[Humans innately frame both moral and natural evil in terms of moral evil.

Scientists intuitively understand this. In order to communicate the mechanisms of a natural subject, they feel compelled to explain its apparent responsibility (corresponding to the intentionality associated with the need for conversion) and developmental history (corresponding to the intentionality associated with immaturity).

Otherwise, nonscientists will not comprehend the scientific explanations.

Of course, these attributes appear absurd to those trained in pure science.  Mechanistic explanations should stand on their own.

But read any scientific article and you will find the vapors – the spirits – of “why it acts”, “what it is responsible for”, and “how it came to be”.

Simply put, we orient ourselves on the basis of moral designs.  We often confound the the moral and the natural, even though they are distinct.]

Summary of text [comment] page 42

[Maturity and fairness are crucial for understanding moral evil.

Now, allow me to go backwards and tackle the assertion that natural evil appears as moral evil.

We already know that both have the same categorical structure.  Is this enough to account for our experiences?  Or are we hardwired to confound the two in some other way?

Let us look at the two nested forms:

evil^metaphysical₃₍₂₍₎₎ & evil^physical₂₍₁₎

Nature:

inherent limitations, privation of capacities₃₍₂₍₎₎ & challenges, privation of goods₂₍₁₎

Moral:

determination of status of subject₁ as person₃ (the wolf) and the status of subject₃ with inherent limitations and lacking certain capacities₃₍₂₍₎₎ (the sheep) & challenges, privation of goods by an agent, subject₁ (the wolf)₂₍₁₎

The singular difference between natural and moral evil is that, for the latter, the subject committing the sin and the subject suffering the consequences are in intersubjective relation.

Since humans habitually recognize the natural evil as an example of moral evil, I must conclude that the latter is innate.

In other words, in the Lebenswelt that we evolved in, recognition of moral evil (with culprits and victims) conferred adaptive advantage, while recognition of natural evil was not under equivalent selection pressures.

Perhaps, some evolutionarily ancient recognition of natural evil served as the foundation for our innate recognition of moral evil.

Or, perhaps, in all mammals, natural evil is personalized, making our recognition of natural evil the psychological feature that needs to be explained.]

Summary of text [comment] page 42

Development is key to understanding the difference between moral and natural evil.  Sin always entails a certain amount of immaturity, “a failure to grow”.

In addition, humans needs conversion.

These features of moral evil; immaturity and “need for conversion” are not features of natural evil.

[How to formulate this in terms of moral evil^metaphysical and moral evil^physical?

Immaturity might apply to the firstness of moral evil^physical.

Moral evil^physical₂₍₁₎:  __₃( human acts create situation₂( moral evil proceeds –- from the – immature – person₁ …)

___₃( actus hominis₂( passio hominem₁)

“The need for conversion” might apply to the thirdness of moral evil^metaphysical.

Moral evil^metaphysical₃₍₂₎: … determines “subject₁” as a person₃ – in need of conversion – & determines status of subject₍₃₎( limitations under the situation₂ ( __₁ )

malum hominis₃( actus et potenia hominis₂( ___₁ )

I conclude that immaturity and the need for conversion go together in the same fashion as metaphysical and physical evil.

I would label these features of the nested form “intentionality”.  Both immaturity and the need to conversion pertain to intentionality, one as firstness and the other as thirdness.]

Summary of text [comment] page 42

[Third, the arrangement of moral evil^metaphysical₃₍₂₎ and moral evil^physical₂₍₁₎ illuminates the nested form of intersubjective₃(objective₂(subjective₁)).

The objectivity of sin₂ is rarely articulated except through the perspectives of intersubjectivity₃ (the determination of subject₁ as a person₃ simultaneously with the determination of the status of subject₍₃₎) or subjectivity₁ (the potential inherent in subject₁).

Say what?

Take a look at the normal context for moral evil.  Two subjects are determined: Subject₁, the perpetrator and wolf, is contextualized as a person₃.  Subject₃, the victim and the sheep, is regarded as “the one whose limitations are tested₃“.

Whenever we judge the action, we talk about the actuality of sinful action through the normal context.  We say: What an injustice.

Out of this formulation, the intersubjective relationality of sin becomes an avenue for articulating moral evil.

Similarly, we talk about the possibilities that underlie the actuality of moral evil.  One subject₁, the perpetrator, is regarded.  The intersubjective relation to the victim does not appear, just like the town on a fault line does not appear in an analysis concerning earthquakes.  The objectivity of sin₂, the actual act, is articulated by discussion about the perpetrator.  We ask: Why would ‘he’ commit such a crime?

In sum, we rarely talk about the sinful act as actuality itself.  We talk about its intersubjective context and subjective motivations.

We articulate the objectivity of sin₂ by talking about moral evil^metaphysical₃₍₂₎ and moral evil^physical₂₍₁₎.  This gives us a clue about how humans deal with actuality.]

Summary of text [comment] page 42

[Second, human acts₂ in moral evil^physical₃ correspond to a sinful situation₂ for moral evil^metaphysical₃.  We have seen this structure elucidated before, where sinful acts serve as the intersection (in actuality) of two intersecting nested forms.

The entire nested form, in Latin, is:

malum hominis₃( actus et potenia hominis₂ et actus hominis₂( passio hominem₁)

In terms of the two category-crossing labels:

moral evil^metaphysical₃₍₂₍₎₎ and moral evil^physical₂₍₁₎]

Summary of text [comment] page 42

[Three items should be noted.

First, the formulation indicates why moral evil feels like physical evil.  They have the same categorical structure.  In this regard, they feel like they are “connected”.]

Summary of text [comment] page 42

[In nested form, this would be:

Moral evil^physical₂₍₁₎:  __₃( human acts create situation₂( moral evil proceeds from subject₁ (who will be regarded as a person by the normal context))

___₃( actus hominis₂( passio hominem₁)

Moral evil^metaphysical₃₍₂₎: … determines subject₁ as a person₃ & determines status of subject₍₃₎( limitations of subject₍₃₎ under the situation₂ ( __₁ )

malum hominis₃( actus et potenia hominis₂( ___₁ )

Typically, we label subject₁ as “culprit” and subject₍₃₎ as “victim”.]

Summary of text [comment] page 42

Schoonenberg argued that natural evil lies in both a privation of a good [evil^physical₂₍₁₎] and the limitation of the subject [evil^metaphysical₃₍₂₍₎₎].

A new dimension arises when natural evil effects humans [that is; when humans occupy the terminus of “metaphysical evil” as subject₍₃₎].

The question arises: Does this connect natural and moral evil?

[A subsidiary question for the translator: Is ‘connect’ the correct word?]

Perhaps not and sort of.

Perhaps not.  Scientific inquiry will reveal the nature of the natural subject [that is, subject₁, the terminus in Firstness.  Therefore, the termini in Thirdness and in Firstness are only connected in actuality.]  This pertains to natural evil.

Sort of. Scientific inquiry cannot reveal the moral intentions [that would correspond to a moral agent as subject₁.  A connection between the termini in Thirdness and in Firstness is always a possibility for moral agents.  Why?  The moral status of subject₁ and the naturally limited status of subject₍₃₎ are simultaneously determined. This pertains to moral evil.

In sum,] our own feelings that “natural evil” has a “moral component” bears witness to some relation, which the translator of Schoonenberg labeled “connection”.

This connection concerns, what Schoonenberg called “a new dimension” that arises in regards to moral evil.  [That “new dimension” “connects” the termini in Thirdness and in Firstness.]

Summary of text [comment] page 41

[Schoonenberg’s example gives us a way to think about evil^physical and evil^metaphysical as “a deprivation of a good through subject₁” and as “a limitation built into subject₍₃₎”, respectively.

Let us say that an earthquake creates a tsunami that cascades over a coast, depriving animals of their habitat whereupon they die due to their limitations.

“Physical evil” pertains to “the change in habitat that emerges from the natural subject (of geological processes₁)”.

“Metaphysical evil” pertains to “the normal context (determination₃) that emerges from the actuality of the habitat change plus the limitations of animal life₍₃₎”.

In short, “physical evil” creates circumstances (the deprivation of goods) where “metaphysical evil” (the limitations of subjects₍₃₎) comes into play.

Technically, this may be expressed in nested form:

physical evil₂₍₁₎ :  ___₃(earthquake that radically alters habitat₂( … proceeds from natural subject₁; geological processes₁))

metaphysical evil₃₍₂₎ :  … determines status₃ of natural subjects₍₃₎; that is, living forms₍₃₎( radically altered habitat plus limitations of living beings₂( ___ ₁))

This precisely parallels the exposition of knowledge₃₍₂₎ and will₂₍₁₎ in prior blogs.]

Summary of text [comment] page 41

[“Evil₃” resonates with “determination of the status₃ of the … subject₍₃₎”.

Is subject₍₃₎ the same as subject₍₁₎, “the potential from which the action proceeds₁”?

The answer is typically “no”.

Consider Schoonenberg’s example.]

Schoonenberg used the example of an earthquake creating a physical evil – a privation of good – that catastrophically alters the status of living beings, changing the conditions so that these living beings – limited by metaphysical evil – die.

[This can be written in nested form:

… determines status of natural subjects₍₃₎; living forms₍₃₎( earthquake that radically alters habitat₂( … proceeds from natural subject₁; geological processes₁))

“The determination of status” pertains to “subject₍₃₎”.

Subject₍₃₎ is not necessarily identical to subject₁.]