0114 Our curent Lebenswelt is not the same as the Lebenswelt that we evolved in.
Cheers for an expanded range of inquiry for evolutionary psychology.
The three masterworks of Razie Mah offer a treasure trove for those interested in human evolution: The Human Niche, An Archaeology of the Fall, and How To Define the Word “Religion”.
These are all available as electronic books. Just search for the author’s name, Razie Mah, along with the title.
0115 A Course on the Human Niche is a series, available at smashwords and other e-book venues, containing the masterwork, a primer, and commentaries, including the following.
Comments on Clive Gamble, John Gowlett and Robin Dunbar’s Book (2014) Thinking Big
Comments on Steven Mithen’s Book (1996) The Prehistory of The Mind
Comments on Robert Berwick and Noam Chomsky’s Book (2016) Why Only Us?
Comments on Derek Bickerton’s Book (2014) More Than Nature Needs
Any literate adult can conduct a seminar class that reads and discusses these works.
0116 Another series, titled Buttressing the Human Niche, contains comments on articles and books on the topic of human evolution.
Here is a sample.
Comments on David McNeill’s Book (2012) How Language Began
Comments on David Reich’s Book (2018) Who We Are and How We Got Here
Comments on Christ Sinha’s Essay (2018) “Praxis, Symbols and Language”
Comments on Kim Sterelny’s Essay (2011) “From Hominins to Humans”
Comments on John Barrett and Krystalli Amilati’s Essay (2004) “Some Light on the Early Origins of Them All”
Comments on Stella Souvatzi, Adnan Baysal and Emma Baysal’s Essay (2019) “Is there Prehistory?”
These works may be purchased at smashwords and other e-book venues. They explore topics and demonstrate the practice of association and implication. They are ideal for throwing into an established study (or curriculum) on human evolution, in order to demonstrate the realness of triadic relations. Triadic relations are real enough to constitute a niche.
0117 Finally, the Razie Mah’s blog at www.raziemah.com looks at other publications. Each “looking at” blog consists of one to twenty parts. These may be used to spread the word, for enjoyment, discussion and erudition.
For example, the following appears in March 2021
Looking at Daniel Turbon’s Article (2020) “…Human Being in Evolution”
In May 2021
Looking at Chris Sinha’s Essay (2018) “Praxis, Symbol and Language”
0118 Currently, evolutionary psychology is narrowly practiced as an adjunct to cognitive psychology. Evolutionary psychology attempts to explain findings, models and evidence from cognitive psychology in terms of natural selection in the environment of evolutionary adaptation.
Now comes the Course on the Human Niche, Buttressing of the Human Niche, and other productions by Razie Mah,proposing that the ultimate human niche is the potential of triadic relations.
Yes, humans also evolve into very many proximate niches. But, all our proximate niches are bundled together by our ultimate niche. Proximate niches are like the various wooden rods bound together in the ancient Roman artifact called “religio”. This artifact serves as a metaphor for the human’s ultimate niche. Our ultimate niche binds all adaptations into proximate niches together.
0119 Professor Gad Saad’s book takes the reader outside of a narrow and closed practice of evolutionary psychology. However, since Saad does not know the hypothesis of the ultimate human niche, he cannot cross from complaining and demanding action to a wide-open practice of evolutionary psychology. Thus, he cannot fully comprehend what he is encountering in postmodern academics and elsewhere. He is moving towards a realization. It is just around the corner.
A wide-open evolutionary psychology examines our current Lebenswelt through the lens of adaptations accrued in the Lebenswelt that we evolved in.
That revolution in thought begins with Razie Mah’s masterwork, The Human Niche.
0001 A chapter on Derrida appears in Michael Millerman’s Book (2020) Beginning with Heidegger: Strauss, Rorty, Derrida and Dugin and the Philosophical Constitution of the Political (Arktos Press), pages 135-166. This fourth chapter considers the writings of the French Jacques Derrida (1930-2004 AD) concerning the German Martin Heidegger (1889-1976).
Millerman’s book consists of a long introduction, followed by chapters on Martin Heidegger, Leo Strauss, Richard Rorty, Jacques Derrida and Alexander Dugin. The latter chapters discuss what the other philosophers say about Heidegger. The method sounds like a doctoral dissertation.
My interest, of course, is to associate features of the arguments to purely relational structures, such as the category-based nested form or the Greimas square.
0002 Here, I look only at chapter four entitled, “Derrida”. Derrida comments on Heidegger in two notable incidents. First, Heidegger is mentioned in an essay comparing deconstruction to negative theology. Second, Derrida writes an essay entitled, “Heidegger’s Ear”.
Millerman approaches the first incident with caution, asking (more or less), “Is it possible to see how Derrida locates himself in a different place than Heidegger?”
Locates himself?
In slang, the question is, “Where is he coming from?”
0003 Where is Derrida coming from?
The first incident of note is an essay by Derrida in a book, Derrida and Negative Theology, edited by Harold Coward and Toby Froshay (Albany: SUNY Press, 1992). The title of the essay is “How To Avoid Speaking: Denials”.Here, Derrida responds to claims that deconstruction resembles negative theology. He says no. Apophatic mysticism is hyperessential. Deconstruction is all about the machinations of language.
0004 Hyperessential?
In order to appreciate this comment in terms of purely relational structures. I associate the above accusation and responseto Peirce’s category of secondness, the realm of actuality. The category of secondness contains two contiguous real elements. For Aristotle’s hylomorphe, the two real elements are matter and form. I label the contiguity, [substance]. The nomenclature is matter [substance] form.
For apophatic mysticism, the form is the human, as a vessel, having emptied “himself” of all matters.
For deconstruction, I follow Ferdinand de Saussure’s (1857-1913 AD) definition of language as two arbitrarily related systems of differences, the spoken word (parole) and the corresponding thought (langue). Parole corresponds to matter. Langue corresponds to form. [Arbitrary relation] serves as the contiguity.
0005 Here is a picture.
Figure 01
0006 Essence is substantiated form.
Derrida claims that negative theology is hyperessential. This makes sense because the essence, {[emptiness] vessel2f}, has no corresponding esse_ce (a play on the Latin term, esse, representing [matter2m [substantiating]}. As soon as matter appears in the slot, —-2m, then the contiguity becomes very difficult (if not impossible) to maintain, and something passes into the vessel, against all mystical admonishments saying, “Keep the vessel2f empty.”
Here is a picture of how esse_ce and essence play out in the realm of actuality2 for hylomorphism, apophatic mysticism and deconstruction.
The next essay that Millerman reviews is titled, “Heidegger’s Ear”.
Here, Derrida waxes on a snippet in Heidegger’s book, Being and Time, that mentions the voice of a friend whom every Dasein carries with it.
0032 To me, if Heidegger’s leap really opens a vista into the Lebenswelt that we evolved in, then Heidegger would have used the word, “gesture”, rather than “voice”.
Or, maybe, the word, “voice” is okay, since, before the first singularity, humans practice hand-speech talk. Two modes of talking co-exist. Cultural tradition determines which mode is more appropriate for any particular social situation.
0033 Derrida reads German. So, he has an ear for Heidegger. German (B), like all spoken languages, carries a conceptual apparatus (D). So, Heidegger must allow Derrida into his pact (B), concerning openness to an inception (C), that is like a concept, but is not a concept, because it complements a secret (A) that makes us present (Da-) to being itself (-Sein) (D).
Because Derrida speaks German, he must be a “friend”. But, Derrida finds that naive, because he can also be an enemy. Derrida figures out that, if you speak the same language, then you can share secrets. Heidegger says “friend” in the most naive way, as if the word reflects a state before the duality of friends and enemies. It seems to me that Derrida could be a real enemy who infiltrated behind the defenses of an opposing camp. And, he knows it.
Derrida is a dangerous philosopher. Everyone respects Derrida. Everyone fears deconstruction. Derrida approaches Heidegger as a “friend”, who speaks the same language. Derrida knows that the fraternal order of philosophy has splintered. First, everyone is a companion (or a compatriot). Then, everyone is either a friend or an enemy. Heidegger marks this transition with a German word: Geschlect.
0034 According to Derrida, Geschlect is a “mark”, a sign of division, a yellow patch for some and no patch for others. Well, maybe the patch can be sex, race, species, genus, status, genealogy or community. The yellow/no patch dualityrelies on concepts (that is, explicit abstractions). Yet, certain phenotypic and physical tags are inceptual (that is, implicit abstractions). But, explicit abstractions end up justifying these implicit abstractions.
0035 Here, I can see the threat of Derrida’s genius. Concepts, as utterances2m [carrying] information2f, are manifestations of Saussure’s definition of spoken language, parole2m [arbitrary relation] langue2f. This implies that the apparent mechanical substance corresponding to [carry] is really grounded in the slippery substance of [arbitrary relation]. This is the nature of sensible construction in speech-alone talk.
Here is how Derrida’s Greimas square manifests as sensible construction.
Figure 14
0036 What does Geschlect do?
Geschlect traverses the topolitology of secrets. In the city of Geschlect, there is a factory, turning pre-political feelingsinto conceptualized divisions among people. Today, that factory is called “modern politics”. It is run by, for and of the government. But, it claims to be by, for and of the People. Compatriots become friends and enemies.
0037 The voice of the compatriot, Heidegger’s “friend”, is embedded in the constitution of the human. Prior to the first singularity, hand-speech talk relies on manual-brachial gestures. Solidarity is guaranteed by one’s gaze. Someone who word-gestures a falsehood is immediately exposed as one’s enemy. How so? Manual-brachial gestures are defined by what they picture or point to. Word-gestures do not define their referents. They picture and point to them.
In contrast, spoken words do not picture or point to anything.
0038 After the first singularity, spoken language relies on our innate sensibilities until… labor and social specialization starts to spin explicit abstractions, like threads on a spool, and speech becomes something like a secret. You have to know the relation between the utterance and the information, in order to be a member of the club. So, the arbitrary relation between parole and langue slowly, irrevocably, weaves the threads into conceptual apparatuses.
Everyone who speaks the same language starts as a compatriot. But, two parties emerge, ones who are in tune with the conceptual apparatus and the ones who still imagine that our words picture and point to their referents.
0039 Derrida discovers a secret within the secret. The conceptual apparatus is mechanistic. And, like all machines, it can be constructed differently. So, deconstruction is a technique to shake the conceptual apparatus, in order to expose the arbitrariness of its relations. Concepts divide us. Deconstructed concepts unnerve us.
Heidegger discovers the foundation of the secret. The secret is a pact, where information is known only by us, and that pact cannot be articulated in speech-alone words. Instead of a concept, where the utterance is a conspiracy, Heidegger proposes an incept, where the pact manifests as inspiration. An incept draws us into one inspiration.
0040 Heidegger has a word that is translated as “both strife and accord”. I suppose that strife labels the struggle to keep the vessel empty. I suppose that accord is the happy moment when the vessel is full. The word is “Walten“.
Or perhaps, Walten is the originating unity of two real elements. Perhaps I can imagine that these elements are —2m and vessel2f. So the unity or the contiguity is [empty]. But also, imagine the unity of …known only to us2m and vessel2f. The contiguity is [fill].
Either way, the originating unity of two real elements is inceptual.
Figure 15
No one can open someone else to an inception. Inception is where the seed of conviction germinates. No political philosopher has a recipe for an inceptual institution of the theologico-political domain. No one, except for Jesus, has torn the veilwoven by explicit abstraction. In contrast, many theologians and politicians have quested for a magical token that empowers the veil and strands us in the domain of conceptual apparatuses.
0041 In our cutthroat world of concepts, people cling to their worldviews, ridicule other worldviews, and fail to notice that their conceptual apparatuses have closed them off from their inceptual heritage. Concepts pose as things that bring us into organization. But, is organization all there is?
Of late, the United States of America has a humorous tradition in this regard. They name legislative decrees with the conceptual apparatus that they are going to replace. For example, in 2001, the so-called “Patriot Act” is legislated and signed into law. Twenty years later, a surveillance-oriented bureaucracy identifies members of the “make America great again” movement as “domestic terrorists”.
Yes, the utterance of “domestic terrorists” institutes a concept that identifies patriots as enemies of thier surveillance state.
0042 What does this imply?
Is Walten like a secret, that is, information known only to us?
Then, as fast as I can say, “Geschlect.”, there are two parties. One party focuses on information. One party focuses on the “known only by us” business.
How can companions come together after established nomenclature turns everyone into either friends or enemies? As politics invades all aspects of society, each person asks, “Which worldview do I belong to?” Cognitive machinations hustle propaganda and apologetics. Some people get carried away. The last thing they want is to be cut from the pact. No one wants to get cut. Plus, true believers are willing to sacrifice others to their cause.
How does a people become a people?
I suppose that theologico-political topolitologies are required.
Plus, it seems as if the secret allows me to visualize the topolitology ofaWalten, an originating unity of two realities.
Here is one reality, corresponding to “information…”.
Figure 16
0043 Here is the other element, corresponding to “…known only by us”.
Figure 17
When does a Walten solidify its current theologico-political domain?
An accord, seeking to be filled with a conceptual apparatus (D), leads to calcification and total domination.
When does a Walten liquify its current theologico-political domain?
A struggle to be open to being filled by God’s meaning, presence and message (H) leads to revelation and new life.
0044 To the extent that Derrida reads German, Derrida is Heidegger’s companion.
What does Derrida see?
Heidegger’s “friend” can speak as either friend or enemy. Geschlect says, “You are either friend or enemy.” Walten says, “Please, remain a companion.”
0045 In one fashion, Derrida’s and Heidegger’s theologico-political constructions mirror one another.
I suspect that Derrida stays his desconstructive hand in recognition of this reality.
In another fashion, these two theological-political constructions derive from a single, undifferentiated, realness, to which we, in our current Lebenswelt, can never return.
We need deconstruction to combat our march towards death by a totalizing conceptual apparatus.
We need inception to seed the fields of our open minds.
In the chapter on Derrida, Millerman finds good reason to start with Heidegger.
0001 This chapter appears in Michael Millerman’s Book (2020) Beginning with Heidegger: Strauss, Rorty, Derrida and Dugin and the Philosophical Constitution of the Political (Arktos Press). The composition of the book sends a message. A forty-nine page introduction is labeled as a preface, complete with Roman numerals. The first chapter covers Heidegger and stands in the center of the book. Then, chapters two through five covers the responses of four political philosophers to Heidegger’s academic labors (as well as his political affiliation).
Richard Rorty is discussed in the third chapter. This chapter serves as a transition from the weighty chapters on Heidegger and Strauss to the surprising chapters on Derrida and Dugin.
0002 Rorty offers a change of style. Rorty is an American philosopher. This pleases me, since I write like an American, too. I roll, roll, roll down the river of literary endeavors. My paddles are purely relational structures, such as the category-based nested form and the Greimas square.
Consequently, Millerman refers to movies, rather than books. And, if books must be mentioned, then novels come first.
0003 Oh, I should add, the first novel comes from the pen of Cervantes. Don Quixote marks the start of the Age of Ideas. In seventeenth-century Spain, two movements coincide. On one hand, Baroque scholastics finally articulate the causality inherent in sign-relations. On the other hand, Cervantes creates a new literary genre.
Perhaps, these two hands belong to a single entity. The novelist represents the scholastic behind the mask of modernity. Like the heroic character in V for Vendetta, there is no removing the mask. The Spanish innovator spins away from truth (the scholastics were all about mind-independent being) and leaps towards happiness (the novelists are all about mind-dependent beings).
Is it any surprise that, in the next century, France produces a revolution with a similar attitude? Then, two centuries later, today’s social democratic politics perform the same routine.
0003 Richard Rorty wrestles with a strange duality. Politics is contextualized by two distinct masters, truth and reality. Politics emerges from the potential of good (which goes with truth) and the potential of what can be done (which goes with reality).
Here is a picture of two nested forms.
Figure 01
0004 Of course, Rorty wants to step away from truth3 and find happiness in reality3. But, one cannot take the mask without the face or the face without the mask. One cannot say, “Look at the mask without thinking about the face.”
Here is where Rorty flounders. His social democratic politics tell him that viable options are the only things that matter. But, as a philosopher, he must face the question as to which options are good.
0005 In short, politics is a single actuality that is composed of two distinct nested forms. Neither nested form can situate the other. So, the actualities for both nested forms fuse, creating one single contradiction-filled actuality, as described in the chapter on message in Razie Mah’s masterwork, How To Define the Word “Religion”.
I call the following diagram, “an intersection”.
Figure 02
0006 Right away, I spy that the single actuality of politics2 veils two unspoken actualities that emerge from (and situate) the vertical and horizontal potentials. These two actualites are overshone by politics2, in the same way that Mercury and Venus appear to disappear within the Sun in astrological conjunctions. The technical term is “combustion”.
Here is a Greek parody of politics2.
Figure 03
0007 Yes, truth3V and reality3H exhibit different orbits around politics2.
According to Millerman, Rorty is a social democrat advocating for truthlessness and hopefulness.
0008 How does that statement mesh with the above intersection? Rorty distains Heidegger’s romance with language and says that there is no such thing as a thing itself that can be put into language. So forget esse_ces (beings substantiating) and essences (substantiated forms). Indeed, forget righteousness. The question is whether the thing is useful. Or not.
At first, it seems that Rorty is only interested in the horizontal axis.
0009 But then, Rorty writes that there are three conceptions of the aim of philosophizing in the modern era. These three are Husserl’s scientism, Heidegger’s poetics and Dewey’s pragmatism. The latter two respond to the former. Husserl idealizes scientists. Heidegger extols poets. Pragmatists, like Rorty, Dewey and James, prefer engineers.
Now, if I associate these embodiments into the above mystery, then I replace Mercury with the engineer and Venus with the poet, resulting the the following intersection.
Figure 04
0010 Once I diagram this, the contradictions become more apparent. The Heideggerian venusian poet2V and the pragmatist mercurial engineer2H orbit an all encompassing solar politics2. From the point of view of an astrologer, sometimes these inner planets run ahead of the solar presence, sometimes they lag behind the solar presence, and sometimes they are in conjunction with the solar presence. Combustion! The Sun’s transit through the constellations, plays this celestial drama over and over again, for those who watch the heavens. For those who watch politics, the Earth orbits the sun.
0021 Of course, Heidegger would (if he could) return the insult, by calling Rorty a liberal propagandist.
After all, Rorty is not concerned with questions of truth3V, preferring issues concerning social consequences3H.
0022 Plus, Heidegger (if he could) would have regarded the imprisonment of Rorty and other social democratic philosophers as a matter of “petty details”.
Petty details?
In Heidegger’s view, the West has exhausted its options1H. And, proof comes later in the title of Rorty’s book, Contingency, Irony and Solidarity. Are these options? Or, are they signs of exhaustion? Compare that title to Being and Time.
0023 The squishiness of the former title is made worse when Rorty’s dichotomy of choice, private versus public, appears to align with the potentials of good1V and options1H, respectively. Is truth3V private? Is reality3V public? If so, then I ask, “Are these affirmations the poisonous fruits of the Treaty of Westphalia?” The Treaty of Westphalia marks the start of the modern era, almost four hundred years ago.
Perhaps, Rorty inadvertently testifies to Heidegger’s proposition. The West has exhausted its options1H. Politics2 is the intersection of the actualities of reality3H and truth3V, arising from the potential of viable options1H and good1V. Without a good1V, there are no options1H. So, politics2 is dead. But, our love (philo-) of wisdom (-sophy) endures. So, it is only a matter of time before politics2 rises again.
Shout it from the rooftops!
Politics2 is dead. Long live politics2.
0024 My thanks to Michael Millerman for his excellent chapter into how Rorty views Heidegger, chapter three in Beginning with Heidegger: Strauss, Rorty, Derrida and Dugin and the Philosophical Constitution of the Political (2020, Arktos Press, London), pages 97-134.
0001 In late 2022, Americans loathe the Russian civilization because the Soviet Union was a existential enemy during the Third Battle Among the Enlightenment Gods: The Cold War Among Materialist Ideologies (1945-1989 AD).
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, not much has been done to alter Americans’ fears, even though lots of water has passed beneath the bridge of history. Indeed, much has been done expressly to conceal those waters, full of greed, ambition, illusion and delusion. The modern intelligensia is guilty of sins of omission.
0002 Here is a brief remediation of that sin, which, unfortunately, may itself be a transgression.
When the Cold War ends in 1989, many difficult to comprehend events follow. Boris Yeltsin supervises a firesale of Russian state property. Maybe, “firesale” is not the right word. “A mind-bending transfer of ownership” may be better. Soon, oligarchs corral entire industries and markets. Russian GDP falls like no tomorrow.
Then, before the wholesale transfer of Russian commodity wealth is fully consummated, Vladimir Putin steps from under the wings of Yeltsin’s weakness and corruption. Following a series of explosive events, Putin manages to secure leadership of the listing ship of the Russian State. He rights the boat, sending many overboard (so to speak).
The predatory wolves of the American Empire do not forget. They lick their wounds. They plan their revenge.
0003 Oh, so that is the reason why nearly every mouthpiece of the American Regime denounces Russia, as if it is still the Soviet Union of old. When the Americans win, they want total surrender. So, the American citizen remains informed that the Cold War never really came to a conclusion.
Just as America once looked to the East and saw an “iron curtain”, Russia now looks West and experiences a “word curtain”.
0004 Of course, this brief transgression into history is required to introduce the tragic philosopher, Alexander Dugin. From 1989 on, Dugin formulates and proposes new ideas concerning the fact that Russia did not totally surrender to America’s empire religion. His struggles culminate in a book that finally breaks through the Western word-curtain about how bad Russia is. That book is titled, The Fourth Political Theory. First published in Russian, an English translation comes out in 2012.
Three years later, Razie Mah electronically publishes Comments On Alexander Dugin’s Book (2012) The Fourth Political Theory. This commentary is available at smashwords and other e-book venues.
0005 Simultaneously, as well as more amazingly, Michael Millerman decides to make the philosophical work of Alexander Dugin the topic of his doctorate in philosophy. Oh, that does not go well. How dare this young intellect challenge the current narrative. Dugin should go into a box. He is a fascist. Or rather, a communist. Or something similarly unsavory, like a Eurasianist. Yes, that box should never be opened.
0006 Michael Millerman, like Pandora, opens the box. And the last monstrosity to emerge is hope.
He actually graduates with his doctorate.
The subsequently blacklisted Millerman starts his own school. The cancelled Millerman publishes the book that I currently examine: Inside Putin’s Brain: The Political Philosophy of Alexander Dugin (2022: Millerman School). Yes, Millerman starts a school. Look and see.
0007 In these blogs, I comment on chapter two, titled, “The Ethnosociological and Existential Dimensions of Dugin’s Populism”. This chapter is originally published in Telos (Winter, 2020).
In order for the reader gain an acquaintance with the Greimas square, I recommend blogs appearing at www.raziemah.com for January 2023. These blogs include Looking atAlex Jones’s Book (2022) The Great Reset and Notes on Daniel Esterlin’s Book (2020) 2045 Global Projects At War.
0050 Eden, the Lebenswelt that we evolved in, is where we, in our current Lebenswelt, come from, but cannot return to. The myth of Adam and Eve says it all.
The ethnos is where the narod comes from and cannot return to.
Figure 17
0051 The implications weave together psychology, sociology and biology.
How can the ethnos (D), the Lebenswelt that we evolved in, serve as the transit between the narod, emerging in our current Lebenswelt (C), and the person as objectified subject (B)?
Does each -ism appeal to our innate imaginations by offering an explicit abstraction, a forbidden fruit, that is desirous to the eyes, tastes sweet, and is desired to make one wise?
Does a narod (C) accepts the Luciferian suggestions (B) in the process of becoming a people (A)?
0052 Dugin proposes his fourth political theory in a world broken by our appetites for explicit abstractions. We have been sold tickets (B) back to Eden (D). Where do our travels bring us? Our travels meet a flaming sword that turns in all directions. A cherubim blocks the way.
Dugin speaks to the people.
His proposal has ethnosociological and existential dimensions.
We are more than individuals, class members, citizens and role-bearers.
We are a narod, on a quest to find who we are supposed to be.
Who do you say that we are?
0053 My thanks to Michael Millerman for his excellent summary of these two dimensions of Alexander Dugin’s political philosophy.
0128 Millerman’s essay would make Leo Strauss proud.
Millerman’s argument is exoteric. Strauss and Dugin share an interest in Heidegger. That is not the only feature that they have in common. Therefore, a Straussian should not dismiss Dugin’s political philosophy out of hand.
0129 The centerpiece turns out to be a translation, by Millerman, of a list of what needs to be done, according to Dugin, in order to establish the possibility of a Russian philosophy.
0130 The three tasks involve…
…dismantling Russian archeomodernity. Ironically, for Americans and western Europeans, the task is precisely the opposite. For western Europe, the archeomodern groove is a receptor. For Russia, the archeomodern groove is a trap.
…correctly comprehending the West. Ironically, the West may not be comprehending itself. The modern West is all about science. But, what is science? Is science a purely relational structure composed of the Positivist’s and empirio-schematic judgments? Plus, is there something vulnerable within this relational structure? Does phenomenology exploit that vulnerability? Does Heidegger’s Sein correspond to the noumenon? What happens to the West if noumena take on lives of their own?
….elaborating a philosophy of chaos. The narod harbors cautionary wisdom that is ignored by modern political movements, who imitate the practices of the empirio-schematic judgment. Chaos is not necessarily the absence of order. Chaos may be the order that cannot be situated by sovereign power.
0131 The placement of Millerman’s translation, along with its surprising content, offers an esoteric message.
0132 All the blogs for February 2023 at www.raziemah.com examine selected chapters from Michael Millerman’s book (2022) Inside “Putin’s Brain”: The Political Philosophy of Alexander Dugin. Millerman has been studying Dugin’s works for over a decade. If there is to be a truly philosophical underpinning to Eurasianism, then Dugin begins the quest.
As for this reviewer, my first endeavor to read Dugin, Comments on Alexander Dugin (2012) Fourth Political Theory, may be found at smashwords and other e-book venues. I ask the question, “If I were to say what Dugin is saying, using triadic relations, then how would that work?” The answer intrigues.
Obviously, I am not interested in whatever box the literati of modern political philosophy want to put Dugin in. I am interested in the purely relational structures that Dugin reveals.
0133 So far, I reviewed chapters two and six. In this blog, I will briefly touch on chapter nine. Well, less that that. I see a Greimas square in the seventh section of chapter nine. Its title is “Theologico-Political Implications”.
In this section, Millerman hones down on the difference between the Heideggerian Left (HL) and Heideggerian Right (HR) in regards to the theological-political issue of the returning of the religious and the receding of the secular.
0134 Recall, Dugin’s formulation of “the people” associates to the following Greimas square.
Figure 01
0135 A is the focal term, “the people”. What is the political expression of the people? In America, the Declaration of Independence starts with “we, the people”. So the answer is involved. Suffice to say that, until recently, the political expression is the democratically elected representative. Until recently? Mailing out unsolicited ballots is unconstitutional. It makes me wonder, what do modern intellectuals mean when they say the word, “democracy”.
B contrasts with A. Here, the three political theories (of liberalism (1), communism (3), fascism (2) and big government (il)liberalism (1, again)) model phenomena of a prepolitical world in terms of the individual (1, 1-again), class membership (3) and citizenship and noncitizenship (2).
C contradicts B and implicates A. Dugin uses the Russian word, “narod”, for prepolitical people that various schools of modern political philosophy regard as noumenon. The people (A) are political. The narod (C) is the people before being objectified by explicit political theories. For me, the narod (C) is humanity in our current Lebenswelt.
D contrasts with C, contradicts A and implicates B. Dugin uses the Russian word, “ethnos“. The narod (C) comes out of the ethnos (D) and cannot return. To me, the ethnos (D) is us in the Lebenswelt that we evolved in. Our current Lebenswelt (narod (C)) is not the same as the Lebenswelt that we evolved in (ethnos (D)). The hypothesis of the fist singularity contributes an evolutionary dimension that complements Dugin’s theologico-political analysis.
0136 Dugin is an example of the Heideggerian Right (HR). HR philosophers are few in number and for good reason. They are considered to be the enemies of the Heideggerian Left (HL), who want to co-opt Heidegger for their theological-political convictions.
Millerman poses this question (more or less), “How does the HL view the theological-political issue of receding secularism and returning religiosity?”
0137 Here is how I associate the discussion to the Greimas square.
Figure 02
0138 According to the HL, A, democracy is under threat because…
0139 …B, democracy must be secular.
Even though secular is an adjective and democracy is a noun and therefore B contrasts with A, secular is a necessary qualifier. A democracy cannot be a democracy unless it is secular. Hence, when HL-friendly pundits on public-private partner television say the word, “democracy”, they actually mean “secular democracy”.
0140 C contradicts B and complements A. C is religious. Non-secular means religious, just as secular means “not religious”. But, this too is wordplay, since religions are not “non-secular”, they are believers in an ultimate foundation, D. However, from the HL Greimas square, C is nonsecular.
At this point, secular institutions take on a scientific glow. The secular (B) use theoretical disciplinary languages to model observations and measurements of social phenomena. Naturally, these models end up defining the options available for ballots in… um… a democracy (A). Thus, the ultimate foundation (D) complements the secular (B) because it (D) does not exist.
0141 D contrasts with C, contradicts A and complements B. Already, I know how D complements B. The fact that an ultimate foundation fills the slot for (D) yet does not exist, according to HL, reveals the nature of the way the ultimate foundation (D) is itsown lacking.
Surely, this sounds like a contradiction in terms. But, that is the way HL rolls.
There is no God. There is no ethnos. The possibility that these statements (D) are wrong contradict (A), “democracy”, which, according to HL, must be godless (B). If these statements are incorrect, then the political system would not be a “democracy”, but a “theocracy”.
0142 Okay, HL is into wordplay.
The Heideggerian Right takes the Heideggerian Left’s wordplay at face value, producing the following remake of the HL Greimas square.
Figure 03
0143 As before, A, the focal word, is “democracy”.
0144 B contrasts with A, in the way that an adjective contrasts with a noun. The secret handshake allows HL pundits to indicate a secular democracy when they use the word, “democracy”, and use the word, “theocracy”, when religious folk take to the ballot box.
0145 C contradicts B because the word, “radical” (C), means “rooted”, and “secular” (B) means not religious. This implies that the radical (C) adheres to emptiness (D) with the same conviction that the religious, er… non-secular (C) adheres to an ultimate foundation (D). No wonder the radical (C) strives to eradicate the ontological and theological facets (phenomena) of the narod. The radical (C) creates conditions where other social phenomena (such as the individual, class membership, the roles of citizen and noncitizen) can be observed and measured by modern scientifically minded theoreticians (B).
0146 Emptiness (D) entails the absence of (1) an ultimate foundation encompassing both God and humans, (2) the ethnos, (3) what we evolved to be and (4) the Lebenswelt that we evolved in.
D contrasts with C, contradicts A and complements B.
Emptiness (D) contrasts with radical (C) because it (C) is rooted in ‘something’ (however ephemeral, such as an act of will).
Emptiness (D) contradicts democracy (A) because the implementation of secular policies (B) reveals the root (C) to be a pure act of will, rather than a product of say… philosophical inquiry.
Emptiness (D) complements the secular (B) because the secular knows that its politics will undermine whatever traditions that they are rooted in (C).
0147 In sum, the HL diagram celebrates democracy (A) and the secular (B) while denying the religious (C) and the possibility of an ultimate foundation (D). The HR view of the HL diagram positively labels the negative attitude towards religion as “radical” (C) and the denial of an ultimate foundation (D) as “emptiness”.
0148 To me, the Greimas square for the HL and for what the HR thinks of the HL’s views must be regarded as funny. Perhaps, hilarious.
How so?
The ethnos is where our sense of humor evolves. The narod is where people formulate jokes. The secular is where people lose their sense of humor . Democracy is where the comedy of the humorless plays out on the world stage.
0149 I do not know whether Heidegger’s “fourfold” or “das Geviert” can be re-articulated as a Greimas square. It might be worth trying. Perhaps, use of the Greimas square will allow the HL to take themselves less seriously and the HR to chuckle under their beards. The problem, of course, is that Dugin is no longer laughing, because the ones who take themselves seriously have designated him, not as a philosopher, but as a threat.
Pray for the soul of Alexander Dugin’s daughter.
0150 My thanks to Millerman for his excellent book. Please check out the Millerman School and dugin.com.
