0038 Section 1.2 wrestles with the possibilities of mathematical and mechanical models, based on truncated material and efficient causalities.  Are these types of models capable of honestly portraying the autonomy, the goal-directedness, and the semiotic character of an agency_b(event_a)?

Say what?

Here is my reading.  If the two-level interscope pictured above is real, then how can a scientist (who would rather not get into philosophical topics) study semiotic agency?  If the two-level interscope is the thing itself, then what are its observable and measurable facets?

0039 Section 1.3 worries that the specifying sign-relation will disappear under a pile of independent applications, each proposing an empirio-schematic model, according to its own disciplinary language.  How could each particular model overlay the um… noumenal overlay of sign-object_2b(sign-vehicle_2a)?

0040 Supposedly, all proposed mechanisms, like leaves in a giant leaf-pile, fall from the same tree.  They cover the roots of the one life that they once all held in common, the noumenal overlay of the agency_b(semiotic_a).  The tree is semiosis.  The tree represents science beyond mere mechanism.  So, as each specialization builds a successful model capable of substituting for the noumenal overlay, that specialization detaches from the semiotic tree, and falls to a mundane level of scientific inquiry.

0041 Say what?

In a play on the subtitle, the goal of the noumenal overlay is to reveal a science beyond natural-science mechanism, and in the process, open opportunities for novel sciences to figure out mechanisms appropriate to a science beyond mathematical and mechanical models.

0042 Ah, so that is what this book is all about.

Or is it?

The authors recognize that there is no consensus concerning the compatibility of semiosis and mechanisms. Theoretically, each sign could have its own science, whereby the sign’s mechanisms are modeled using a highly specific material-oriented and instrumental language.  Furthermore, once a model is successful, it may replace its noumenal overlay, according to the style of triumphalist scientists, and thereby detach from the tree of semiosis, because the postulation of that tree is no longer necessary.

0043 The remainder of section 1.3 and all of 1.4 waffle around a question, asking, “Can we imagine that this multitude of mechanistic empirio-schematic leaves, covering the roots of the tree that originally embodied the agent_b(event_a) paradigm that budded them, is linked to the tree of semiosis?”

0044 It is like not seeing the tree due to the abundance of fallen leaves.  

Each leaf testifies to a mechanism that accounts for the observations and measurements of phenomena for one particular noumenon… or noumenal overlay… or something like that… and that mechanism, if successful, may be triumphantly placed over that one noumenon, and, in doing so, inquiry detaches from what?… the noumenon that all semiotic agencies have in common?

Once an empirio-schematic judgment successfully models the phenomena associated with its noumenon, then what use does it have for the thing itself?

Yes, all the models built by the sciences beyond (natural science) mechanism, one for each manifestation of semiotic agency, are like the dead leaves of autumn.  One wonders whether they all belong to the same living noumenon, pictured above as Kull’s two-level interscope.

0045 Sharov and Tonnessen resolve this dilemma by formulating a noumenal overlay that allows scientists to identify which elements give rise to phenomena and which elements need to be explained by semiotic models.

0046 How do they accomplish this?

The very term, “semiotic agency”, offers a clue.

Kull’s interscope belongs to the category of thirdness.  “Semiotic agency” transitions to the category of secondness.  Secondness consists in two contiguous real elements.  The two real elements are the content-level and situation-level actualities (SV_s and SO_s).  The contiguity consists of the situation-level normal context and potential (SI_s).

Here is a picture.

0047 A triadic structure (the specifying sign) may be transformed into a dyadic structure (the dyad of semiotic agency).  Dyads are typical for the category of secondness, the realm of actuality.  The above figure contains a fundament dyad and a resonant dyad.  Both dyads may be compared to Aristotle’s hylomorphe, matter [substance] form.

0048 So far, so good.  The next question wonders, “Does this noumenal overlay work?  Can the scientist readily appreciate which elements give rise to phenomena and which need to be accounted for by a model?”

0049 I proceed by way of example.

Consider a metabolic thing such as a circadian rhythm for waking and sleeping.  The content-level actualities_2a are “sunlight” and “lack of sunlight”.  Sunlight_2a (SV_s) stands for “being awake”_2b (SO_s) according to an animal’s self-governance_3b operating on the potential of two metabolic states’_1b (SI_s).

Here is Kull’s interscope.

0050 Yes, I can recognize this interscope as a noumenon, but the items that give rise to phenomena and the processes that need mechanistic models are not obvious.  Maybe, the SV_s and SO_s support phenomena and SI_s needs to be accounted for by a model.

0051 Sharov and Tonnessen’s dyadic noumenal overlay formalizes this intuition and conveys the fact that all examples of semiotic agency have one (easily interpreted) dyadic actuality in common.

This example is no exception.

Phenomena follow form and matter (SV_s and SO_s).  The contiguities (SI_s and resonant contiguity) call for models.

0052 Surely, some simplifications may assist.

In particular, the contiguities should be made more accessible.

Fortunately, the English vernacular offers two words that fit the bill.

0053 The first is “habit”.  “Habit” is a spoken word that labels the SI_s.  A “habit” goes with the explicit abstraction where self-governance_3b serves as a normal context to the potential of ‘various courses of action’_1b.   Yes, our civilization already appropriated a label for this explicit abstraction.  That is promising.

On top of that, “habit” sounds like a formal cause and may serve as a final cause.

0054 The second is “salience”.  “Salience” is a spoken word that labels the contiguity between a specifying sign-object (SO_s) and an end (or final cause).  That “end” may be “a goal”, “a purpose” or “an intention”.

0054 Here is a picture of a simplified S&T’s noumenal overlay for this example.

0055 Surely, the elements that give rise to phenomena and the elements that must be accounted for by models stand out.

But, since I am not above pointing out the obvious, here are my associations.

May I summarize?

I start with an agent as a noumenon and Kull’s criteria as phenomena.

I end by combining both agent and Kull’s criteria in a triadic structure of semiotic agency that is at once a two-level interscope and a specifying sign-relation.

Then, Sharov and Tonnessen offer the opportunity to simplify this complicated triadic structure into a (science friendly) dyadic structure.

Now, Sharov and Tonnessen’s dyadic rendering of semiotic agency serves as a noumenal overlay that works as subject matter for biosemiotic inquiry.

0056 In the laboratory sciences, an experimental recipe allows the student to observe and measure phenomena that validate the model (overlaying the noumenon).

In biosemiotics, S&T’s noumenal overlay serves as a template for students and researchers.  Phenomena, corresponding to certain (real) elements, may be observed and measured in order to elucidate mechanistic models for the elements that constitute the contiguities.  In short, the mechanisms for the science beyond natural science consider phenomena that incorporate Aristotle’s formal and final causalities to be observable and measurable facets of S&T’s noumenal overlay. Consequently, biosemiotics is not philosophically impoverished.

0057 Does S&T’s noumenal overlay correspond to the propositions of a “New Mechanistic Philosophy” that have been floating around since around 2000 AD?

Yes, S&T’s noumenal overlay applies to structures that perform a function by virtue of their participation as a component in a larger operation.  In the example, being awake functions as a platform for the operation of conscious activities.  Function associates to salience.

No, S&T’s noumenal overlay does not reduce higher-level phenomena to the dynamics of lower-level components,except in so far as failure of lower-level components may trigger failure of higher-level components, leading to systemic failure.

0058 After that curveball, what about the idea of information?.

May I substitute the term, “information” for “object (SO_s)”?

If I do so, then I get two hylomorphes that look fairly independent, even though they are actually embedded, one within the other.

0059 What are the advantages of Sharov and Tonnessen’s noumenal overlay?

Well, first, for the natural sciences, noumena are recognizable things.  Such is the advantage of the label, “noumenon”.  The thing itself cannot be objectified by its observable and measurable facets because the noumenon should be obvious.  If it is not so obvious, then it must be pointed out.  To me, agency seems intuitively obvious.  At the same time, one cannot picture or point to agency.  The term is an explicit abstraction, leading to Kull’s criteria and similar proposals.

Second, for biosemiotics, semiotic agency manifests a sign-relation.  Sign-relations are intuitively obvious, but one cannot paint or tag a sign-relation.  In order to make the sign-relation an actual thing, the authors render a dyad, derived from the two-level specifying sign-relation. The dyad is a diagram that pictures the specifying-sign relation as an actuality.

For Aristotle, the dyad of matter and form constitutes the first step of philosophical abstraction.  See Comments on Jacques Maritain’s Book (1935) Natural Philosophy.  For Peirce, the category of secondness, the realm of actuality,consists in two contiguous real elements.

0060 Third, the S&T noumenal overlay more or less breaks down into elements that associate to phenomena and elements that need to be accounted for by models.

0061 How about validation?

Does this dyad integrate semiosis with mechanism?

In section 1.4, the authors offer principles for integration.

The question is whether this dyad satisfies those principles.

0062 The first principle?

According to anthropologist and semiotician, Gregory Bateson (1904-1980), a sign is a difference that expresses a difference.

Does S&T’s noumenal overlay match this statement?

0063 Note how Bateson mentions two differences.

The first difference is the difference between the SV_s and all other potential significations.  Somehow, to an agent, the SV_s stands out.  Well, it stands out because the SV_s “causes” (through habit SI_s) a SO_s. Or is it the other way around?  Does a SO_s make a SV_s more likely to be noticed?

The SV_s associates to form (for Aristotle’s hylomorphe) and effect (for a standard configuration of Peirce’s secondness).  The SV_s stands for a SO_s in the same way that a form can stand for its matter.  The SV_s is like a form that conjures the matter that substantiates it.  The SV_s is like an effect that prompts its cause.  So, the first difference is counter-intuitive, especially for the Aristotelian and the philosopher who imagines that cause precedes effect. Sign-relations do not easily break down into causes and effects. 

0064 The second difference occurs within the SO_s.  Now, within the SO_s, a sign-object [substantiates] a goal.  This substance characterizes a second dyad, corresponding to the sign-object serving as information substantiating a purpose.  So, the second difference is between two contiguous real elements: information and intention.  The substance may now be labeled with the term, “salience”.

Bateson’s definition of sign is satisfied.

0065 The second principle for integrating mechanism and semiosis is that a sign-relation may be regarded mechanistically.

Sharov and Tonnessen’s noumenal overlay fits the second principle in so far as the contiguities are subject to models.  The biosemiotician models [habits] and [salience].

0066 The third principle is that lower-level agencies are relied upon by higher-level agents.

S&T’s overlay satisfies this principle in the following manner.

0067 The fourth and final principle?

Mechanistic and semiotic analyses complement one another.

The complementarity between dyadic mechanistic formulations and triadic semiotic structures is obvious in S&T’s noumenal overlay.

0068 Now, I wrap up chapter one, by returning to the nature of science as two interlocking judgments.

The Positivist’s judgment originally applies to the natural sciences.  By the time that Kant articulates his position (that the noumenon cannot be ignored), physics and chemistry are speedily developing.  Biology is not far behind.  The social sciences are already exercising empirio-schematic judgments, even though noumena for the social sciences are not as obvious as noumena for the natural sciences.

0069 Does the Positivist’s judgment make sense?

Yes, as far as scientists are concerned, the empirio-schematic judgment (what ought to be, secondness) defines the operation.  Disciplinary language (relation, thirdness) brings mathematical and mechanical models (what ought to be,secondness) into relation with observations and measurements of phenomena (what is, firstness).  Models are a source of illumination for scientists.

No, as far as philosophers are concerned, what is for the Positivist’s judgment potentiates the operation. But, there is a problem.

0070 Why doesn’t a noumenon [&] its phenomena belong to the category of secondness, rather than firstness?

Secondness consists of two contiguous real elements.  Secondness is the dyadic realm of actuality.  Matter and form belong to one thing.  They are two real and distinct elements.  So, theoretically they are independent.  Matter [substantiates] form.

In contrast, what is for the Positivist’s judgment is assigned to the category of firstness.  Firstness is the monadic realm of possibility.  This implies that the two real elements cannot exist independently.  In other words, there is no noumenon without its phenomena and there are no phenomena without their noumenon.  The noumenon is the thing itself.  Phenomena are its observable and measurable facets.  They are the same thing.

But, they are distinctly different aspects of the same thing.  A noumenon [cannot be be objectified as] its phenomena.

0071 For example, consider a coin.

For Aristotle, the matter of a coin is (presumably) a precious metal.  The form is the stamped shape.  Matter and form are real (and independent) elements.  The coin belongs to secondness, according to Aristotle.

For the Positivist’s what is, the noumenon of a coin is the thing itself.  Its phenomena consists of the stamped impression, its standard weight, its standard metallic composition, as well as other observable and measurable facets.  Do phenomena also include how people handle coins?  Is how people handle coins an observable and measurable facet of the coin itself?

What is going on?

Is the Positivist asking the Aristotelian for the coin that he is holding, in order to ascertain whether he can detect some phenomena related to this noumenon?

What is he providing in return?

Oh, the Positivist is going to provide a data-driven mathematical model that is as actual (imbued with secondness) as what the Aristotelian regards as matter [substance] form.

I suppose that is worth the price of the coin.

0072 Okay, what about the transactional value of the coin?

For Aristotle, the transactional value is the coin’s formal cause.  The intended use of the coin for transactions (and for storing value) are the coin’s final causes.  These formal and final causes belong to the category of firstness, the realm of possibility.  So, for all practical purposes, the Aristotelian philosopher focuses on the noumenon, as the source of illumination.

For the Positivist’s what ought to be, models of transactional value explain how people respond to the noumenon, the coin, through use in transactions and in storage.  In the empirio-schematic judgment, the disciplinary language of economics (relation, thirdness) brings mathematical and mechanical models (what ought to be, secondness) into relation with observations and measurements of the way people handle money (what is, firstness),

0073 Clearly, the scientist adopts the Positivist’s judgment in order to construct models as real sources of illumination.  These models exclude formal and final causation.  The positivist intellect excludes metaphysics.  Consequently, all the formal and the final causes within the Positivist’s judgment get shoveled into the noumenon, then ignored, since the noumenon cannot be objectified as its phenomena.

0074 In the following figure, the two sources of illumination are painted red.

0075 So, what does the triumphalist scientist do?

Well, in academic laboratory sciences, triumphalist scientists place the model as an overlay for the noumenon.

In this way, a triumphal natural scientist can resolve the antithesis embedded in Kant’s slogan. The model (overlaying the noumenon) can be objectified as its phenomena.

0076 Here is a comparison. 

0077 While the reader may think that the triumphalist scientist’s trick for getting around Kant’s slogan may not be legitimate, the substitution provides a curious opportunity.  If a natural scientific model serves as a noumenon, then the observable and measurable facets of that noumenal overlay may serve as phenomena for another exercise of the empirio-schematic judgment.  A change in what is, for the Positivist’s judgment, provides new material for what ought to be.  In this case, what ought to be supports academic educational laboratory sciences.

The challenge for the laboratory sciences involves a search for experimental phenomena that clearly, safely and conveniently objectify their model (noumenal overlay).

0078 Chapter two contains a historical overview that wildly differs from a recent philosophically oriented history of semiotics, John Deely’s book (2001 AD), The Four Ages.  Already, in the examination of chapter one, past philosophers have been mentioned, as needed.  These philosophers include Charles Peirce (1839-1914), Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) and the mechanical philosophers of the seventeenth century, such as Rene Descartes (1596-1650).   Oh, let me not forget Aristotle (384-322 BC).

0079 Aristotle’s philosophy is embedded in Sharov and Tonnessen’s noumenal overlay.

0080 The noumenal overlay has the structure of the initial step in natural philosophy, the recognition that a thing is a dyad consisting of matter [substance] form.  In particular, the agent associates to matter.  A sign-vehicle, the first element in a sign-relation, associates to form.

One could say, “Agency (matter) takes the shape (form) of the sign-vehicle.”  Of course, this statement confounds the sign-vehicle with the sign-relation.  But, that is what humans routinely do.  A red-octagonal “stop-sign” is not the same as the act of stopping according to a traffic law.  Yet, it seems so.

0081 I could say that the sign-vehicle represents a semiotic form that actualizes agency as matter.

Or, I could say that the agency, as matter, substantiates semiosis, as form, for the fundamental dyad.

0082 For the resonant dyad, agency has the same structure as Aristotle’s hylomorphe.  Agency may be configured as matter [substantiating] form.  The matter-in-matter may be regarded as “the stuff of agency”,  while its corresponding form-in-matter may be regarded as “the shape of agency”.  The stuff of agency [substantiates] the shape of agency.

0083 The authors recount Aristotle’s three ethical principles of human agency.

One, the agent is the “originating principle” of his actions.  In Greek, the term, “originating”, is “arche-“.  Carl Jung (1875-1961) bases his psychoanalytical approach on “archetypes”.  Archetypes label habitual (some would say “innate”) patterns of human attitudes and behaviors.

Two, the agent deliberates about things within the agent’s own power to accomplish.

Three, the agent aims at ends that are distinct from the agent, himself.

0084 Does S&T’s noumenal overlay resonate with Aristotle’s three principles of human agency?

Here is my guess.

The only item that Aristotle does not elucidate is the real initiating event, the form that constellates matter for the fundamental dyad.

0085 To me, Jung’s psychoanalytic model of the archetype associates to Aristotle’s first ethical principle.  Given a real initiating event, the archetype accounts for psychoanalytic observations of the way that a client considers things (2) and the ends that are implied by choices that the client makes (3).  Indeed, Jung’s tradition labels a constellated archetype (a habit of deliberation) with the term, “primordial image”.

For example, the “king” is an archetype.  The constellations of “an honorable and just king” and “a dishonorable and manipulative king” are primordial images.

0085 Carl Jung builds on a foundational insight of Sigmund Freud (1856-1939).

What is the founding insight of the founder of psychoanalysis?

A choice is not the same as a wish.

Choice corresponds to the contiguity between information and goal (or “things to consider” and “ends other than self”).

Wish corresponds to the semiotic form implicated in human agency.  A wish may serve as a real initiating event.

0086  Hmmm….

This makes me wonder…

Exactly what is psychotherapy designed to accomplish?

Does psychotherapy train the practitioner to turn wishes into choices?

No wonder therapy costs so much.

Most civilizations teach precisely the opposite lesson.

Wishes should not be converted into choices.

0087 Rene Descartes and Immanuel Kant are discussed in sections 2.2 and 2.3.

0088 Descartes is considered to be one of the great mechanical philosophers of the 17^th century.  He invents a tradition that becomes capable of substituting mathematical and mechanical models for the thing itself.

Weirdly, triumphalist natural science makes the noumenon superfluous.

That brings me to the metaphor of the leaf as a site for a type of inquiry that makes the tree of semiosis invisible.  I pull a leaf off the tree of semiosis, examine it carefully, and realize that it only proposes a mechanism that substitutes for the thing itself.

Does the tree of semiosis even exist?

Where do all these leaves, like ink-filled pages in academic journals, come from?  All I read about are observations and measurements of phenomena, as well as the mathematical and mechanical models that account for them.  Sheaves of leaves, all detached from… what?

0089 Well, from prior discussion on the nature of the Positivist’s judgment and the empirio-schematic judgment, I may construct the following association between Sharov and Tonnessen’s noumenal overlay and Descartes’ triumphalist scientific paradigm.

It is just a guess.

0090 What about Descartes’ mind-body dualism?

Well, what if the noumenon is a wish?

Does the term, “wish”, associate to the mind or the body?

If wish (noumenon) associates to the mind, and if the observable and measurable facets of my wish are my choices (phenomena), then I can construct a model based on my bad choices that does not blame my conscious self (er…. “mind”) but rather my unconscious self (er… “body”).

Oh, that takes me back to Sigmund Freud.

0091 Now, I am not claiming that Freudian psychoanalysis is an exemplar of Descartes’ mind-body dualism.

My claim runs on a different set of tracks.

The locomotive manifests the power to move its body-cars and authorizes its own mission for why the cars are in the train.

As soon as the inquirer replaces the psychoanalytic noumenon, with a model of an unconscious locomotive, pulling the body along like a train and justifying itself to the mind, then the analytic dyad becomes the method by which a client comes to awareness of what drives unconscious wishes.

0092 Let me say that again.

What do the above figures imply?

Initially, conscious wishes constitute the real initiating event (SV_s) for this noumenal overlay.

0093 As soon as I commit an act of triumphalist science and replace the conscious wish with an unconscious one, then Freud’s schema detaches from the S&T noumenal overlay.  

Unconscious wishes are models that replace conscious wishes as the noumenon.

Bad choices serve as phenomena that can be observed and measured.  Observations of bad choices support models for how a locomotive for unconscious wishes both pulls the body along, like cars on a train, and justifies its own existence because the cars on the train must be going somewhere important.

The Freudian “driver of unconscious wishes” paradigm enters into Sharov and Tonnessen’s dyadic noumenal overlay as the source of real initiating events (SV_s) and then is objectified by bad choices (SO_s).

The real initiating event (SV_s) no longer consists of conscious wishes, but unconscious ones.

At this moment, the psychoanalyst lets go of the tree of semiosis because the locomotive-model (as noumenon) now generates real initiating events (SV_s) that stand for bad choices (SO_s).

The client now must learn how to place the locomotive on a track that produces less bad or maybe even good choices.

0094 In short, as soon as the triumphalist psychoanalyst claims the prize and places the locomotive-model in for the noumenon, the subject of inquiry changes to one that a biosemiotician is no longer interested in.  The real initiating event_2a is produced by a locomotive of desire, as if this hypothetical construct is a disembodied mind.

Okay, maybe the substitution of a locomotive model for the real initiating event_2a would create a subject of inquiry that a biosemiotician might be interested in.

Shall we ask what the locomotive has to say?

0095 Sharov and Tonnessen’s noumenal overlay allows me to see how the character of biosemiotic models changes within the milieu of psychoanalysis.

What else have I learned?

Biosemiotic models primarily account for the habit of the major dyad.  Psychoanalytic disciplinary language and the potential of the analytic dyad correspond to self-governance and the potential of courses of action.  

Biosemiotic models secondarily account for the salience between bad choices (as observed phenomena) and attributions to a locomotion of unconscious wishes (as a source of phenomena).

0096 The primary biosemiotic models may be abbreviated with the term, “habit”.

The secondary biosemiotic models are a little more slippery.  The resonant dyad associates with the matter of semiotic agency and may be abbreviated with the term, “choice”.

Here is a picture of Sharov and Tonnessen’s noumenal overlay, which has proved surprisingly adaptable so far, greatly simplified.

0097 Section 2.4 concerns evolution.

Botanist Jean Baptiste Lemark (1744-1829), natural philosopher Charles Darwin (1809-1882) and English polymath Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) observe natural phenomena.  Each builds models from their observations.  In doing so, each follows the Positivist’s judgment, to varying degrees.

0098 Here is a picture, one again.

0099 The noumenon may be described as each species, making its way in the world.  Jean Baptiste Lemark is a botanist, who argues that nature (not God) is the supreme author of all evolving things and conceives of evolution as nature’s self-governance.  This alone is a breakthrough viewpoint, especially in regards to the idea of semiotic agency.  The question that he apparently does not answer is how self-governance works on the potential of diverse courses of action.

0100 In this regard, Lemark’s models do not satisfy the expectations of success that allows a triumphalist scientist to place his models, over the noumenon, thereby resolving the tension introduced by Immanuel Kant.

0101 A lifetime later, Charles Darwin arrives at a model that does the job. Noting the practices of animal breeders, Darwin claims that nature itself selects for certain properties. Nature acts as ruthlessly as human animal breeders (who kill the animals that do not satisfy expectations).  “Breeder selection” becomes “natural selection”.  The trait being selected for gets re-labeled as “adaptation”.  The breeder selects for a particular trait based on some opportunity.  That opportunity becomes the niche, the potential to exploit ‘something’ independent of the adapting species.

0102 Darwin’s paradigm, is it really a model?

Or is it a noumenon?

It is not based on observations and measurements of the animal itself, but of what a human breeder is doing in order to um… play God with another species.

Oh, it is alright.  The breeder is really “playing nature”.

0103 Here is a picture of the resulting two-level interscope.

0104 Now, Darwin’s two-level interscope should look familiar.  It embodies a specifying-sign relation.

Using dog breeding as an example, burrows of various forest animals_2a (SV_s) stands for the long-narrow body of the dachshund or “badger dog”_2b (SO_s) in regards to selective breeding_3b of a dog able to participate in the hunting of badgers_1b (SI_s).

0105 At this point, Darwinism can be reformulated into a dyadic structure more suitable for overlaying onto the noumenon, since components of the structure are readily identified as phenomena or the stuff of models.

0106 Here is a picture of Darwinism portrayed as an S&T noumenal overlay.

0107 What about simplification?

I wonder whether this is where the English polymath, Herbert Spencer, comes into the picture. 

0108 Natural selection_3b operates on the potential of exploiting an actuality independent of the adapting species_1b and supports an evolutionary model_3b that Spencer labels, “survival of the fittest”.  It’s like a habit. Today, “survival of the fittest” is less provocatively named “differential reproductive success”.

0109 An adaptation is objectively oriented towards a goal. Do what it takes to stay alive.  So, the contiguity between the objective adaptation and the goal of staying alive may be labeled, “a choice”.

0110 Finally, nature asks, “If I bred animals for specific traits, what would I wish for?”

Would I wish for a dog that scurries down badger burrows?

Would I wish for a dog that runs a race-track and wins?

0111 Only a genius would tease out a simplification capable of transforming the discipline of biology from the scribbles of natural philosophers to the notebooks of scientific dachshunds.

0112 Spencer’s evolutionary vision is beautiful in its radical simplicity.  It is what the noumenon must be, if Darwin’s evolutionary schema is to be applicable.  For decades, most biologists demur, saying, “I would rather study biology as pure mechanism or through observations of natural phenomena.”

0113 But, Spencer’s breakthrough cannot be denied.

During the same decades, other post-Christendom polymaths begin working out the machinations of other “evolutionary visions”, in which an intellectual (or, should I say, “oligarchal”) vanguard selectively “habituates” humans according to their ideological formulations (wishes).  Adapt to our wish-filled system or die.  In some jurisdictions, this mandate becomes the human’s choice.

Well, that sounds existential.

0114 But, it establishes a point.

For some biological sciences, triumphalist scientists can overlay the noumenon with a successful model, just as in chemistry and physics.

For other biological sciences, something else is going on.

Sharov and Tonnessen’s dyad is not the first non-mechanistic noumenal overlay.

0115 Section 2.5 considers the non-mechanistic approaches of the American pragmatist, William James (1842-1910), and French philosopher, Henri Bergson (1859-1941).

These thinkers reject fully mechanistic models.

Do their ideas cohere to Sharov and Tonnessen’s noumenal overlay?

0116 For example, James considers consciousness.  Consciousness is a state of semiotic agency.

This makes sense.

0117 Here is another option.

If one reduced the noumenal overlay of “consciousness” to a model of one specific type of incident where a real initiating event (such as a subject encountering loaded options provided by a state-empowered ideological agent) determines the same choice (regardless of the diversity of the human subjects), then a mechanism (the option preferred by the empowered agent is the “better” option) may be said to be a correct model.  Afterwards, this “successful” modelmay be placed over the noumenal overlay of “consciousness”.  Choice is habitually following the wishes of an ideological agent.

0118 This makes no sense at all.

Why?

The subject (human) lacks semiotic agency (the topic introduced in section 2.6).

0119 But, what if the intellects of the time (say, around 1900) say that the subject has agency in way of choice [habit] wish.  What if choice [habit] wish establishes a conceptual apparatus that can substitute for S&T’s semiotic agency as a noumenal overlay?

Then, is “consciousness” still relevant?

Sure, James and Bergson say so.  But, where are the mechanistic and mathematical models that are the fruits of the Positivist’s judgment when “consciousness” is positioned as the noumenon for human agency?

0120 Is this where phenomenology comes in?

Phenomenology is the topic of section 2.7.

0121 Razie Mah offers a series, titled “Phenomenology And The Positivist Intellect”.  E-articles within the series are available at smashwords and other e-book venues. The present blog fits nicely into this series, because… well… wait and see.

Sharov and Tonnessen’s book, Semiotic Agency, brings up the issue of phenomenology in section 2.7 and develops the theme of phenomenology in chapter 9.

So, section 2.7 is an introduction.

0122 I have already set a civilizational scene that draws phenomenology onto the stage as an actor who is trying to deal with the way that a theoretical construct that seems to be a mechanistic model (such as Spencer’s evolutionary vision as the dyad, choice [habit] wish) gets overlaid onto biological noumena and then is objectified by phenomena supporting empirio-schematic models that treat humans, not as semiotic agents, but as machines that validate the noumenal overlay.

0123 But, Spencer’s evolutionary vision is not a mechanistic model, even though it appears that way to the triumphalist biologist.  Rather, it is a declaration of what the noumenon should be for the evolutionary sciences.

Plus, it is a simplification of Darwin’s two-level interscope, re-configured in the style of S&T’s noumenal overlay (points 107-112).

The resulting phenomena support observations when wishes and choices are experimentally controlled.  After crunching the data, scientists offer a mathematical or mechanical model that characterizes the habit.

When applied to humans as biological subjects, the Positivist’s judgment does not make sense.

Human semiotic agency becomes a black box, to be replaced by a successful mathematical and mechanical model based on phenomena arising from the controlled initiation of wishes and the detached observation of choices.

Does this makes sense?

If phenomena are the observable and measurable facets of a noumenon, and if the noumenon is choice [habit] wish,then occasions of choices and wishes, even though metaphysical (in Aristotle’s sense of the term) must be classified as phenomena.

Humans are capable of observing and measuring these phenomena, because the tools to do so are innate.