If “modern art” is “the object that occupies an empty space on a wall at the Museum of Art”, then, I suppose, there must be a reason for that empty space to be affiliated with “art”.  There must have been a “something” that once occupied that “empty space on the wall that orients the desires of art lovers”.

The “something” that “once occupied that empty space on the wall” has either been forgotten or placed under erasure, because not even the experts remember or acknowledge what that “something” was.

Similarly, if “Nothing” is “the object that that occupies the empty space in our heart of hearts”, then there must have been a “something” that once occupied “the empty space in our hearts of hearts”.

Similarly, the “something” that “once occupied the empty space in our heart of hearts” has either been forgotten or placed under erasure.

Perhaps, that forgetting and placing under erasure is scandalous.

Fortunately, or maybe unfortunately, anyone can superimpose ‘himself’ onto the point of transcendence, that is, onto the positive form of Nothing, even “a scoundrel on a rack” (49-52).  This parallels the way that a modernist “work”, by occupying an empty space on a wall in a “Museum of Art”, superimposes itself onto the placeholder for “art”, thereby becoming “art”.

Since any number of fools would sacrifice themselves for “art”, one cannot deny the necessity of experts; that is, of theoretical men (specially trained as to not appear to be co-opting the Platonic tradition), to ensure that the “objects” on display are never so evocative as to provoke impetuous action.

We cannot allow just anyone willy-nilly inadvertently superimposing ‘himself’ onto Nothing.  Only the anointed need apply.

Ironically, last blog described precisely how Girard depicts “conflictual mimesis”.  The rivalry itself becomes the “object that brings all into relation”.

Yet, from all appearances, the rivalry has no content.  The fight is over Nothing.

Thus, mimesis^constrained becomes mimesis^{unconstrained}.

But I am getting ahead of myself.

Secularists do not deny the triune God for nothing.  Or do they?

Can Nothing be worshipped (44-46)?

Does not “the positive form of Nothing” act as both necessity (the point of transcendence, the “object that brings everyone into relation through mimesis^constrained”, so that everyone imagines that “they want to sacrifice themselves for Nothing”, because they sense that everyone else holds the same desire) and impossibility (after all, their sacrifice will be for Nothing)?

That is to say: Does the positive form of Nothing act as both transcendence and inevitability?

Any reasonable expert will retort:

Why sacrifice if your sacrifice will be redeemed by Nothing?

The question even applies to manners (47):

Why have good manners when good manners are redeemed by Nothing?

The answer has to be:

Nothing is not nothing.  Or rather, “the positive form of Nothing” is “Everything”

By “everything”, I point to “some thing capable of stimulating mimesis^constrained”.

“The object that brings us all into relation” is both transcendent and inevitable.

The divide between the “secular” and the “sacred” is not a divide between “no religion” and “religion”.  It is a divide between two symbolic orders, that is, two “religions”.  This is confusing, since God appears to have been forgotten in secular writing.  Perhaps, another word for “forgotten” might be “under erasure”.

Beneath the surface of Rousseau’s ploy lurks a vital lesson:

“The object that brings the group into relation” both defines and is defined by a symbolic order, that is, an apparently closed set of symbols (that excludes other symbolic orders).

Alberg convincingly demonstrated that Rousseau’s symbolic order derived its authority from the exclusion of the Christian symbolic order.  Without the Christian symbolic order, Rousseau’s symbolic order would rattle apart.

Even if the secular experts disagree on what the object should be, they all agree on this: “The ‘Son of Man’ should not show his face in any bureaucratic office and disturb their expert delineations of the multitudinous objects that bring us all into … relation?  … no … ‘organization’ is a better word”.

As long as that possibility remains, Rousseau’s admirers will not have to ask for forgiveness, despite the consequences.  Oh, I meant to say, the corpses.

Of course, when people reacted negatively to Rousseau’s pontifications (44), they (not him) were the idiots, because they could not see how the symbolic order that Rousseau created not only eliminated the need to regard that “scoundrel who pretended to ‘sacrifice for us all’ by dying on the rack” as some “hero”, but provided civilization with the opportunity for individuals like himself – “experts”, so called – to rationally determine “the objects that bring everyone into relation”.

OK.  Perhaps, Nietzsche’s self-promotion was a little over the top.

How about the fall back position, where I know that I should sacrifice for some object, but step back, and weigh the consequences?

Meet Jacques Rousseau.

Who wants to sacrifice when one does not get the rewards or the credit for the sacrifice?

Well, at least my innate “knowing that I should sacrifice” means that I must be naturally good.  But heavens, one should not over-do it, like that nut-job fellow who got himself crucified (page 43).  Someone else – someone reasonable – should be in charge of the “object that brings everyone into relation”.

If so … ?

An ironic turn in mimesis occurred with the potentiation of civilization.

Mimesis^constrained was adaptive in the Lebenswelt that we evolved in. However, our current Lebenswelt is not the Lebenswelt that we evolved in.  Mimesis^{unconstrained} is so maladaptive that it produces the scapegoat mechanism.

A parallel ironic turn occurred with respect to referentiality in the passage from hand-speech to speech alone talk.  It is described in An Archaeology of the Fall.

Where does the vital lesson lead?  What question does It raise?

Nietzsche’s placement of himself as ‘object that brings all into relation’ by posing as both Dionysius and Socrates; that is, as both insane and reasonable; could only occur if Nietzsche hammered out a new specialization, a new language of theoretically aesthetic tragic drama.  Such an effort could only happen due to the purely symbolic qualities of speech alone talk.

To me, that means that Girard’s theory of mimetic rivalry applies primarily to the era of unconstrained complexity.

Consequently, I shall label it mimesis^{unconstrained}.

Now I can re-present the question that I started with:

Could there have been a different mimetic rivalry in the era of constrained complexity, that is, in the era that we evolved in (and that began to lose its mooring starting 7800 years ago)?

If so, I may label it mimesis^constrained?