0014 Why are Catholic philosophers interested in phenomenology?
In Comments on Richard Colledge’s Essay (2021) “Thomism and Contemporary Phenomenology”, a third incentive is proposed.
0015 Colledge reads a 2006 book by German phenomenologist, Gunter Figal, entitled Objectivity, The Hermeneutical and the Philosophical.
Colledge wonders, “Is this a phenomenological realist open to Christian anti-reductionism?”
Can we talk?
0016 Figal admits that the thing itself1a should be mind-independent. If this is the case, then metaphysics should be allowed. Aren’t the mathematical and mechanical models of the empirio-schematic judgment mind-dependent beings? Don’t mind-dependent beings transcend (while entangling) physics? Doesn’t that fit the definition of metaphysics.
Well, yes, this becomes apparent when phenomenology reveals what the thing itself1a must be1b and then a novel empirical science2a arises to investigate its1a(1b) phenomena1a.
0017 Why do Catholicphilosophers (who are curious about phenomenology) not mention science?
This is a very good question, since Aristotle’s and the Positivist’s judgments are structurally similar.
Well, they are different, because the three elements of judgment are imbued with different categories.
0018 The similar structures, along with different categorical assignments, benefit phenomenology. Phenomenology can sneak Aristotelian metaphysical constructs into the laboratory by reifying hylomorphes into what the thing itself1a must be1b. Phenomenology appropriates illicit metaphysical constructs then cleans them of metaphysical terminology.
0019 For example, in terms of physics, a one Euro coin may be reduced to its constituent metal and minted shape. To me, this looks like matter and form.
At the same time, in terms of phenomenological reduction2b, a one Euro coin1a is money1b. Money1b is what the Euro coin itself1a must be.
0020 What happens when what the thing itself1a must be1bis not the thing itself1a?
Is phenomenological reduction at work?
0021 If the one Euro coin as money is a mind-independent (formerly mind-dependent) being, then novel laws of “physics” apply. The coin1a(1b) now exhibits the phenomena of value1a and fiat currency1a.
The novel “social” science of modern economics investigates the phenomena1a that objectify this noumenon1a(1b).
0022 Okay, so far in this sequence of blogs, I have discussed three incentives for why Catholic philosophers may be interested in phenomenology. I have also raised a question concerning why these philosophers do not mention science.
0023 The answer to the latter question is located in the relation within the Positivist’s judgment. A positivist intellect (relation, thirdness) brings an empirio-schematic judgment (what ought to be, secondness) into relation with observations and measurements (what is, firstness). The positivist intellect has a rule. Metaphysics is not allowed.
0024 What is the result?
Catholic anti-reductionists are excluded from discourse… er, polite scientific society in this modern Age of Ideas.
The positivist intellect says, “No.”
So, why even try?
Why not discourse with the ones who might want to talk, the phenomenologists?
0025 Do I see Gunter Figal heading to the exit?
Professor Figal is interested in objectivity, not givenness.
0026 Are Catholic philosophers so alienated from science that they are willing to talk through the mouthpiece of phenomenology?
Are there other ways to enter into discourse in this modern Age of Ideas?
Why does the hylomorphic structure of reality constantly get co-opted in the pursuit of science?
Are phenomenologists implicated?
0027 Doctor Figal imagines a gap3c, whose interpretive polarity1c sparks the exteriorization2c of what the thing itself1amust be1b, thereby generating a noumenon1b(1a) that can be objectified as its phenomena1a, according to “social” scientific discipline2a. He labels the operation, “objectivity2c“.
Is objectivity metaphysical?
Or, does it sound like “electricity”?
0028 Colledge is fascinated. What marvelous transformations occur in the laboratory of Professor Figal. Metaphysics alchemically mutates into the stuff of physics.
0029 Comments on Richard Colledge’s Essay (2021) “Thomism and Contemporary Phenomenology” offers value to the originating essay. Not only is science brought into the picture, but the re-vision is rooted in Comments on Jacques Maritain’s Book (1935) Natural Philosophy. Colledge has more than he knows.
003 It is wonderful to see striking similarities between Marion’s naming of givenness2c and Figal’s enumeration of objectivity2c.
Peirce’s categories offer ways to diagram that vision.
It is worthy of financial support by people of good will.
Reality is the only journal, to date, closing the gap between Thomistic philosophy and Peircean semiotics.
Brian Kemple Ph.D. is the editor of Reality.
0002 He is also the last graduate student of the late John Deely (1942-2017), of fond memory.
0003 The essay at hand appears in 2020, volume 1, and covers pages 76-123.
The full title is “Signs and Reality: An Advocation for Semiotic Realism”.
0004 The issue is captured on page 115.
Kemple writes (more or less), “If we are to have a living, thriving realism, it must be a realism capable of dealing with the entirety of the real; not only the reality that we engage directly through our senses, but the reality we experience perceptually and intellectually as well, a reality comprising the relations and especially the sign-relations that constitute so much of our experience.”
0005 Matthew Minerd Ph.D. pens a commentary that follows Brian Kemple’s essay.
Thomists currently exhibit an attitude when it comes to semiotic things.
0006 He notes (more or less), “For contemporary scholastics, the domain of cognition-dependent reality generally is a kind of terra non-considerata. Real being is ens naturae and is separate from the domains of knowledge, technical craft and moral freedom. These are entia rationis (mind-dependent beings) that, honestly, belong in the shadow.”
0007 How so?
The shadow is not the causalities inherent in ens rationis.
The shadow is the awfulness of the topic.
Look at the shadow side of the domains that Minerd mentions: ignorance (shadow of knowledge), incompetence (shadow of technical craft) and depravity (shadow of moral freedom).
0009 Now, I regard Kemple’s article “Signs and Reality”, in the journal, Reality, and Razie Mah’s Comments on Brian Kemple’s Essay (2020) “Signs and Reality” (available at the smashwords website).
Is there a crack in the mirror of the scholastic world, as it reflects on res (thing)?
Things are real.
So are sign relations.
If so, are sign relations things?
0010 If sign relations are real, then the consequences of their realness cannot be denied.
This if-then statement applies to biology.
Are sign-relations so real that they are able to support a niche, into which some hapless creature may adapt? A niche is the potential of an actuality independent of the adapting genus. Could sign-relations, or triadic relations in general, be so real as to constitute a niche?
Consider the masterwork, The Human Niche.
0011 There are more consequences.
If sign relations are real, then a cultural change in the natural-sign character of talk may account for a rapid, inexorable alteration of a Lebenswelt. Does such a transition explain why our current Lebenswelt is not the same as the Lebenswelt that we evolved in?
Consider the masterwork, An Archaeology of the Fall.
0012 Finally, if our current Lebenswelt turns the evolutionary progression upside down, elevating stipulation over custom and custom over nature, then how do we validate our spoken words? If the meaning, presence and message underlying a spoken word is stipulated, upon what thing do we staple our stipulation? How about this: If we construct an artifact, then that artifact should validate our stipulation. The artifact validates what we stipulate it to be.
What can go wrong with that?
Consider the masterwork, How to Define the Word “Religion”.
0013 Three masterworks, all available on smashwords, The Human Niche, An Archaeology of the Fall and How to Define the Word “Religion”, expose scientific implications of Brian Kemple’s claims.
If sign-relations are things, then we have an entirely new way to appreciate human evolution, including a recent, and revelatory, twist.
0014 Another triadic relation, the category-based nested form, proves invaluable in discussing these issues.
A Primer on the Category-Based Nested Form and A Primer on Sensible and Social Construction provide the background.
A category-based nested form consists in a normal context3, an actuality2 and a potential1. The subscripts refer to Peirce’s categories. These three elements fulfill four relational statements.
0016 Comments on Brian Kemple’s Essay (2020) “Signs and Reality”, available on the smashwords website, examines Kemple’s work using the category-based nested form and the three-level interscope.
0017 Kemple presents three actualities: species impressa, species expressa and species intelligibilis from various texts by Aquinas.
These fit into a three-level interscope in the following fashion.
Figure 2
0018 Of course, one may contest these associations.
But, how else would these terms fit into the empty slots of a three-level interscope?
Perhaps, I could put in the word “normal context” for the normal context3 for all three levels and “potential” for the potential1 of all three levels.
But, that would not change the overall picture.
0019 Even more curious, these three actualities serve as sign-objects and sign-vehicles in sign-relations. There are three sign-relations in this figure. So each actuality may serve as both a sign-vehicle and a sign-object.
The interventional sign couples the perspective and content levels.
The specifying sign couples the content and situation levels.The exemplar sign couples the situation and perspective levels.
0020 Comments on Brian Kemple’s Essay (2020) “Signs and Reality” tells a story and suggests associations between Kemple’s… er…. Aquinas’s terminology and the category-based nested form.
First, three kinds of sign-objects correspond to three actualities in a three-level interscope.
Second, three sign-relations couple the levels, so that each object may serve as both a sign-vehicle and sign-object. The only sign that does not serve as both a sign-vehicle and sign-object is the interventional sign.
0021 Here is a picture.
Figure 3
0022 The interventional sign couples the perspective and content levels.
The specifying sign couples the content and situation levels.
The exemplar sign couples the situation and perspective levels.
0023 Kemple specifically mentions three types of signs. These correspond to the character of the sign-vehicle for the interventional sign.
These types are nature, custom and stipulation.
These three types associate to periods in human evolution.
0024 The first two are discussed in Comments on Chris Sinha’s Essay (2018) “Praxis, Symbol and Language”. See this blog for the middle of May, 2021.
Early in the Lebenswelt that we evolved in, natural events serve as sign-vehicles for interventional signs. Since hominins adapt into the niche of triadic relations, the sign-objects of the interventional sign, sensations and feelings, turn into sign-vehicles for specifying signs.
Later in the Lebenswelt that we evolved in,linguistic manual-brachial word-gestures serve as sign vehicles for interventional signs. The sign-objects decode the interventional signs according to custom. Specifying signs are trained by timeless traditions. Exemplar signs cannot be articulated using hand talk, yet they involve crucial adaptations, because the exemplar sign-object manifests as a commitment.
0025 Finally, after the first singularity, in our current Lebenswelt, the exemplar sign is able to be symbolized by speech-alone talk.
This turns out to be most problematic, since speech-alone allows the interventional sign-vehicle to be stipulated. Comments on Brian Kemple’s Essay (2020) “Signs and Reality” tells a story about a stipulation. The story also tells about concupiscence.
0026 The sign-object of the exemplar sign occupies the same position in the three-level interscope as the sign-vehicle of the interventional sign. This is significant. Thomas Aquinas’s theology of original sin conducts itself precisely along the circuit depicted above, as discussed in Comments on Daniel Houck’s Book (2020) “Aquinas, Original Sin and the Challenge of Evolution”.
