Summary of text [comment] pages 43 and 44

Schoonenberg noted that, according to de Chardin, “evil” arose from statistical necessity, due to the multiplicity and variety of innumerable attempts to bring “something out of Nothing”.  These attempts, even for the short span of a lifetime, means that scandals – events that shock our moral sensibilities – will occur.  But do not worry. The world is rising towards ever increasing unity.

[To me, it seems that de Chardin’s term “unity” stands in contrast to “multiplicity”.  “Unity” puts “multiplicity” into context and “multiplicity” situates “nothingness”.

In nested form: Unity₃( multiplicity₂( Nothingness₁))

“Unity₃” brings “mulitiplicity₂” into relation with “the potential inherent in Nothingness₁”.

Unity₃ puts multiplicity₂ into context.

Multiplicity₂ emerges from Nothingness₁.

Multiplicity₂ situates Nothingness₁.

Perhaps, de Chardin imagined “unity” to be “some sort of end point in the evolution of multiplicity”.

But is that not the same as a normal context?]

Summary of text [comment] pages 43 and 44

De Chardin claimed that, in our evolutionary understanding of biology, the problem of natural evil had vanished.  [Schoonenberg used the term “physical”, but I have already assigned the same term for particular purposes.]

The constitution of creatures out of nothingness imposes a limitation on “what is created”.

[That is, in the creation of a positive good – the creature – out of nothingness, one necessarily – logically – creates the potential for a privation.  All creatures live within certain the limits.]

Summary of text [comment] pages 43 and 44

Is evil necessary?

[Look at natural selection.  Natural selection occurs when one natural subject puts another natural subject to the test – occasionally pushing it to the limit – so to speak.  The nested form containing both natural metaphysical and physical evil is built into the system.  Disorder and failure accompany every spontaneous order and success.

Consider the way that we use the terms “environment” and “ecology”.

“Environment” associates to “physical evil”, the source of the test, the situation.

“Ecology” associates to “metaphysical evil”. For example, the consequences of an environmental challenge is seen in the survival of populations. Certain adaptations will reduce the cost of that particular challenge.  But the price is always being exacted.

And yet, we regard both the “environment” and the “ecology” as good, perhaps sacred, spontaneous orders.

Given this, is it any wonder that Schoonenberg turned to Pierre Tielhard de Chardin for an answer to the apparently insoluble problem of natural evil?]

[Second, let me look at moral evil:

Moral evil^physical₂₍₁₎:  __₃( human acts create situation₂( moral evil proceeds – through intentionality – from the – immature – person₁ …)

Moral evil^metaphysical₃₍₂₎: … determines “subject₁” as a person₃ – in need of conversion – & determines status of subject₍₃₎( limitations under the situation₂ ( __₁ )

Can I associate moral evil^metaphysical to a context that possesses a depth, longevity and destructive power that is greater than natural evil^metaphysical?

For moral evil, status of the subject₍₃₎ is not the only property determined.  The status of subject₁ is also judged to be a person₃.  Thus, an intersubjective relation necessarily accompanies the determination.   Here is the site of the depth, duration and destruction.  One context contains both perpetrator and victim.

Consider the relation between a town and an earthquake fault line.  There is no intersubjective relation between the two.

Consider the relation between a criminal and a victim.  There an intersubjective relation between the two.

This relation has no bottom, it endures, and it can be totally destructive.]

Summary of text [comment] page 43

Physical and moral evil differ not only in their origin but also in their depth, duration and destructive tendencies.

[Now the topic really gets interesting.  Or, I should say, confusing.

To me, depth, duration and destructive tendencies points to law^essential and its conjugates, law^{acceptance_of_consequences} and law^{denial_of_consequences}.

So let me look at natural evil first:

Natural evil^physical₂₍₁₎ :  ___₃( an event, say an earthquake₂( … proceeds from natural subject₁; say, geological processes₁))

Natural evil^metaphysical₃₍₂₎ :  … determines status of natural subjects₍₃₎; say, living forms₍₃₎( radically altered habitat plus limitations of living beings₂( ___ ₁))

Can I associate both natural and moral evil^metaphysical to a context that “possesses some kind of infinity” because “the determination of status” belongs to a normal context?

Normal contexts always possess some kind of infinity, because they, like all judgments, are atemporal.  This includes both law^essential and think^divine.

Maybe this gets me part of the way.

However, this does not seem to address how natural and moral evils differ in depth, duration and destructive tendencies.]

Summary of text [comment] page 43

Saint Anselm said, “Sin possesses some kind of infinity.”  Schoonenberg relates this to ‘man’ refusing to live in communion with an infinite God.

Physical evil does not have these features.

[How are we to fit this into a nested form?

Does “refusing to live in communion with an infinite God₃” correspond to “a determination of the state of subject₁ as person₃“?

It sure seems that way.

“Sin₂ possesses some kind of infinity” is formulated by Schoonenberg as “some sort of actual limitation₂” contextualized by “refusing to live in communion with an infinite God₃”.

Consequently, Anselm may be addressing moral evil^metaphysical₃₍₂₍₎₎ by pointing out a limitation₂ of “the person who makes sin possible₁”.]

[Humans innately frame both moral and natural evil in terms of moral evil.

Scientists intuitively understand this. In order to communicate the mechanisms of a natural subject, they feel compelled to explain its apparent responsibility (corresponding to the intentionality associated with the need for conversion) and developmental history (corresponding to the intentionality associated with immaturity).

Otherwise, nonscientists will not comprehend the scientific explanations.

Of course, these attributes appear absurd to those trained in pure science.  Mechanistic explanations should stand on their own.

But read any scientific article and you will find the vapors – the spirits – of “why it acts”, “what it is responsible for”, and “how it came to be”.

Simply put, we orient ourselves on the basis of moral designs.  We often confound the the moral and the natural, even though they are distinct.]

Summary of text [comment] page 42

[Maturity and fairness are crucial for understanding moral evil.

Now, allow me to go backwards and tackle the assertion that natural evil appears as moral evil.

We already know that both have the same categorical structure.  Is this enough to account for our experiences?  Or are we hardwired to confound the two in some other way?

Let us look at the two nested forms:

evil^metaphysical₃₍₂₍₎₎ & evil^physical₂₍₁₎

Nature:

inherent limitations, privation of capacities₃₍₂₍₎₎ & challenges, privation of goods₂₍₁₎

Moral:

determination of status of subject₁ as person₃ (the wolf) and the status of subject₃ with inherent limitations and lacking certain capacities₃₍₂₍₎₎ (the sheep) & challenges, privation of goods by an agent, subject₁ (the wolf)₂₍₁₎

The singular difference between natural and moral evil is that, for the latter, the subject committing the sin and the subject suffering the consequences are in intersubjective relation.

Since humans habitually recognize the natural evil as an example of moral evil, I must conclude that the latter is innate.

In other words, in the Lebenswelt that we evolved in, recognition of moral evil (with culprits and victims) conferred adaptive advantage, while recognition of natural evil was not under equivalent selection pressures.

Perhaps, some evolutionarily ancient recognition of natural evil served as the foundation for our innate recognition of moral evil.

Or, perhaps, in all mammals, natural evil is personalized, making our recognition of natural evil the psychological feature that needs to be explained.]

Summary of text [comment] page 42

Development is key to understanding the difference between moral and natural evil.  Sin always entails a certain amount of immaturity, “a failure to grow”.

In addition, humans needs conversion.

These features of moral evil; immaturity and “need for conversion” are not features of natural evil.

[How to formulate this in terms of moral evil^metaphysical and moral evil^physical?

Immaturity might apply to the firstness of moral evil^physical.

Moral evil^physical₂₍₁₎:  __₃( human acts create situation₂( moral evil proceeds –- from the – immature – person₁ …)

___₃( actus hominis₂( passio hominem₁)

“The need for conversion” might apply to the thirdness of moral evil^metaphysical.

Moral evil^metaphysical₃₍₂₎: … determines “subject₁” as a person₃ – in need of conversion – & determines status of subject₍₃₎( limitations under the situation₂ ( __₁ )

malum hominis₃( actus et potenia hominis₂( ___₁ )

I conclude that immaturity and the need for conversion go together in the same fashion as metaphysical and physical evil.

I would label these features of the nested form “intentionality”.  Both immaturity and the need to conversion pertain to intentionality, one as firstness and the other as thirdness.]

Summary of text [comment] page 42

[Third, the arrangement of moral evil^metaphysical₃₍₂₎ and moral evil^physical₂₍₁₎ illuminates the nested form of intersubjective₃(objective₂(subjective₁)).

The objectivity of sin₂ is rarely articulated except through the perspectives of intersubjectivity₃ (the determination of subject₁ as a person₃ simultaneously with the determination of the status of subject₍₃₎) or subjectivity₁ (the potential inherent in subject₁).

Say what?

Take a look at the normal context for moral evil.  Two subjects are determined: Subject₁, the perpetrator and wolf, is contextualized as a person₃.  Subject₃, the victim and the sheep, is regarded as “the one whose limitations are tested₃“.

Whenever we judge the action, we talk about the actuality of sinful action through the normal context.  We say: What an injustice.

Out of this formulation, the intersubjective relationality of sin becomes an avenue for articulating moral evil.

Similarly, we talk about the possibilities that underlie the actuality of moral evil.  One subject₁, the perpetrator, is regarded.  The intersubjective relation to the victim does not appear, just like the town on a fault line does not appear in an analysis concerning earthquakes.  The objectivity of sin₂, the actual act, is articulated by discussion about the perpetrator.  We ask: Why would ‘he’ commit such a crime?

In sum, we rarely talk about the sinful act as actuality itself.  We talk about its intersubjective context and subjective motivations.

We articulate the objectivity of sin₂ by talking about moral evil^metaphysical₃₍₂₎ and moral evil^physical₂₍₁₎.  This gives us a clue about how humans deal with actuality.]