Summary of text [comment] page 37

[However, I cannot stop there.  I can also wonder:

Does “intensity” also pertain to the horizontal nested form?

Consider these scenarios:

A: Think^group₃(x₂( conscience^lacking₁)) favors “x₂” that would be performed if “one denied the consequences of one’s actions” in regards to oneself, basically claiming that “law^essential does not apply to me”. The person ignores the consequences that may harm self (and possibly others).

Example, no one who windsurfs ever imagines drowning.

B: Think^group₃(x₂( conscience^lacking₁)) favors “x₂” that would be performed if “one denied the consequences of one’s actions in regards to others”, basically claiming that “law^essential does not apply to me”. The person ignores that others may suffer evil consequences.

Example, a vendor who rents a cracked windsurfing board to a novice.

C: Think^pro-object₁(x₂(conscience^pro-object₁) favors “x₂” where “one defines the consequences of one’s actions” (technically, law^denial), basically claiming that ‘law^essential conforms to my intentions or to my interpretation of what law^essential should be, especially when others imagine that they suffer consequences and complain’. In fact, the complaining person is beholden to think^anti-object ideologies and has false conscience^anti-object”.

Example, the lawyer defending the vendor who rented out a faulty board that led to the death of a novice windsurfer.]

Summary of text [comment] page 37

Venial and mortal sin are analogous.  They differ in intensity.

[One would think that, for mortal sin, the interpellation between the vertical nested forms of think^divine and think^group stops.

It does not.  It cannot.  Even when the occlusion of think^divine by a sovereign^infra think^pro-object appears complete, and the world seems to be swallowed in an inevitable doom, the guilt is palpable.

One would also think that, for saintly practices, the interpellation stops.

It does not.  It cannot.  The dispositions always are falling in love with some good, some partiality, that undermines impartiality.  Buddhism developed a symbolic order devoted to removing the veils of illusion.  But, as any devout Buddhist will tell you, few have ever removed the last partiality.

Then why do the Ideological Pervert and the Buddhist Saint both come across as totally intense?

To me, “the diminution of interpellation between the two primal vertical nested forms” resonates with the image of “intensity”.

Both venial and mortal sin diminish (or or exacerbate) the call of think^divine.  They are analogous in this way.  They differ in intensity.]

Summary of text [comment] page 37

Many theologians speak of an analogy between venial and mortal sin.

Venial and mortal differ in intensity.

[One would think that “gravity₂” and “intensity” would be synonyms.  They are not.  “Gravity” implies two realms.  “Intensity” implies one.

So I may ask: Is there an analogy or a commonality to venial and mortal sins?

Are mortal sin and venial sin different species of the same genus?

The idea of “kind” draws my imagination to the exclusive yet interpellating vertical nested forms in the intersecting nested forms.

Think^group₃( human action₂(conscience^lacking₁)) and think^divine₃( human action₂(conscience^free₁)) have the same structure, even though they are exclusive yet interpellating.

Does this make them of the same kind?]

[Here is the scenario for “gravity” that relies on the interscoping nested forms:

Knowledge₃( human action₂( subject₁))

Will₃( subject₂( object₁))

If I consider “gravity₂” as the “realm of actuality₂ in tension with the intersubjective₃ and the subjective­₁” then “gravity₂” precisely reflects “the aspect of human action₂ corresponding to the subject₂”.

Does this definition of “gravity₂” accord with the Dutch logic table?

It seems so.

The more grave₂ the sin or virtue, the more imprisoned or free the subject becomes.]

[What about the other question: What about the idea of “gravity”?

I can see two scenarios.

Here is one that relies on the polarized form:

Knowledge₃₍₂₍₎₎ Will₂₍₁₎

If I consider “gravity₂” as the “realm of actuality₂ in tension with the intersubjective₃ and the subjective­₁” then “gravity₂” precisely reflects “the aspect of human action₂ corresponding to the poles of knowledge₃ and will₁”.

“Gravity₂” is “that feature of human action₂ that must be intersubjectively contextualized₃ as knowledge₃”.

“Gravity₂” is also “that feature of human action₂ that reifies conscience₁ and disposition₁; that is, the will₁”.]

[The previous blog provided some insight into the normal context of the second, adjacent lower nested form.

In 1.5AA4 I wrote:

Normal context₃( subject₂( object₁))

Context of attraction, repulsion or neutrality₃( subject who desires₂( object of desire₁))

In 1.5AB1 I wrote:

Will₃( subject₂( object₁))

So these must be parallel.]

Summary of text [comment] pages 36 and 37

[Let me try to locate “gravity” once again.

Allow me to review the nested forms:

The most general are:

Thirdness( secondness( firstness))

Normal context₃( actuality₂( possibility₁))

Looking at the earlier blogs, I have:

Knowledge₃( human action₂( will₁))

And that can be turned into a polarized form:

Knowledge₃( acts of knowledge₂ acts of will₂( will₁))

Knowledge₃₍₂₍₎₎ will₂₍₁₎

Also, that can be turned into interscoping nested forms:

Knowledge₃( human action₂( subject₁))

Will₃( subject₂( object₁))]

[Let me write the full twist as two interscoping nested forms.

The higher level form is:

One subject contextualizes another subject’s actions₃( objective human actions₂( subject₁))

Knowledge₃( human action₂( subject₁))

The lower level form is:

Context of attraction, repulsion or neutrality₃( subject who desires₂( object of desire₁))

Normal context₃( subject₂( object₁))

Both the upper and lower nested forms have the qualities of:

Intersubjective₃( objective₂( subjective₁))

So, we should look into this second, adjacent lower level normal context.

And, what happened to to the idea of “gravity”?]

[There is a certain irony to the fact that the term “objective” covers two very different concepts.  So now, let me see whether I can accomplish the full twist to the claim:

Knowledge₃ is “intersubjective”.

Well, why not “interobjective”?  After all, there are two objects.

Then I can counter: There are also two subjects, each perceiving an “object”.

Knowledge₃ brings these two subjects, with their respective objects, into a nested form.

“Knowledge₃” contextualizes “human action₂“.

Human action₂ is the objective behavior of a subject₁.

“Knowledge₃” brings “objective human action₂” into relation with “the possibilities inherent in the subject₁“.

These possibilities concern some object perceived by subject₁.  That object, for the subject₁, must be actual on a different (interscoping, adjacent lower) nested form.

That suggests that there may be “some normal context₃” that brings “the subject₂” into relation with “the possibilities inherent in the (perceived) object₁“.

This “normal context₃“, plus knowledge₃, yields two subjects and two objects. Hence, in this case, thirdness is “intersubjective₃” and “interobjective₃“.

How twisted was that?]

[The term “will₂₍₁₎” labels the emergence of “objective” human action₂ (from the point of view of knowledge) from “subjective” realms₁ (from the point of view of the will, which operates with some “objective” in mind.  Plus, that “objective” may reflect the normal contexts of the intersecting nested forms).]