0017 In alignment, two category-based nested forms generate a two-level interscope.

Before rushing headlong into that fact, I want to pause to appreciate another aspect of Peirce’s philosophy: the category of secondness.

Peirce’s secondness is the realm of actuality.  Actuality consists in two contiguous real elements.  It₂ may be written: one real element [contiguity] other real element.

0018 Cause and effect is one expression of this contiguity.  “Causality” is what most envision as the contiguity between any two real elements.  The dyad, cause [contiguity] effect, exhibits the logic of noncontradiction.  If nothing else, real causes do not contradict their real effects.

However, even though we (humans) typically (an perhaps, innately) anticipate causality to present itself as a dyadic actuality, one wonders what happens when two elements are juxtaposed in a speculative fashion.  This is an old philosophical problem.  Nothing demonstrates it as well as the contiguity between a noumenon and its phenomena.

0019 A noumenon is a thing itself.

Phenomena are observable and measurable facets of the thing.

Actuality₂ is dyadic.  So is the contiguity between a noumenon and its phenomena.  But, obviously the word “not” presents a problem, casting the dyad into the realm of possibility, which exhibits the logics of inclusion and befuddlement.  Phenomena cannot exist without a noumenon.  Yet, they cannot objectify that noumenon.

Many of the causalities in evolutionary science are dyads in the style of actuality, because the contiguity is speculative.

0020 For example, Turbon states that human genes form the basis of extra-somatic culture and extra-somatic culture is an effective method for adapting to the environment.  Here is a picture of these two speculations.

0021 Does this observation, that Turbon’s causal chains follow the style of secondness, assist in figuring out the alignment between philosophy and science?

Surely, the observation suggests that philosophy situates science.So, if the two nested forms combine into a two-level interscope, following the script of A Primer on Sensible and Social Construction, then noumenon-oriented philosophy should situate phenomena-oriented science.

0022  From the prior blogs, I arrive at a two-level interscope.

0023 The crux of Turbon’s article resides in the last sentence of the abstract.

Whatever_2a makes humans distinctive_1a in the normal context of evolution_3a should be “digestible” by whatever_2b makes humans distinctive_1b in the normal context of our own intuition_3b.

0024 Turbon’s appeal fails when evolution₃ excludes intuition₃.

Turbon’s appeal will succeed when evolution_3a and intuition_3b align.

0025 In order to be “digestible”, scientific origins of human beings_2a ought to be capable of being virtually situated by a coherent origins_2b, arising from the potential of ‘something distinctive’_1b, in the normal context of human intuition_3b.

What disciplines guide human intuition_3b?

Philosophy and theology.

0026 I now make a slight adjustment to the previous two-level interscope.  I replace the content-level “character” with the scientific term, “adaptation.

Here is a diagram of the result.

0027 In the realm of possibility, ‘something distinctive’_1b virtually situates ‘distinctive adaptations’_1a.

 I do not find a ‘distinctive something’_1b in Turbon’s article.

Instead, I find a litany of ‘distinctive adaptations’_1a.

0028 I examine section one, titled “The Essentials of the Evolution of Humankind”.  The section opens with a question, asking, “How can the technological and scientific output of different modern peoples be explained?”

Surely, that is a historical question.

0029 What about the time before history?

What about earlier species in the Homo genus?

For 700,000 years, australopithecines and early Homo used Oldewan stone tools.  Then, for 1,000,000 years, middle Homo erectus used Acheulean stone tools.  Finally, around 500,000 years ago, late Homo heidelbergensis and later, Homo neadertalis used more sophisticated suites of stone tools, again for a very long time.  Around 100,000 years ago, stone tools become very sophisticated and the Upper Paleolithic Revolution dawns.  The Upper Paleolithic associates to anatomically modern humans.

0030 Ah, that sounds more like an essential.  Stone tool use must be a distinctive adaptation_1a.

Here is where Turbon introduces the two previously-noted dyads in the style of actuality.

0031 Stone tools belong to extra-somatic culture.   Plus, stone tools are adaptive.  Stone tools allow humans to do activities that they otherwise could not.

Changes in human genetics must have facilitated a mind and a body that are capable of manufacturing and using stone tools.  However, the facilitation takes many, many generations, suggesting that stone tool use was one of many clever survival techniques practiced by Homo habilis, “handy man”, and other members of the Homo genus.

0032 So, I wonder, “Do all these clever survival techniques, these extra-somatic adaptations, have ‘something distinctive’ in common?”

0033 The last blog adds more nuance to the ongoing two-level interscope.

0034 Evolutionary scientists propose adaptations that solve problems in the Pleistocene environment.  Human genes somehow allow the phenotypes that carry these adaptations.

One adaptation is the use of Oldewan, then Acheulean, then more sophisticated stone tools.  This is not the only adaptation.  More on that later.

The body of Turbon’s article provides a litany of adaptations.

0035 In Section 1, hominins become smarter in general, with special intelligences mixed in.  So, a person can not only talk (which is smart) but knows a lot about something that is of interest (which is special intelligence).

Surely, both DNA and the environment of evolutionary adaptation, genetics and natural history, are relevant.  But, there is something more, as noted later in Turbon’s article, as well as in Comments on Steven Mithen’s Book (1996) Prehistory of Mind.

0035 In Section 2.1, language is an adaptation that increases adaptability.  

Here, Turbon refers to “language” as speech-alone talk.  Today, many evolutionary scientists acknowledge that it is difficult to formulate how language evolves in the milieu of speech.  However, as discussed in Comments on Robert Berwick and Noam Chomsky’s book (2016) Why only Us?  More likely, “language”, evolves in the milieu of hand talk.I continue Turbon’s list in the next blog.

0036 Here are the adaptations proposed by Daniel Turbon in sections one and two of his paper, “The Distinctive Character of Human Being in Evolution”.

I continue.

0037 In Section 2.2, Turbon mentions brain reorganization and size increase, over very long periods of time.  The parietal and frontal lobes preferentially enlarge.  Encephalization increases.

There is more here than meets the eye.  The brain not only increases but reorganizes.  This is covered in Comments on Steven Mithen’s Book (1996) Prehistory of Mind.  The way hominins think changes over many, many generations.  So does the brain’s architecture.

In Section 2.3, Turbon attaches importance to the FoxP2 regulatory gene.  Mutations in the gene produce impediments to speech and writing.  Scientists link the FoxP2 gene to neuro-motor control of rapid recursive and coordinated actions.  Neanderthals and humans share identical FoxP2 gene sequences.  Turbon associates this gene to speech-alone talk.  The gene equally applies to hand talk.

0038 The dyad of the brain [adapts to] talk is covered in Comments on Derek Bickerton’s Book (2014) More Than Nature Needs.   Our brain to body ratio is large.  It’s so large as to seem to be more than necessary for survival.  But, for talking, that is a different matter.

Also, children pick up language with a paucity of clues.  More cognitive processing is needed for that.  The question is, “How to model linguistic communication, in order to account for how children bootstrap language use.”  The answer is wrestled with in Comments on Robert Berwick and Noam Chomsky’s Book (2016) Why Only Us?

0039 In section 3.1 and 3.2, Turbon discusses a potential concurrent adaptation in the domestication of fire (starting around 800,000 years ago) and advances in stone tool technologies (starting around 500,000 years ago).  There seems to be a transition, here.  Why do these two extra-somatic adaptations occur in tandem?

These questions are addressed in Comments on Clive Gamble, John Gowlett and Robin Dunbar’s Book (2014) Thinking Big.  Increasing neocortex size correlates to larger group sizes.  Larger group sizes correlate to larger brain size.  Do I detect a feedback loop?  Does this feedback loop ramp up with the adaptations of cooking and hunting with composite wood and stone tools?

0040 In Sections 4 and 5, Turbon discusses the evolution of the family.  Increasing encephalization means bigger heads.  In order to fit through the birth canal, big-brained babies are born early.  They are helpless infants.  Infant helplessness should lead to higher mortality in the dangerous environment of the open savannah.  The family is one adaptation that decreases risk for infants and children.  So are other social circles, such as the team, the band, and finally, the community.

0041 Finally, in Section 6, Turbon discusses altruism.