0049 Deely begins chapter seven by noting that Baroque scholasticism concludes (around 1650-1700) and Peirce begins (around 1850-1900) with the same question, “What is the nature of signification?”

0050 Modern science does not help.

No scientist can put a sign-relation directly under a microscope.  But, a scientist can observe and measure one or two of the termini.  Often, the sign-vehicle and the sign-object (the proximate fundament) presents scientists with phenomena, which are duly measured and used to build models of sign-behavior.  Consequently, the sign-relation, the thing itself, can be put into a variety of boxes, each labeled “noumenon”, for each suite of phenomena produced by that sign-relation.

0051 After all, science does not worry about noumena.  It only observes and measures their phenomena.

Did I say that correctly?

0052 Deely notes that Kant makes a fine distinction between the term, “noumenon”, the intelligible aspect of things, and “Ding an sich” (German for “the thing itself”), the sensible aspect of things.

To me, this aside calls to mind a Cartesian version of Saussure’s sandwich.

So, in my book, “noumenon” and “the thing itself” coincide.

0053 Here is a twist.

According to ancient Greek philosophy and scholasticism, a thing should be both sensible and intelligible.

Does matter go with sensible?  Does intelligible associate to form?  

If they do then, oops, the big modern sandwich gets pressed into a panini.

0054 Charles Peirce calls the modern inquirer back to the approaches of the old philosophers, by saying that sign-vehicles cannot serve as phenomena that cause associated behaviors.  A stop sign does not cause a moving automobile to slow to a rolling standstill anymore than a fly causes a hygienist to swat it.  A stop sign represents the laws of the road.  A fly represents potential contamination and disease.

The term “represents” is a substitute for “stands for”.

Consequently, science-mavens propose variations and descriptions of the term, “stands for”, when they describe the nature of humans.  Humans are rational animals.  Humans are signifying creatures.  Humans are a symbolic species.  The list is long.

0055 Further confusion follows with the following set of statements.

I experience my world as subjective, since I embody the potential for sign-objects.

My world is subjective, since the world is the subject matter of my experiences.

I experience the world as objective, since my world is perfused with sign-vehicles.

Sign-objects are objective, because they are objects, not things.

We experience our world as intersubjective, because several of us can embody similar sign-objects in response to a single… um… subjective sign-vehicle.

Even though we may encounter the same sign-vehicle, we are not thinking precisely the same sign-object because we have different bodies.  However, the sign-objects that we are thinking have relational structures so similar that they may serve as one sign-vehicle.

So, our objective sign-objects become an intersubjective sign-vehicle.  

The resulting sign-object is suprasubjective.  The suprasubjective sign-object may be judged.  Indeed, the suprasubjective sign-object may even constitute a judgment.  So, our own judgments may be couched in suprasubjective frameworks, such as the dichotomy of true versus false or honest versus deceptive.

0056 Do I notice that there are two sign-relations in this set of statements?

There is a sign-relation that seems to be properly a sign-vehicle standing for a sign-object in regards to a sign-interpretant.

Then, there is sign-relation according to the human as a semiotic animal.   The Latins called this relation, “relatio secundum esse” (a relation according to esse_ce, where esse_ce describes, not the essence of, but the presence of humans).  I don’t know whether the sign-relation whose sign-vehicle is intersubjective precisely corresponds to the Latin term.  But, the possibility intrigues.

0057 In section 8.1, Deely discusses how triadic relations challenge scholastic philosophers who are trained to draw distinctions.

0058 The Latin scholastics faced great difficulties in regards to triadic relations, whether they recognized them or not.

First, Aristotle loves distinctions.  And Plato loves to transcend distinctions.  So, the Latins, who retain Platonic traditions through the loss of the Roman Empire and the rise of Christendom, have some difficulties with Aristotle, who enters the scene through translations of Arabic texts, booty from the Crusades.  Saint Thomas Aquinas brings the Aristotelian aspect of Christian philosophy up to speed in regards to reflecting on distinctions.

Second, it is not exactly obvious how to go from distinctions to triadic relations.  It’s like the old adage of blind men observing an elephant.  Their tactile-based reports describe different creatures.  But, the elephant is a single creature.

0059 Here are two distinctions that crop up in Deely’s discussion.

0060 The proximal fundament, what we see (hear, smell, taste or touch) and what we think we see has a contrast, the remote fundament, the person who does the seeing and thinking.

Ens reale is mind-independent being.  Ens rationis is mind-dependent being.  Ens rationis is also called “a being of reason”.

The scholastics start with these distinctions.  So, it is not so obvious how they are going to elucidate a triadic relation, where a sign-vehicle (SV) stands for a sign-object (SO) in regards to a sign-interpretant (SI).

0061 The following figure shows how each element of each distinction views the sign-relation.

0062 Note how the sign-interpretant (SI) spans the gap between ens reale and ens rationis.  The reason?  The SI is the ens reale that makes ens rationis possible.

0063 I could say that the two distinctions are “protosemiotic”, but that is only looking from the answer to the problem.

Surely, the intellectual journey from protosemiotic to semiotic is not obvious.

The logics of contradiction and non-contradiction apply to secondness.  When I hear the word, “reason”, I typically think of this type of logic.

0064 I suspect that the logics of contradiction and non-contradiction apply to fundamenta proxima and to ens reale.  I am not so sure about fundamenta remota and ens rationis.

So, calling humans “rational or reason-based animals” does not do the trick.

Neither does calling humans “irrational or superstitious animals”.

0065 For animals, specifying signs constitute a creatures’ Umwelt (or Significant World).  The content and situation level of a two-level interscope are joined when a subject, a content-level actuality₂, appears.

0066 Consider the howl of a wolf.

In the scholastic world, a howl_2a is subjective (the subject matter is a thing) and an image of a wolf_2b is objective (the object is not the thing, but is a thought about the thing).

Both play a role in a specifying sign-relation.  A specifying sign traverses the content and situation levels.

0067 If I am a sheep, I hear the howl_2a (SV) and immediately conjure a phantasm of a wolf_2b (SO) within the normal context_3b of “what does it mean to me?” (SI) arising from the potential of situating the howl_1b (SI).

In the modern world, the howl_2a is objective (that is, not dependent on who is hearing it).  Also, a phantasm of a wolf_2b is subjective (that is, dependent on who is thinking it).  

Surely, when it comes to the terms, “subject” and “object”, the modern world presents an inverse of the scholastic.

The locus of “the subject” has switched from the subject matter to the thinking thing.  The former locus is scholastic.  The latter is modern.

0068 Keep that in mind when I say that there seems to be a backflow from the situation to the content level.  The situation-level question_3b, “What does it mean to me?”, flows back into the content-level query_3a, “What is happening?”.

In scholastic terms, the objective flows back into the subjective.

0069 At the same time, if I am a sheep, the situation-level phantasm of a wolf_2b stands for a perspective-level question, “Where is my shepherd?”_2c, in regards to the normal context of sensible action_3c and the possibilities inherent in ‘protection’_1c.

0070 The attempt to make sense_3c of what it means to me_3b and what is happening_3a belongs to the sign-interpretant of an exemplar sign.  So does its_3c potential_1c.  An exemplar sign traverses the situation and perspective levels.  In the exemplar sign, the situation level is intersubjective (rather than objective) and the perspective level is suprasubjective (a relation that everyone can agree upon… or maybe… at least, hold in mutual regard and, in the best case, turns out to be true).

Here is a picture.

The specifying and exemplar signs are discussed in Comments on John Deely’s Book (1994) New Beginnings, by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues.

0071 The Lord is my shepherd.  I shall not want (Psalm 23).

In this case of the howl of a wolf, substitute the word, “fear” for “want”.

If I am a sheep, then (I suspect that) my shepherd has a bunch of rocks in his satchel, along with a sling to throw those rocks.  All it takes is one well-thrown rock to deter a wolf.

0072 Does this imply that the sign-object for the exemplar sign can become a sign-vehicle for another sign?

If so, then the sign-vehicle, asking, “Where is my shepherd?”_2c, stands for a sign-object, the actuality of a shepherd and his flock_2a, in regards to a sign-interpretant, where a normal context, saying that danger is happening_3a, arises from the potential that I need not fear_1a.

0073 This interventional sign is developed in Comments on Sasha Newell’s Article (2018) “The Affectiveness of Symbols”, by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues.

0074 Here is a picture.

0075 John Deely, during his time on Earth, serves as a shepherd, of sorts.  He always tries to keep the sheep together, but never really succeeds.  He is more an impresario than a shepherd, so when he says, “Hear my voice.”, one does not even need to be in the same room.  His flock includes semioticians, admirers, curious folk and a few Thomists, who love sheep analogies.  In the wings of his rag-tag coalition, wolves in sheep-clothing linger.

Deely preaches the specifying sign.  His inquiries exhibit the exemplar sign.  His behavior reminds me of the interventional sign.  If anyone lives life as a semiotic animal, Deely does.

0076 Deely is open to all comers, including doctors, scientists, pharmaceutical executives, shamans, fortune-tellers and Thomists.  Each is concerned with an instance of a sign relation, including symptoms, psychological and sociological causalities, drug-body and drug-mind interactions, spiritual wanderings, clues to future events, and, of course, the appropriateness of Thomas Aquinas for all applications.  Deely encourages each inquirer to consider their instances as examples of sign-relations and says, “See where that goes.”

0077 Here is Deely’s specifying sign.

0078 In Deely’s exemplar sign, topics for semiotics_2b (SV) stands for the triadic nature of signs, mediations, judgments and so on_2c (SO) in regards to a perspective-level normal context, asking “What can I learn?”_3c, arising from the potential of discovery_1c (SI).

Deely’s exemplar discovery is that the Baroque Scholastic, John Poinsot (writing around 1650 AD) arrives at the same definition of a sign-relation as Charles Peirce (writing in the 1850s AD).  This discovery couples the initiation of postmodernism (truly, not falsely, labeled) with the twilight of Thomistic (as well as other brands of) scholasticism.  Deely places the start of the modern Age of Ideas at 1650.  Deely dates the start of the Age of Triadic Relations with Peirce’s publication of his first list of categories in 1857.

0079 Here is Deely’s exemplar sign.

0080 In the book under examination, written midway between Deely’s publication of the monumental The Four Ages of Understanding in 2001 and his death in 2017, triadic relations_2c (SV) stands for the nature of humans_2a (SO) in regards to postmodern inquiry_3a arising from potential of ‘overcoming modern distinctions, such as the distinction between idealism and realism’_1a (SI).

0081 Here is my view of Deely’s interventional sign.

0082 Deely dies in 2017.  The flock has no clue as to the implications.

The wool-clad wolves say, “Enough of this.  We are weary of you encouraging this rag-tag flock of inquirers.  We are going to turn semiotics into an academic discipline and a profession.  In order to be a semiotician, certification will be required.”

0083 The specifying sign remains the same.  Find an instance_2a then explain that instance in terms of semiotics_2b.  

0084 The exemplar sign is where the teeth start to flash.  Each topic for semiotics_3b (SV) stands for an opportunity to develop disciplinary expertise_2a (SO) in regards to the normal context of an academic establishment_3c arising from the potential of ‘professionalism’_1c (SI).

The inspiration is not to make a discovery.  The ambition is to become professional.

0085 The interventional sign produces an incredible oddity.  Individual wolves are not sufficient.  They must team up into a single three-headed creature, a Cerebus, so to speak, who guards the passage to the underworld of success in academics.  One head is a gatekeeper.  One head edits publications.  One head hones the criteria for professional license.

The disciplinary language of semiotics_2c (SV) stands for an opportunity to publish in a “reputable” journal_2a (SO) in regards to the Cerebus_3a guarding the professional “credentials” of those seeking publication_1a (SI).  Should only those with postgraduate degrees in the preferred fields and from the preferred schools submit to the premier journals?

I wonder.

0086 Here is a picture of the interventional sign.

0087 The medieval scholastics identified the specifying and the exemplar signs.  They may have grasped something like the interventional sign.  But, the interventional sign becomes more and more apparent only recently, in the field of anthropology.  The interventional sign may be a post-modern and a post-scholastic discovery that touches base first, with the field of anthropology, as noted in Comments on Sasha Newell’s Article (2018) “The Affectiveness of Symbols”, by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues.

0088 Deely does not mention this sign in any of his books.

Why?

He lives it.

Deely is a semiotic animal.

0089 Today, Deely, from his place of rest, speaks in his publications.

In chapter eight, Deely reminds us that triadic relations allow for mistakes.

Why are mistakes important?

Mistakes offer opportunities for correction and development, including the slow realization of the implications of following a particular shepherd.

0090 Is it a mistake to regard Deely as a most entertaining and bombastic shepherd?

If the answer is yes, then the sheep must now be culled for professionalism by a three-headed dog.

If the answer is no, then the Cerebus of the Underworld of Semiotica will also pass, as it becomes more and more clear that humans are semiotic animals, which is what Deely and his flock are advocating all along.  Simply being humanmakes one into a semiotician.  

Certification is not required.

0091 In chapter eight, Deely evaluates the sign-relation in regards to premodern protosemiotic distinctions.  Distinctions vary according to category.

Two distinct normal contexts will either exclude or align.  For example, death and resting in peace are normal contexts that can exclude or align, depending on one’s perspective (and God’s suprasubjective judgment).

Two distinct actualities separate on the basis of one particular contradiction.  For example, living and dead are may refer to the same biological entity, suffering one or the other condition.

Two possibilities may be recognized as distinct, even though one cannot exist without the other.  For a scientific example, a noumenon cannot exist without its phenomena and phenomena cannot exist without their noumenon.

0093 Here are two distinctions that, for centuries, schoolmen thought actual.

0094 First, Deely notes that the sign-relation makes these distinctions “permeable”.  They start to leak into one another.  Indeed, not only does leakage occur within the distinctions, it occurs between the pairs of distinctions.

What does this imply?

Do both distinctions move from the category of secondness and into the category of firstness?

If so, then the distinction between fundamenta remota and proxima belongs to a single entity, as well as the distinction between mind-independent and mind-dependent being, as well as the distinction between fundaments and beings.

0095 Whoa!  Aristotelian distinctions may be relevant, but leaky?

Or does each distinction offer only a partial view of a single entity?

0096 Second, Deely claims that the sign-relation, in particular, and triadic relations, in general, are the only modes in which a finite mind can form.  Our minds embody sign-relations, in particular, and triadic relations, in general.

What a remarkable claim.  Biologists take note.  Here is a proposal concerning the human niche.  The human niche is the potential of triadic relations.

In this regard, Razie Mah presents three masterworks on the topic of human evolution: The Human Niche (with four accompanying commentaries), An Archaeology of the Fall (with accompanying  instructor’s guide) and How To Define the Word “Religion” (with ten accompanying primers).  These are available at smashwords and other e-book venues.

0097 How does anyone know when what is out there is real?

Wisdom will tell.  That is why the word, “philosophy” is Greek for the love of Sophia.  Sophia is the personification of wisdom.  

0098 Aristotle formulates his list of categories in order to specify ways in which a finite mind can verify independent existence.  This list contains features that a being of reason (ens rationis) would need to verify in its encounter with mind-independent being (ens reale).

0099 What does this imply?

Twenty-five centuries after Aristotle, a self-promoting psychoanalyst, Sigmund Freud, tells me.  Dreams are the fulfillment of unconscious wishes, desires and beliefs.

Consequently, Aristotle’s categories are dream-elements that allow the inquirer to… um… step out of his or her sleep-walking.

0100 The term, “relation”, appears on Aristotle’s list.

With this observation, Deely begins his discussion and spends the remainder of chapter eight, and all of nine, recounting how philosophers wrestle with this term, “relation”, for thousands of years.  Their contest concludes with the Baroque scholastic, John Poinsot.

0101 Here is the crux.

All the other terms in Aristotle’s list allows one to distinguish between substance (the way that matter substantiates form) and accidents (properties that do not exist in and of themselves, but in and of substantive beings).  A substantive being has the character of ens reale.  An accident is more like… well… something with the character of ens rationis.  It’s realness depends on someone noticing it.

0102 Deely attributes a long period of philosophical meandering to the distinction between substance and accident.  Flowers are substantive.  Bees are substantive.  What about the relation of flowers and bees?  Well, “relation” is on Aristotle’s list.  So, it must be substantive.  But, this relation is neither flower nor bee.  Perhaps, it is real if someone notices it.  Doesn’t that sound vaguely postmodern?  A text is real only in the reading.

0103 Here is another example.

Some common folk notice that, after throwing a soggy log onto a campfire, a salamander or two runs out.  Hmmm.  What is a schoolman to say to that?

It is the same problem as flowers and bees, with one more substance.  The fire is real.  The log is real.  The salamander is real.   Also, the relation is real.  But, this relation is real only because someone notices ‘something’ about the fire, the log and the salamander.

0104 The schoolman says the following.

The remote fundament is the person who sees the event.

The proximate fundament is the salamander and the fire.

The mind-independent being is the salamander, who runs right out of the fire… er… steaming log.

The mind-dependent being is the notion that salamanders are born from fire.

0105 The schoolmen have yet to figure out that their crucial distinctions actually describe a relation with three termini.

0106 Adding to this mix is the distinction between substance and accident.

Here, it helps to remember Aristotle’s foundational dyadic actuality.

0107 For the log and fire, the substance is the contiguity between matter and form.  That is straightforward.  For the salamander, its substance is “in esse” the fire, in so far as the fire substantiates the form of the salamander.

Consequently, the relation between the salamander and fire is “in esse“.  This relation belongs to ens reale, and conveys a sense of esse_ce (which is my way of Anglicizing the Latin term, “esse“).

Plus, the relation between the the salamander and the observer is “ad esse“, from the proximate fundament towards (in Latin, “ad”) the remote fundament.  This conveys a sense of ens rationis.

0108 What a mess!

Deely winds his way through the terminology of subjective (the subject is ens reale, mind independent being), objective(the object is ens rationis, an accident noticed by someone in regards to the subject) and intersubjective (the fact that someone notices ‘something’ about the subject is itself a mind-independent being).

0109 In the 1000s, schoolmen put ens reale front and center.  Why?  They want to distinguish ens reale from ens rationis.  The idea is to separate the subject from the object.

By the 1600s, the Baroque scholastics examine the intersubjective, the ens rationis (of the specifying sign) that inspires the ens reale (of the exemplar sign), while Descartes’ vision of a mechanical philosophy takes Northern Europe by storm.

0110 In section 8.3.3, still working towards the 1600s, Deely slows to a crawl.

The distinction between substance and accident veils the triadic sign-relation.

Things have or are substances.  The technical terms are esse, substantiated being (for me, esse_ce) and ens, being as being (regardless of substantiation).

Colors or adornments are accidents that depend on the subjectivity of a subject.  The technical term is in esse or depending on the esse_ce of another.  Esse_ce is equivalent to matter [substantiating].  Note that an adornment does not alter the essence, the [substantiated] form.

Sign-relations may depend on the subjectivity of a substance as one terminus.  But, um… it may also depend on the subjectivity of an accident.  The subjectivity of the sign-vehicle associates to ens reale.  The objectivity of the sign-objectis altogether confounding, because it is ens rationis.  It depends on someone noticing.  That someone serves as the ens reale that makes ens rationis possible.

0111 What is the substance of a sign relation?

The fact that the question confuses is no accident.

It is in esse, in so far as one terminus is indifferent to substance or accident, as long as there is a substance or accident.

It is ad esse, in so far as another terminus depends on someone noticing.  Plus, it does not care who that someone is.

0112 Let me return to the salamander business.

Let me play the role of a perplexed schoolman in (say) the early 1600s.  Europe is on fire, both metaphorically and literally.  Huge wars.  Weird weather.  Some rivers flood and other run dry.  Rumor has it that a dog is born with three heads. Gold and silver from the new continent drive Spanish aristocrats mad.  Like the protestants, the aristocrats think that money is a sign of God’s favor.  So, the time has come to go to war.

At least, Fernando Suarez’s books are best sellers.

0113 Then, there are reports of salamanders.  For centuries, salamanders stand for birth in fire in regards to observations at campfires.  Now, the mechanical philosophers from the north say that the claim is nonsense and superstition.

Ugh. Three items.  And, I only have two sets of applicable distinctions.

0114 What about salamanders?

Salamanders are things.  Things belong to ens reale.  Natural philosophy says, “Consider things in terms of two contiguous real elements, matter and form.”

0115 The form is the salamander. The matter must be fire.  The essence is substantiated form, that is, a real salamander dashing from a sizzling log.  The esse_ce is matter substantiating.  The presence of esse_ce in the thing produces a potential for ‘something inesse‘.  That ‘something’ associates to the proximate fundament, the observed sign.

Also, the fact that someone notices means that something in the actuality of matter has the potential to be noticed.  So, the presence of esse_ce in the thing produces a potential for ‘something adesse‘.  That ‘something’ associates to the remote fundament, the one who observes the sign.

0116 Here is a picture.

0117 The missing element_2b belongs to the remote fundament.

The missing element_2b is also ens rationis.

So, what do scholastics conclude, with the approbation of common folk?

Fire births salamanders_2b.  This is a kind of expression, in Latin, a species expressa.

0118 In the figure below, the sign-vehicle (SV), the sign-object (SO), and the sign-interpretant (SI) are labeled for the specifying sign (or, for scholastics, specifying extrinsic formal causality).

0119 At the start of chapter nine, Deely claims that triadic relations are the only modes of being that the finite mind can form by its properly cognitive activity.

This raises an awkward question, asking, “How do I know whether my finite mind agrees with any other?”

0120 Here, Deely makes a crucial point.  Objective is not enough.  My specifying sign-object is mine.  What about others?

After all, I am a sheep.  I worry about things like that.

0121 If everyone else experiences the same specifying sign-relation, and if we all share the same perspective, then I can assume that my objective sign-object is shared among subjects like myself (intersubjective). 

Now, the confusion between subjective and objective among moderns becomes a little clearer.  Moderns confound the specifying and exemplar signs.  Moderns relabel “intersubjective” as “subjective”, because the inquirer’s frame shifts from situating content (according to the specifying sign) to contextualizing situation (with the exemplar sign).

On top of that, they relabel the suprasubjective (or perspective) level as “objective”.

0122 So, does Descartes convert the exemplar sign into a specifying sign? 

Egads!

0123 Oh, I don’t want to step off that ledge.

So, let me back up and say that there must a perspective level (corresponding to Peirce’s thirdness) contextualizing a situation level (corresponding to Peirce’s secondness).

Here is a picture.

0123 According to Deely, there are two modes for a purely objective being, objective and intersubjective. 

The situation level is objective, with respect to the specifying sign, and intersubjective, with respect to the exemplar sign.

The specifying sign couples the content (SV) and situation (SO & SI) levels.

The exemplar sign couples the situation (SV) and perspective (SO and SI) levels.

0124 In 1500, everyone agrees that fire conjures salamanders.

By 1600, lots of people are asking, “Does the claim make sense?”

That question raises the potential of contextualizing the (to the modern academic, “subjective”, and to the postmodern scholastic, “intersubjective”) situation-level actuality, the species expressa that fire conjures salamanders_2b.

0125 At this point, the Baroque scholastics are going for broke.

0126 Plus, Rene Descartes is telling everyone who will listen, “Salamanders are not born in fire.”