurs in circumstances and changes circumstances.  These changes may be labeled “objective”.

How does human action change the actor?

The person is distinct from circumstances, even as the person operates in circumstances.  The change in the person during human action is correspondingly “subjective”.

The terms “objective” and “subjective” thus become difficult to comprehend.  They depend on where one stands.]

Summary of text [comment] pages 32 and 33

Schoonenberg then wrote about will and an ascending series of venial sins, mortal sins, and final impenitence.

The will has to do with an intuition in this life about a future life.  The will makes choices in this life … and there comes a moment … a moment in dying … when the will and the choice become one  …

Free will works with the sensual appetites. The appetites spontaneously tend to partial goods.  They are able, like the sense knowledge to which they correspond, to push deeper decisions into the background.

[In terms of the intersecting nested forms, conscience^specified corresponds to free will and dispositions corresponds to appetite.

The dispositions focus the attention of the conscience onto partial goods (subjective knowledge) while pushing the deeper decisions (objective knowledge; think^{group_or_divine}) into the background.]