Tag Archives: hermeneutics

05/18/22

Looking at Andrew Kulikovsky’s Overview (2005) “The Bible and Hermeneutics” (Part 8 of 10)

0058 The greimas square in the prior blog contains two paradoxes.

0059 For A1 and B1, here is the paradox.

Genesis 1-11 participates in the historical reality of the literary traditions of the ancient Near East.  These literary traditions present fantastical elements that, to us, appear to be inventions.  They are inventions.  But, they are not made out of whole cloth.  They describe natural processes, historical events and social behaviors that cannot be captured by spoken language, except through phantasmagorical scenes, for a variety of reasons.

One of these reasons is that the semiotic qualities of speech-alone talk potentiate “world building” processes that cannot be captured in the spoken language at the time.  How can someone inside a historic process tell the story of the historic process from an outsider’s point of view?

Indeed, what is the nature of witness?

0060 For A2 and B2, here is the paradox.

The biblical witness is preserved by a living tradition. When the Bible is redacted, perhaps during and shortly after the Babylonian exile, no one knows that those hills, out in the middle of the desert, contain royal archives, holding stories very similar to those that the redactors are working with.

The extrabiblical materials include cuneiform tablets, excavated and translated by archaeologists.  These tablets come from royal libraries of long-buried capitals.  These tablets serve as the subject matter for constructing the literary forms of the ancient Near East.

0061 Kulikovsky clarifies this greimas square by mentioning a favorite theme of liberal theologians: cultural accommodation.

Without a doubt, the stories of Genesis 2:4-11 correspond to the archaeological periods of the Ubaid, the Uruk and the Sumerian Dynastic of southern Mesopotamia.

From all appearances, the tradition of Seth promulgates stories, from Adam and Eve in the Garden of Eden to the Tower of Babel, from a point of view standing deep inside of the above progression of cultures.  Then, Abraham and Sarah step out of that insider tradition.

The so-called “Seth hypothesis” is discussed in chapter 13C of An Archaeology of the Fall.

So, what does the term, “cultural accommodation” really mean?

0062 Genesis 1-11 is properly interpreted by considering extrabiblical materials from the ancient Near East.  Kulikovsky quotes Paul Seely in this regard.  Genesis 1 reflects the cosmology of the second millennium BC.  Modern science may produce a more accurate picture of the universe.  But, that does not invalidate (or take priority over) the theological message of Genesis 1.  However, it does suggest that Genesis 1 is a temporal concession to the people at that time.

0063 Hmmm.  Does the term, “temporal concession”, key into B2 in the following greimas square.

Figure 13

It sure does, because Genesis 2.4-11 is an insider’s view of the formation of civilization in southern Mesopotamia.

0064 Does the intercalation of Genesis into the society and history of southern Mesopotamia  (B2) contrast with the truth and honesty of the biblical witness of nature, history and behavior (A2)?

There are two ways to say, “Yes.”

0065 Yes, theological liberals think that cultural accommodation (B2) contradicts the idea that the biblical record conveys historical reality (A1).  Plus, extrabiblical material from the ancient Near East (B2) complements the idea that the fantastic elements and narratives are inventions (B1).

0066 Yes, the idea that Genesis 2:4-11 is an insider’s view of the Ubaid, the Uruk and the Sumerian Dynastic (B2), contrasts with a plain view of the biblical portrayal of nature, history, and human behavior as true and honest (A2), but the idea does not invalidate biblical truth and honesty.  The idea (B2) contradicts the notion of historical reality (A1), because witness from within a historical event cannot describe the totality of the event, even though such witness can describe the character of the event.  For this reason, the inventiveness of ancient literary traditions (B1) can be seen as necessary, because the character of events is more important than the mundane details of the occurrence.

0067 The word, “invention”, is under contention.

In one use, primitive people invent their stories out of whole cloth, so the stories are both incorrect and deceptive.

In the other use, inventiveness is necessary because spoken words fail during civilizational crises.   Mythical constructions attempt to capture the processes where one social reality dissolves and another coagulates in the crucible of speech-alone talking southern Mesopotamia.

0068 The former use of the word, “invention”, is condemned by the Evangelical Theological Society.  The latter is not.

05/17/22

Looking at Andrew Kulikovsky’s Overview (2005) “The Bible and Hermeneutics” (Part 9 of 10)

0069 Does the term, “cultural accommodation”, cohere with the idea that Genesis 2:4-11 is an insider’s view of the Ubaid, the Uruk, and the Sumerian Dynastic.

0070 How does one describe events that are potentiated by the semiotic qualities of speech-alone talk?

This is one of the challenges facing folk within the emerging civilization of southern Mesopotamia.

Things happen that no one expects.  The world of the Ubaid gets more and more complicated.  Innovation follows innovation.  Villages turn into towns.  Towns expand into cities.  The Ubaid becomes wealthier, more powerful, more hierarchical, more specialized, more unequal and, of course, more deranged.

0071 The hypothesis of the first singularity challenges the modern… er… postmodern imagination.

How do we imagine the social changes that follow the potentiation of labor and social specialization by speech-alone talk?

0072 The semiotics of speech-alone talk is radically different than the semiotics of hand-speech talk.  As discussed in The First Singularity and Its Fairy Tale Trace, the early Ubaid practices speech-alone talk, at a time when all the surrounding cultures practice hand-speech talk.  But, that is not the case for long.  The surrounding cultures see what the Ubaid can do.  They drop the hand-talk component of their hand-speech talk in imitation.  Then, weirdly, they also start to become more and more complicated.

0073 No one in the Ubaid is prepared for the way that speech-alone talk works.  No one is accustomed to the deception that speech-alone permits, in contrast to hand-speech talk.  

Well, I suppose, after a number of generations, some people within the Ubaid culture start to figure out that speech-alone talk can be used to deceive, even while making apparently correct statements.  Plus, these deceptions lead to exposure. Exposure ends in disaster.

0074 How so?

We project meaning, presence and message into spoken words.  Then, we construct artifacts that validate our projection.  When the artifacts are working, everything seems fine.  When the artifacts stop working, we are exposed.  Everything that our projections tell us is true turns out to be wrong.

0075 Hmmm.  Does any of this sound like Genesis 2.4-4?

05/16/22

Looking at Andrew Kulikovsky’s Overview (2005) “The Bible and Hermeneutics” (Part 10 of 10)

0076 Of course, the science always changes.  The revelations in Scripture do not.

Darwin’s theory of natural selection is less than two centuries old.  Certain Christian doctrines have remained unchanged for twenty centuries.

0077 What is the problem?

Is there a problem with highly educated experts claiming that scientific knowledge is more believable than the book of Genesis?

Wait until they hear about the hypothesis of the first singularity.

Is the problem that there is a demonic serpent hiding in the tree of the knowledge of good and evil?

Modern secular academics have been cultivating that tree for centuries.

0078 Hermeneutics is key.  The problem lies in how to interpret Scripture.  The reader3b must interpret2b the biblical text1b, using hermeneutics and exegesis1b.

Kulikovsky relies on the 1978 Chicago Statement on Biblical Inerrancy, promulgated by the Evangelical Theological Society, in order to address these problems.

The Society affirms the good and denies the bad.

Yet, the bad turns out to be affirmations that are vulnerable to denial, because they may be taken so far as to negate their corresponding affirmations.  The denials contain views that must be held in abeyance and regarded with an eye towards mischief.

0079 Yet, the hypothesis of the first singularity offers a new opportunity.  Devotees of scientism will find no harbor in saying that scientific knowledge disproves or has priority over the Scriptures.  Those who want to limit Biblical authority to religious themes, and who offer recipes to separate the theological message from the worldviews of the ancient Near East, find no solace.

Why?

Genesis 2.4-11 is an insider’s view of the development of unconstrained social complexity in the Ubaid, the Uruk and the Sumerian Dynastic archaeological periods.

0080 The text itself is a feature of God’s revelation.

0081 The denials may be modified into contrasts that are vulnerable to being misconstrued and placed in greimas squares, along with their affirmations.

0082 Articles IX and XII yield one greimas square.

Figure 14

0083 Articles XIV and XX yield another greimas square.

Figure 15

0085 The scientific hypothesis of the first singularity changes the ground beneath Kulikovsky’s brief and concise overview.

Yet, the grounds of hermeneutics and exegesis remain the same.

Kulikovsky concludes that the difficultly lies, not so much with understanding the teaching of Scripture, but believing it to be real.

04/29/22

Looking at John Perez Vargas, Johan Nieto Bravo and Juan Santamaria Rodriguez’s Essay (2020) “Hermeneutics and Phenomenology in… Social Sciences Research” (Part 1 of 18)

0001 Three faculty at the Universidad Santo Tomas, Columbia, publish an article with the title, “Hermeneutics and Phenomenology in Human and Social Sciences Research”, in the journal, Civilizar: Cienceas Sociales y Humanas(volume 20(38), 2020, 137 to 146, DOI: https//doi.org/10.22518/jour.ccsh./2020.1a10).  I thank the authors for presenting in English.

0002 In this series of blogs, the above article serves as a testing ground for four commentaries on phenomenology, contemporary Thomism and science.  The commentaries, available at smashwords and other electronic e-book vendors, follow.

Reverie on Mark Spencer’s Essay (2021) “The Many Phenomenological Reductions”

Comments on Joseph Trabbic’s Essay (2021) “Jean-Luc Marion and … First Philosophy”

Comments on Richard Colledge’s Essay (2021) “Thomism and Contemporary Phenomenology”

Comments on Jack Reynolds’ Book (2018) “Phenomenology, Naturalism and Science”

0003 Testing ground?

These commentaries contain particular category-based nested forms, interscopes and judgments, constructed from (or in reverie to) the essay and book under consideration.  These synthetic structures are abductions, constructed on Peircean frames.

So, what to do with a guess?

Test it.

04/27/22

Looking at John Perez Vargas, Johan Nieto Bravo and Juan Santamaria Rodriguez’s Essay (2020) “Hermeneutics and Phenomenology in… Social Sciences Research” (Part 3 of 18)

0006 Test one.

In the conclusion (Part 5), the unspoken agenda of the authors becomes apparent.

Why are hermeneutics neglected in phenomenological inquiry?

0007 The authors offer several good reasons for why hermeneutics should be employed.

First, in history, Husserl’s project differentiates out of nineteenth century hermeneutic traditions.  Both refuse to accept the triumph of positivism.  So, if these two traditions have common ancestry, then why are they apparently not compatible?

Second, hermeneutics situates texts, in the same way that a reader situates an author’s writing.  So, hermeneutics situate the same phenomena as phenomenology.

Third, hermeneutic practices arise out of the potential of interpretation.  Phenomenological reductions arise out of the potential of identifying what the noumenon must be.  Why are these not complementary processes?

0008 An answer starts with the Positivist’s judgment, initially diagrammed in Comments on Jacques Maritain’s Book (1935) Natural Philosophy.  Judgment has a triadic structure consisting of three elements: relation, what is and what ought to be.  When these elements are assigned to Peirce’s categories, the judgment becomes actionable.

0009 The relation is a positivist intellect, who has a rule, saying, “Metaphysics is not allowed.”  This relation belongs to thirdness, the realm of normal contexts.

What ought to be is an empirio-schematic judgment, consisting of a disciplinary language (relation), mathematical and mechanical models (what ought to be) and observations and measurements (what is).  What ought to be belongs to secondness, the realm of actuality.

What is is a dyad, consisting of two contiguous elements.  The elements are a noumenon, the thing itself, and its phenomena, its observable and measurable facets.  The contiguity expresses a logical necessity.  In natural science, a noumenon cannot be reduced to its phenomena.  No arrangements of phenomena fully objectify their noumenon.  I place the contiguity in brackets.  A noumenon [cannot be objectified as] its phenomena.

0010 Here is a picture of the Positivist’s judgment.

Figure 01

This figure does not answer test one completely.  But, it is a start.

04/26/22

Looking at John Perez Vargas, Johan Nieto Bravo and Juan Santamaria Rodriguez’s Essay (2020) “Hermeneutics and Phenomenology in… Social Sciences Research” (Part 4 of 18)

0011 The first test posed by the authors concerns the apparent lack of compatibility between hermeneutics and phenomenology.

The lack is explained by the rule of the positivist intellect, saying, “No metaphysics.”

0012 Both phenomenology and hermeneutics are capable of situating the Positivist’s judgment.

However, hermeneutics arises from interpretation, which is necessarily metaphysical.  Interpretation is not physics.

0013 Can the same be said for phenomenology?

Phenomenological reduction self-identifies as not metaphysical, even as it elucidates what the noumenon ought to be.

0014 The positivist intellect’s rule gives permission to phenomenology, but not to hermeneutics.

Phenomenology, not hermeneutics, situates the Positivist’s judgment.

This answer is portrayed in Reverie on Mark Spencer’s Essay (2021) “The Many Phenomenological Reductions”.

04/25/22

Looking at John Perez Vargas, Johan Nieto Bravo and Juan Santamaria Rodriguez’s Essay (2020) “Hermeneutics and Phenomenology in… Social Sciences Research” (Part 5 of 18)

0015 Test two.

What is the latent dilemma between phenomenology and hermeneutics?

Both phenomenology and hermeneutics are able to situate the Positivist’s judgment.  However, since the rule of the positivist intellect disallows metaphysics, only phenomenology is allowed to situate scientific discourse.  Hermeneutics is programmatically excluded.

0016 How am I to diagram this answer?

First, the Positivist’s judgment unfolds into a content-level nested form, according to the categorical assignments of the elements.  Here is a picture.

Figure 02

0017 According to Comments on Jack Reynolds’ Book (2018) “Phenomenology, Naturalism and Science”, another latent problem stands between science and phenomenology.  Practicing scientists are perfectly happy to work within this content level, as the mechanical philosophers of the 17th century intend.  Hands-on natural scientists3a build models2a of observations2a of phenomena1a.  They take the noumenon1a for granted.

But, by the 20th century, visionary scientists lobby to situate the Positivist’s judgment with a glorified unfolding of the empirio-schematic judgment.

Edward Husserl (1859-1938) counters visionary scientists with phenomenology.  Husserl’s project3b brings the actuality of phenomenological reduction2b into relation of the possibilities inherent in a return to the noumenon1b.

0018 Here is a diagram of the resulting two-level interscope.  The situation-level nested form virtually situates (and emerges from) the content-level nested form.

Figure 03
04/22/22

Looking at John Perez Vargas, Johan Nieto Bravo and Juan Santamaria Rodriguez’s Essay (2020) “Hermeneutics and Phenomenology in… Social Sciences Research” (Part 6 of 18)

0019 Before continuing, I note that the relational structures in the prior blogs are presented in A Primer on the Category-Based Nested Form and A Primer on Sensible and Social Construction.  A two-level interscope characterizes sensible construction.  Sensible construction presumes a functioning perspective level, even though that perspective level may not be articulated.

0020 Now, I move on to test two, the latent exclusion of hermeneutics by Husserl’s paradigm.

What would a situation-level hermeneutic look like?

0021 Here is my guess, based on the essay.

A hermeneutic paradigm3b brings metaphysical realism2b into relation with the possibilities inherent in interpretation1b.

Figure 04

0022 This arrangement is not permitted.

Obviously, the actuality2 of this situation levelb, metaphysical realism2b, grates against the positivist intellect3a, because it2b defies its3a rule against metaphysics.  Less obviously, a difficulty originates from the reality that hermeneutics3b does not share the same perspective as the positivist intellect3a.  

Where is the perspective level?  

It is latent.

The term, “latent”, qualifies, because the perspective level of the Positivist’s judgment is not articulated.  It2c is just there.

It2c is simply given.

0023 What does this further imply?

Perceptive phenomenologists, such as the Catholic Jean-Luc Marion, note this lack of perspective and wonder what to do with it.  Could hermeneutics apply?  If so, then a normal context of hermeneutics3c could virtually contextualize Husserl’s paradigm3b, as Husserl’s project3b virtually situates the positivist intellect3a.

Would a perspective-level hermeneutics3c condone the rule of the positivist intellect3a?

I do not think so.

04/21/22

Looking at John Perez Vargas, Johan Nieto Bravo and Juan Santamaria Rodriguez’s Essay (2020) “Hermeneutics and Phenomenology in… Social Sciences Research” (Part 7 of 18

0024 So, hermeneutics3c does not put Husserl’s project3b into perspectivec.

What does this imply?

Perhaps, the perspective level does not want to be articulated.  Perhaps, it flourishes on the basis of some trickery.  Take a close look at the two-level interscope and guess what that trickery may involve.

0025 At this juncture, I have answered test two.

The latent difficulty between phenomenology and hermeneutics concerns the perspective level, which is not articulated.  Who knows what is in the perspective level?  Many may guess.  But, two points are certain.  Husserl’s project3b and the positivist intellect3a align with an unspoken perspective.  A situation-level hermeneutics3b and the positivist intellect3a do not.

0026 This answer raises the third test, asking, “What is the subject matter of phenomenology3b?”

04/20/22

Looking at John Perez Vargas, Johan Nieto Bravo and Juan Santamaria Rodriguez’s Essay (2020) “Hermeneutics and Phenomenology in… Social Sciences Research” (Part 8 of 18)

0027 Test three.

What does phenomenology3b do?

0028 In section three, the authors propose that Husserl’s phenomenology3b approaches reality1a by transcending the explanatory intentionality2a of the exact sciences3a.  Reality1a is a noumenon1a and its phenomena1a.  The explanatory intentionality2a of the exact sciences is the empirio-schematic judgment2a.   Phenomenology3b approaches reality1athrough phenomenological reduction2b.

In sum, phenomenology virtually situates hands-on first-order science.

Figure 05

0029 The authors continue, saying (more or less), “Consciousness (trained in the methods of phenomenological reduction2b) unveils the face of subjectivity (the noumenon1a) that has been eclipsed by positive objectivism (the positivist intellect3a).”

This quote fits the picture of Husserl’s project3b virtually situating hands-on natural science3a.

This quote fits the idea that phenomenological reduction2b elucidates what the noumenon1a must be1b.

0030 Notably, a return to the noumenon1b renders a subjectivity that can be shared by others in the same situation.  Phenomenological reduction2b elucidates an intersubjective being1b in the category of firstness, the realm of possibility.

According to the authors, Husserl’s project3b has been criticized for reducing intersubjectivity to the field of consciousness.  However, consciousness has already been narrowed by hands-on science to a cogito (the essence of the positivist intellect3a, including the rule of no metaphysics).  

So, the terminus of phenomenological reduction2b, what the noumenon1a must be1b (that is, a noumenon1b), is a mind-dependent being, capable of being treated as a mind independent being.  I would go as far as to conjecture that this capacity directly correlates to the intersubjectivity of the noumenon1b.