0482 Before proceeding to the second interview in this article, an interlude is in order.

Undoubtedly readers, unfamiliar with the philosophy of Charles Peirce, can scarcely imagine that signs are triadic relations that couple category-based nested forms, which are also triadic relations.  

To date, I suppose that few scholars rely on Peirce’s philosophy as a tool.

To most, Peirce’s ideas and nomenclature are subjects for inquiry and refinement.

0483 In contrast, the TMS school clearly uses Saussure’s semiology as a tool for inquiry.  The same applies to structuralism.  Structuralism alters the discipline of linguistics, once everyone realizes that, if Saussure’s definition of the spoken word is valid, and if spoken words are placeholders in a system of vocal differences (parole) that is arbitrarily related to a system of mental differences (langue), then linguistics has shifted from the humanities into the sciences.

0484 I suspect that the TMS school may be more likely to use diagrams based on Peirce’s categories as tools, once it becomes apparent that these diagrams expound the school’s historical consciousness of development in time, as well as its cosmological consciousness of a foundational invention that well… promises to deliver what natural and social science cannot deliver.

That is, meaning_1a.

0485 What is the question at hand?

I don’t know, but everyone knows that scientific inquiry cannot produce meaning.

But here, it does.

How confounding.

Is that the foundational invention?

0486 In this interlude (G-J), I will re-present the fundament (the semiological_3a structuralist_3b or the “loquens”) interscope (G), wrap up the remaining virtual nested form and emergent (H), portray the transition from fundament to derivative interscopes (I), then present two comparisons that shed light on the shimmering brilliance of the TMS invention (J).

0487 Two works by Razie Mah may assist in the appreciation of the following interscope.  A Primer on the Category-Based Nested Form and A Primer on Sensible and Social Construction.  These are available at smashwords and other-book vendors.

Here is a diagram of the fundament interscope (G).

0488 The invention of this interscope opens the door for the Tartu-Moscow School to flourish within a political regime that prides itself on its own scientific foundations.  The perspective-level nested form coheres to the shape of the empirio-schematic judgment.

Also, the virtual nested forms in the categories of thirdness and firstness, already discussed, do not give any impression of subjectivity.

0489 These are the features that the interview on August 25, 2011 discuss.  The reason?  One cannot directly observe normal contexts₃ and potentials₁.  Nonetheless, one can discuss them.  That is one of the advantages of the ability of speech-alone talk to attach a label to anything.

0490 The virtual nested form in secondness portrays the workings of this tool of the intellect.

0491 Actuality starts with langue_2am as matter and parole_2af as form.  Saussure’s thing_2a stands as a hylomorphe within the schema of Peirce’s secondness.  A convenient label for Saussure’s thing_2a is “language”.  Language is may further be labeled as “subject” and described as “subjective”.

Next, language_2bm as matter virtually situates the entire content-level actuality_2a (in terms of systems of differences) and directly substantiates a literary text_2bf (in the broadest sense of the term) as form.  While the substances within each actuality within the content level may be investigated subjectively, consideration of word use_2bm within a system_3baccording to the laws of that system_1b must be objective.

Objective considerations support intersubjective proposals, if a language with exact methods_3c is available.  The intersubjective result is a semiological structuralist model_2c based on observations of phenomena_1c in the literary text_2bf.

0492 Does the intersubjective ever become suprasubjective?

The semiological model_2c transports the literary text from a form_2bf that is substantiated by language as matter_2bm to a form_2af that entangles the character of how we (humans) define the spoken word_2am, that is, language_2am as matter itself.  Spoken language_2b is two arbitrarily related systems of differences in the fundament (or “loquens”) interscope.  Spoken language_2a manifests the potentials of meaning_1a, presence_1b and message_1c in the derivative (or “ego”) interscope.

Doesn’t that seem miraculous (H)?

0493 By appearance, the arrow mimics the proclivity of triumphalist natural scientists to replace the noumenon with a successful model, in order that the model (substituting for the noumenon) can be objectified by its phenomena.

Okay, maybe it seems triumphalist (H, again).

0494 On the situation level of the loquens interscope, the literary text_2bf is the noumenon, the thing itself.  But how can that be, if it_2bf is substantiated by the matter of language_2bm, where language_2bm is technically defined by Ferdinand de Saussure?

Well, before answering that question, I hurry to the next statement.

On the content level of the ego interscope, the literary text_2af is couched in a semiostructuralist model_2c that presents itself as the thing itself_2af, in order to entangle a new set of phenomena₁.   These phenomena₁ are recognized in gestalt fashion by humans during the game of pantomime.   These phenomena₁ are meaning_1a, presence_1b and message_1c.

0495 Plus, if Kant’s slogan holds, these phenomena cannot objectify their noumenon.

And, if triumphalism holds, these phenomena can objectify the model that substitutes for the noumenon.

0496 Of course, no one knows what those last two statements imply, other than there is no way to proceed in a straightforward manner.

Maybe a gestalt shift is coming.

0497 Here is a picture of the transition between the fundament, the semiological_3a structuralist_3b intersubjective_3cinterscope and the derivative, suprasubjective interscope that contains cultural studies_3b (I).  The transition moves from the perspective-level of the fundament to the content-level of the derivative.

0498 In order to visualize a shift in orientation, two comparisons follow (J).

0499 The first compares the perspective-level nested form of the fundament with the empirio-schematic judgment.

The similarity is stark enough to convince the vigilant Socialist authorities that the work of Lotman, Uspenskij and collaborators must be legitimate… that is… “scientific”.  These bureaucrats are very interested in keeping the academy’s nose to the grindstone of godless inquiry.  Compared to all the western quacks in the arts of superstition (religious studies) and capitalist sophistry (humanities), these researchers look like the real deal.

0500 The second compares the content-level nested form of the derivative with the definition of a spoken word that appears in Razie Mah’s e-book, How To Define The Word “Religion” (available at smashwords and other e-book venues).

501 Do not, for a moment, think that Razie Mah’s e-book offers a list of dictionary definitions.

Razie Mah offers ways to investigate the meaning, presence and message₁ underlying the spoken word, “religion”.  Each potential ends up with its own visual diagram.  Each potential entails a unique purely relational structure.  These relational structures do not depict phenomena of the noumenon of “religion”.  These relational structures depict the immaterial thing itself.  The noumenon, the thing itself, consists of immaterial relational structures.

0502 Here is a picture.

Aha!  Where is the unfolded Positivist’s judgment?

Is this a Gestalt shift?

0503 Razie Mah’s category-based nested form of definition breaks the mold of the social sciences, whose models cohere with empirio-schematic formulations, and then triumphantly substitute themselves for their noumena.

The TMS school begins in a similar fashion.  Then, rather than terminating in the Positivist’s judgment, with models substituting for noumena, the TMS_3a launches an interscope that offers a language_2am of meaning_1a, presence_1b and message_1c.  Meaning_1a, presence_1b and message_1c are like phenomena that raise the question, “What must the noumenon_2af be?”

0504 Is the noumenon contained in the virtual nested form in secondness for the derivative interscope?

That is a good question.

But, even without an official answer to the good question, a Gestalt shift from the Positivist’s judgment to a Peircean definition, may explain why the TMS is ignored by bigilib mainstream observation and measurement-oriented research establishments and systematically excluded from funding by review boards staffed by their mindless institutional compatriots.

0505 Put in terms of the scholastic interscope, TMS makes a leap from what is happening? to what does this mean to me?.

In Uspenskij’s terms, TMS jumps form loquens to ego.

This is precisely what the social sciences desire to do.

0506 The modern social sciences may build models of what is happening?, but they cannot make the leap to relevance, characterized as meaning, presence and message.

So concludes this interlude (see point 0093).

0523 “Precission” is a very specific term, indicating that a higher category arises from an adjacent lower category.  Theoretically, a category-based nested form contains two precissions, from firstness to secondness and from secondness to thirdness. Actuality₂ emerges from potential₁.  Normal context₃ contextualizes actuality₂.

0524 The fractal nature of precission allows a repetition where one category-based nested form belongs to firstness(content) and an adjacent higher category-based nested form belongs to secondness (situation).  Thus, the interscopemanifests as a fractal image of the category-based nested form on an adjacent larger scale.

Then, three-tiers manifest on the adjacent higher scale than the interscope.

0525 Notably, the scale of the TMS inquiry is limited to two tiers, belonging to firstness and secondness.

At least, that is how it seems to me.

Within each interscope, two signs connect adjacent levels (precission) without qualification.  One requires qualification.

Medieval scholastics label the regular signs as specificative extrinsic formal causality (the specifying sign) and exemplar extrinsic formal causality (the exemplar sign).  The former joins content and situation.  The latter binds situation and perspective.  If the signs occur within a system, then the causalities change from extrinsic to intrinsic.  

0526 Uspenskij offers a typology of three signs (listed during the second interview on page 431).  To me, they associate to the scholastic labels quite nicely.

0527 The second interview, conducted May 27, 2012, asks thirteen questions.

0528 The first question concerns how Uspenskij defines the word, “sign”, with the implication that, if the answer is a triadic relation, then the definition goes with Peirce’s framework, called “semiotics”, and if the answer is a dyadic relation, then the definition goes with Saussure’s framework, called “semiology”.

The old man says that a sign has both form and meaning (page 425-426).

0529 Of course, this is a semiological formulation. “Form” associates with signifier_1a (and for speech-alone talk, parole_2af).  “Meaning” associates with signified_1a (and for speech-alone talk, langue_2am).

0530 But that is not all, there is an unspoken third term.  This third term comes into play as Uspenskij rules out some disciplines as not semiotic (that is, dealing with form and not meaning) and classifies some disciplines as semiotic (dealing with both) (pages 427-428)

The third is “a relation between form and meaning”. 

0531 Uspenskij characterizes a “sign” as having form and meaning.

Is that the same as the relation between literary form_2af and the potential underlying a positivist language_2am?

This question is left unspoken, because making the connection is obviously a human trait.  Humans connect a sign-vehicle (SV) and its sign-object (SO) all the time.  Plus, they occasionally realize that they are exercising a sign-interpretant (SI).  One funny implication is that, for a scientist, this realization gets labeled “metaphysics”, at best, and “anthropomorphism”, at worst.

0532 What happens to the specifying sign-relation when I suggest that the signified is not langue_2am, but rather a sign-object (SO_i) and the signifier is not parole_2af, but rather a sign-vehicle (SV_s), as shown in the following figure?

0533 In response, a reader may ask, “Is that a trick question?”

If it is, it is a nice trick.

0534 It suggests, as does Uspenskij’s answer to the first question, that there is a third term, “the relation between a signifier and its signified_1a in the normal context of Saussure’s semiology_3a“.

The process of identifying the signified_1a and the signifier_1a, as well as naming the SO_i and the SV_s, seems obvious in our current Lebenswelt.  We neglect the SI_i, which may the only sign-element that requires an explanation.

0535 Fortunately, speech-alone talk allows us to label the SI_i as the normal context₃ and potential₁ of the actuality₂ of the SO_i, thereby making each sign-element subject to inquiry.

How can speech-alone talk do that?

Speech-alone talk can label anything, even things that cannot be pictured or pointed to.

See A Primer on Implicit and Explicit Abstraction, by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues.  Or, read on.

0536 Could explicit abstraction occur ten-thousand years ago, at the very end of the Lebenswelt that we evolved in?

No, hand- and hand-speech talk cannot engage in explicit abstraction.  Our ancestors could not explicitly abstract the terms, “mumbo-jumbo” or “anthropomorphism”.

Instead, hand- and hand-speech talk facilitates implicit abstraction.  Signs operate.  Humans are aware of sign-processes.  Signs are performed, rather than analyzed.

0537 The specifying sign may serve as a case study that involves self-reference (discussed on pages 431 and 432).

Here is an expression of the specifying sign-relation that corresponds to hand-talk in the Lebenswelt that we evolved in.

0538 In hand talk, “I” may be performed as [point to MYSELF].

In semiology_3c, [Point to MYSELF]_2af is substantiated by me (the referent)_2am.

This is how hand- and hand-speech talk works, the word-gesture (although habituated) pictures or points to its referent.

0539 Twelve-thousand years ago, my hunting team approaches a water hole where a single gazelle drinks, ignoring the other gazelles who have wandered through a passage in a nearby stand of rocks.  The other gazelles do this in anticipation of our approach.  But, not this buck!

0540 I have a bright idea. I wave to catch the attention of the other members of the team.

[Point to MYSELF][point to PASSAGE IN ROCKS][image HIDE][image JUMP][image CLUB][point to gazelle].

One of my team points to himself.  [ME TOO].

0541 It’s clear that I have a signified and a signifier in mind.

0542 While the rest of the team slows their approach, we run into the rocks, make it to the passage, and prepare to jump.  When the team sees that we are ready, [wave CLUB], they speed their approach in order to spook the gazelle in our direction.

We jump into the passage, and the gazelle is coming fast and… BAM!

All I see is the gazelle leaping…

0543 When I revive, with a bloody nose, the team is there.  My friend clubbed the gazelle that could not quite leap over me.  Everyone is happy.  They are relieved that I am miraculously uninjured.  They have a catch to bring home.

0544 Nobody likes getting hit in the face.

Nobody likes a question that goes unanswered.

If the inquirer is able to construct a specifying sign-relation from the example, then the construction should make sense.

Specifying signs are formative.

Specifying signs initiate sensible construction.

0545 But, can one ignore the adjoining interventional sign-relation?

In the following snippet of the fundament interscope, the potential of a presumed interventional sign-interpretant (SI_i) supports both the actuality of langue_2am (the thought_2am (SO_i) behind the spoken word_2af, SV_s) and, virtually, the potential of the specifying sign-interpretant (SI_s).

Where does this interventional sign-interpretant (SI_i) come from?

Oh, I can see a part of SI_i.

0546 On page 435, the interviewer asks Uspenskij about his use of the word, “sense”, then claims that the author uses the term in a variety of ways.

Uspenskij answers in two sentences.  The words in a text have sense.  Sense is a phenomenon of the text.

Of course, for the fundament interscope, these statements imply that “sense” is a way to observe the linguistic phenomena_1c within a literary text as form_2af.

0547 What about the derivative interscope?

Does this interscope also contain a specifying sign-relation that supports sensible construction?

Yes, it does.

0548 Here is the picture.

0549 Here, the two uses of the word, “sense”, make… um… sense.

The literary text as form_2af entangles a language_2am (SV_s) that stands for both sensible cognition_2bm (SO_s) and sensible interaction_2bf  in regards to cultural studies_3b operating on the struggle to find the right words that label the presentation_1b (SI_i).

This is like what happens during the first ascendant of the Tartu-Moscow School of Semiotics.  Cognition_2bm, based on semiological_3a structural_3b models_2c, is objective.  Scholarly collaborative social interactions_2bf, framed in terms of meaning_1a and presence_1b, are intersubjective.

0550 For example, reading an author’s text_2a (SV_s) stands for generating and sharing an interpretation_2b (SO_s) in regards to cultural frameworks_3b that the text supports_1b (SI_s).

0551 Uspenskij lists six criteria for “making sense” (pages 435 and 436).

The first two (A and B) are most important.

0552 Here are the two, using my own words.

For A, all the words must pertain to a particular situation.  If we cannot figure out the situation, then the words are meaningless.

For B, a statement makes sense when we can assess its content, discuss it, and estimate under what conditions it is true or false.

0553 Some of the other items on the list are curious.

(E) The reader may assume a text makes sense, until proven otherwise.

This criteria is curious, leading me to wonder, “How widely does this apply?”

0554 Does this rule apply to artifacts belonging to the Lebenswelt that we evolved in, such as the Upper Paleolithic (say, 70 to 10 kyr)?

When an archaeologist recovers an artifact from this period, there is a choice.  If the artifact has an obvious utility, then the archaeologist applies the label, “tool”.  If the artifact does not have an obvious function, then the expert applies the label, “symbol”.  Tools have obvious meaning.  Symbols do not, but we must presume that represent ‘something’.

0555 Here is a picture of the specifying sign-relation.

0556 The dyadic actuality, {excavated artifact as form [entangles] meaningful labels as matter}_2a (SV_s) stands for the dyadic actuality, {anthropological assessment as matter [substantiates] classification as form}_2b (SO_s) in the normal context of anthropology_3b operating on the possibilities of ‘utility or symbolic representation’_1b (SI_s).

0557 Does that make sense?

An answer to that question corresponds to the potential of ‘message’_1c.

0557 What does that imply?

An exemplar sign-relation is about to launch.

The SO_s of the specifying sign is contiguous with the SV_e of the exemplar sign.

Here is a picture.

0558 The specifying sign crosses from content into situation.  The specifying sign is formative.

The exemplar sign crosses from situation to perspective.  The exemplar sign is performative.

0559 The discussion, so far, only suggests that the exemplar sign may be present.

0560 I continue the example of an archaeologist’s conundrum.

The situation-level dyad, {assessment as matter (SO_s) [substantiates] classification as form (SV_e)}_2b  stands for a perspective-level actuality_2c (SO_e) in regards to a perspective-level normal context_3c operating on the potential that ‘what the archaeologist is doing makes sense’_1c (SI_e).

Can I imagine what that perspective-level normal context_3c and actuality_2c must be, given the example of a Paleolithic artifact_2af that has been recently unearthed?

May I speculate on the exemplar-sign relation?

0561 Does it involve translation?

Consider the scene.

During an archaeological excavation, the participants anticipate finding something.  Let me say that it consists of two relatively thin, flat pieces of fossilized wood, almost identical, both notched and worn on one end, as if a fiber cord had been tightly wound around one end of each, but not the other.

The discoverer waves another excavator over.

0562 Here is what they say.

0563 “What have we here?” one digger says_2af.

Well, it_2bf sure looks like it must be human.  Not a human.  Something made by a human_2bm.  The wood is clearly petrified.  So, the cellulose served as a site for mineral precipitation over time.

It obviously has a use.  So, what are we talking about?  There is a hearth nearby.  That structures the scene.  Closely examining the phenomenal aspects of the forms_1c, the researchers propose a model_2c.  The excavated artifact is a tool, but also a symbol.  The cord marks show that it_2af is an adornment, worn around the neck of someone attending communal cooking, and it_2af is tool, because it is flat and narrow, perfect for lifting food from a campfire.

0564 Soil is taken and sealed in a bag.  Later, the soil will be radiocarbon dated.

So far, all this makes sense.  The fossilized tools are like parole_2af, in that they are saying something.  The fossilized pair are like a literary text as form_2af substantiated by the language of an archaeological team_2bm.

0565 The content and situation levels constitute a specifying-sign relation.  The spoken words attracting the attention of others_2a (SV_s) stands for the matter of being human [substantiating] the things as forms_2b (SO_s) in regards to the structure of a modern archaeological excavation_3b operating on the potential ‘order of geological deposition of materials’_1b (SI_s).

0566 Yes, so far all this makes sense, and that sensible construction is modeled_2c in an exemplar sign relation, connecting the situation and perspective level.  When sensible construction works, the perspective level cannot even be recognized.  Things go so smoothly.  The exemplar sign-relation basically confirms that the specifying sign-object (SO_s) is… well.. sensible.

0567 Oh, the specifying sign-object (SO_s) and the exemplar sign-vehicle (SV_e) are contiguous.  They both occupy the situation-level actuality_2b.

The thing found in a dig_2bf and must be human-made_2bm (SV_e) stands for a sign-based_3a excavation-structured_3bmodel_2c (SO_e) in regards to the language of physical anthropology_3c operating on the potential of ‘these particular archaeological phenomena’_1c (SI_e).

In other words, the specifying sign-relation makes sense.  The exemplar sign-relation not only confirms the conclusion,but packages the specifying-sign object_2b (SO_s and SV_e) and its sensible representation_2c (SO_e) into an interventional sign-vehicle_2c (SV_i) to launch to the next tier.

The exemplar sign-relation passes like a nod of the head.

0568 Then, the interventional sign-relation proceeds, connecting the fundament and derivative tiers.

The semiological_3b structuralist_3a model_2c (SV_i) stands for {an excavated artifact as form_2af [entangling] the language of meaning as matter_2am} (SO_i) in regards to a defining intellectual normal context_3a operating on the potential of ‘meaning’_1a (SI_i).

0569 Here is a picture of the derivative interscope.

0570 The content-level dyad of entanglement_2a initiates a specifying sign-vehicle (SV_s) that stands for the actualization of the presence of meaning_2b (SO_s) in regards to the normal context of anthropology_3b operating on the potential of ‘what makes meaning present in this particular investigation’_1b (SI_i).

0571 Okay, what makes the meaning of “tool” or “symbol” present_1b?

A tool has utility.  A symbol does not.

A symbol represents ‘something’, even though the inquirer does not know what that ‘something’ is.

0572 Does that make sense?

With this question, the pattern starts to become more apparent.

In both interscopes, the specifying sign-relation is supposed to make sense.

The exemplar sign-relation either validates, or sets conditions, or tells the inquirer how the specifying sign-relation makes sense.

0573 On page 437, after the interviewer uses Uspenskij’s own criteria to query about the terms, “sense” and “meaningful”, Uspenskij simply admits that he is interested in language (first of all), especially what is sensible in language.

0574 So, I suspect that his research constructs an exemplar sign-relation in the derivative interscope.

Surely, this is not a simple task.

0594 On page 438, the question of translation takes a creepy turn.

What happens when the presence_1b of the language_2am of meaning_1a produces a social interaction_2bf that is obviously not substantiated by a cognition_2am that makes sense?

0595 Say what?

Uspenskij proposes the following scenario.

When I say something to you, I can take into account that you may not understand me.  You may not translate what I am saying_2af according to the same… positivist intellect_3a or meaning_1a.  As soon as I know that this is the case, I become silent, as Wittgenstein advised (after he had published a vast treatise that could not be translated into any establishment framework).

0596 Does this sound familiar?

This is not a scenario about translation between two people speaking different mother tongues.

This is a scenario about translation between two people engaging different languages_2am of meaning_1a.

0597 For example, I ask about a “tool_2af“.

This raises the semasiological question of the meaning_1a… er… language_2am that gives the term meaning_1b.

What meanings can one attach to the word, “tool_2af“?

A handyman may translate that into a question about what instruments are needed to perform the task at hand_2am.

A surveillance agent may translate that into a question about what type of weapons are you talking about?_2am.

I suspect that the handyman that the agency sent is here to conduct surveillance because he does not appear interested in getting any work done_2bm.  Instead, he seems interested in figuring out where my weapons may be hiding.

0598 I immediately stop asking questions and fall silent, following Wittgenstein’s advice.

Why?

I do not want to send the wrong message_1c.

0599 Uspenskij offers this scenario twenty-three years after the fall of the Berlin Wall.

Is he traumatized or what?

The interviewer is unfazed.

0600 On page 439, the next question (#8) concerns how Uspenskij feels about Saussure and Peirce.

Uspenskij says that, as a linguist, he subjectively appreciates Saussure and objectively understands what he says.  As for Peirce, he is incomprehensible.

The interviewer states that one of the advantages of Peirce’s sign-relations is that they allow one to differentiate among plants, animals and humans, just like Thomas Aquinas does, following Aristotle.

Uspenskij replies (more or less), “That is bullshit.”

0601 The old man is correct.

How so?

Take a look at the ego interscope.

Does the history and the semiotics of the first iteration of the Tartu-Moscow School of Semiotics translate into this interscope?

0602 If so, then there is more to Peirce’s categories and semiotics than icons, indexes and symbols.

So, maybe, Peirce’s tradition will fare better in the second iteration of the TMS.

0603 Meanwhile, take a look at the above figure.

If Lotman is correct, then it is inevitable that there is something untranslatable in the translation_2a that occurs in the content-level actuality_2a of the ego interscope.

If entanglement is translation, then I wonder what the semiological_3a structuralist_3b model_2c (SV_i) stands for.

0604 Who am I?

Am I the one who emerges from (and situates) the languages that I speak?

Or am I who I am?

0605 Clearly, the first question applies to the narrator responsible for any literary text_2bf, also known as “the author”.

Theoretically, the second question applies to the reader of any literary text_2af, eager to ascertain its meaning_1a, presence_1b and message_1c.

0606 These profound questions_2af stand well within the domain of the TMS, yet remain only a Venn diagram away from… how do I say it?… languages_2am that cannot be contextualized as science.

Yeah, I am talking about languages that use Aristotle’s metaphysics shamelessly.

0607 Am I pointing theologians and classical philosophers?

Here is another way to picture the interventional sign-vehicle (SV_i), its sign-object (SO_i), and the entangled specifying sign-vehicle (SV_s).

How confounding.

I suppose that it is the task of theologians and old-time philosophers to savor this type of mess.

0608 The confounding of hylomorphe and entanglement is a Russian delicacy, the fruit of the fact that there is a uninterrupted (although wildly gyrating) history that starts with Aristotle, passes to the Slavs through the missions of Saints Cyril and Methodius, and has remained, sometimes flourishing and sometimes waning.

The Soviet academics Juri Lotman and Boris Uspenskij re-discover the recipe through their excavations of Slavic civilization.

0609 And what of the future?

Aristotle’s hylomorphe of {matter [substantiates] form} is an exemplar of Charles Peirce’s category of secondness.

So is {form [entangles] matter}.

0610 So where am I (in Latin: ego) in the following loquens interscope?

This is a provocative question.

0611 This examiner sets aside the remainder of the interview under examination, in order to address a possible solution to the last question, while relying on the discipline of biosemiotics.

0612 Am I the owl whose face appears on the wings of a moth?

Am I the small bird who would prefer to eat a moth and not be eaten by a predatory owl?

Am I the moth who would prefer to not be eaten by the small bird?

0613 What am I talking about?

Biologists observe a phenomena, appearing on the top surface of the wings of certain species of moths.  Each wingdisplays a large black dot, in such a fashion that the human instantly recognizes the face of an owl.  So, by extension, must small birds, the moth’s primary predator.

0614 I associate the appearance of an owl’s eyes_2bf with a literary text_2bf, substantiated by the language of pattern recognition_2bm in the normal context of a visual system_3b operating on the potential ‘laws of recognition for an animal’s visual system’_1b.

0615 With the situation-level of the loquens interscope filled, it is easy to say that the same level contains a specifying sign-interpretant (SI_s) and sign-object (SO_s).  The specifying sign-vehicle corresponds to the content-level actuality_2a(SV_s).

0616 The question arises, “Does this make sense?”

Yes, it makes sense when the appearance of the eyes of an owl_2bf (SV_e) stands for a primary… or is it secondary?… model_2c of a looming predator_2c (SO_e) in regards to a biosemiotic language_3c based on ‘observations of the behavioral phenomena of small birds’_1c. (SI_e).

0617 Ah, that statement constitutes the exemplar sign-relation, the sign-relation where a situation-level actuality_2b is contextualized.

0618 The question again is, “Who am I?”

Am I a small bird whose ancestors have learned to immediately evade the appearance of a looming figure with two large eyes?

Or am I the human who acknowledges that small birds evade the moth when it opens its wings?

0619 Are humans supposed to know the experiences of small birds that well?

What do their cultural traditions say?

0620 This counter-intuitive example stands at the heart of the biosemiotic project, as discussed in Biosemiotics as Noumenon (Parts 1-4) by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues (as well as Razie Mah’s serial blogs from January through June, 2024).  

If the behavior is innate for small birds, then human recognition of the bird’s sign-system is also innate.