0431 In contrast to the capitalization of the term, “code”, if I go back, say 10,000 years before this time, before the potentiation of civilization, then I would find that the word, “code”, could not be uttered in hand-speech talk.
In human evolution, language evolves in the milieu of hand-talk. Speech is added to hand-talk, as an adornment, at the start of our species, Homo sapiens.
See Comments on Michael Tomasello’s Arc of Inquiry (1999-2019) as well as the masterwork, The Human Niche (by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues). Portions of the former may be found in Razie Mah’s blog for January through March, 2024.
0432 Hand-talk words picture and point to their referents. Consequently, the problem of definition is resolved before it can even be raised. The referent exists before the gestural word. Otherwise, what would the gestural word image or indicate?
Nevertheless, hand talk fits into code biology.
0433 The agent cannot be ignored.
For hand and hand-speech talk, the agent belongs to the Lebenswelt that we evolved in. The linguistic manual-brachial word gesture2a (SVs) stands for the referent that it images or points to2b (SOs) in regards to a specifying code3bperformed by a specific region of the hominin brain1b (SIs).
The hominin agent does not have to ask, “What is happening?”, because ‘something’ is always happening. All the hominin needs to do is implicit abstraction. Because hand-talk words are images or indications, then implicit abstraction is called for. “Decoding” enters the picture when the word-gestures are sufficiently different as to be rapidly interpreted on the grounds that they are easy to recognize.
Yes, meaning relies on codes, but agents cannot be ignored.
0434 The text before me is chapter twelve in Pathways to the Origin and Evolution of Meanings in the Universe (2024, edited by Alexei Sharov and George E. Mikhailovsky, pages 265-278). The full title is “Evolutionary Growth of Meanings in the Relational Universe of Intercommunicating Agents”. The author is a biologist at the Memorial University of Newfoundland, at St. John’s.
0435 The introduction places the term, “agent”, on stage.
How does one know whether “an agent” is an agent?
Well, the agent should be obvious. An agent is physical. An agent is the repository of – what Aristotle calls – “final causality”. Final causality associates to another metaphysics-laden term, “teleology”.
What is the meaning of this term, “repository”.
0436 I only ask this because the thing that we encounter in science associates to what is for the Positivist’s judgment. Sharov and Tonnessen’s noumenal overlay pertains to what is, and it describes semiotic agency. Semiotic agency (as the noumenon) gives rise to phenomena that are observed and measured by biologists, then the resulting models are attributed, not to agency2 itself, but to the agent3 and the agent’s intentions1 (that is, final causalities).
0437 “Repository” plays out as a category-based nested form.
The normal context of an agent3 brings the actuality of semiotic agency2 into relation with the possibilities inherent in ‘final causality’1.
The agent3 puts semiotic agency2 into context. Semiotic agency2 emerges from (and situates) the potential of ‘teleology’1.
These basics are found in A Primer on the Category-Based Nested Form, by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues.
0438 The image of “the agent” as “an obvious repository of final causality” treats the category-based nested form diagrammed above as a thing.
The author presents the image without hesitation, as if that is what human naturally do. Humans not only treat a thing as a thing, but we also treat a corresponding category-based nested form as a thing. Not the same “thing”, but still, a thing.
We observe semiotic agency2. We visualize the agent3 as a physical repository of final causality1.
0439 What does this imply?
Consider the title of the chapter, Evolutionary Growth of Meanings in the Relational Universe of Intercommunicating Agents.
Where do I slip the category-based nested form into this title?
Do category-based nested forms slide into the author’s designation of “relational universe”?
If so, then the substitution brings this examiner face to face with where the author seems to be going, the recovery of Aristotle’s causalities within the milieu of biosemiotics.
0440 If that is the case, let me present a more hylomorphic version of the category-based nested form.
0441 Notice that actuality2 corresponds to Peirce’s category of secondness. Secondness consists of two contiguous real elements. In the figure, the contiguity is placed in brackets for the purposes of notation.
For example, for Aristotle, when I encounter a thing, the two real elements that come to mind are matter and form. Matter is necessary for presence. Form is necessary for shape. What is the contiguity between matter and form? Here, I snatch a term that has been much abused, because it has been so difficult to grasp. The term is “substance”. I now assign a very specific, technical definition to the term in hand. “Substance” is the contiguity between matter and form.
0442 Aristotle’s hylomorphe is an exemplar of Peirce’s category of secondness.
Thus, the recovery of Aristotle’s terminology in the biosemiotic milieu begins.
0443 Abir Igamberdiev is not the only one to imagine a recovery of Aristotle’s causality in light of the postmodern compromise of the positivist intellect.
Mariusz Tabaczek pursues a recovery in the field of emergence. Emergence endeavors to account for the constellation of higher-order noumena that could not be predicted on the basis of lower-level noumena. Like biosemiotics, the goal is understanding, rather than prediction and control.
See Comments on Mariusz Tabaczek’s Arc of Inquiry (2019-2024) by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues. Much of this commentary may be found in Razie Mah’s blog for March, April and May 2024. Tabaczek’s work is discussed in this examination in points 0276 to 0300.
0460 Section 12.3 covers meaningful information in autopoetic systems.
“Auto” means “self”. “Poetic” means “powered”.
0461 To start, the universe is full of spontaneous processes that may be modeled by truncated material and efficient causes. Entropy increases. Agency does not need to be present.
Autopoetic systems are not really self-powered. Instead, they entangle a spontaneous process (where entropy increases) in a triadic relation, so that, as movement towards thermodynamic equilibrium proceeds, some of the free energy is diverted to the maintenance and construction of an “autopoetic” being. This is the nature of emergence. Emergence associates to life.
0462 Igamberdiev notices that biological dynamics include both low-energy and high-energy processes separated by an epistemic cut. The epistemic cut becomes obvious when visualizing the way that formal and final causes envelope material and efficient causes. Formal and final causes associate to “low-energy”. Material and efficient causes go with “higher-energy”.
In the above figure. Low-energy describes the ontolon (in purple). Higher-energy describes the vortices (in green).
0463 Now, it seems that the low-energy and the high-energy dynamics must work in tandem. For example, models of self governance and potential courses of action and of salience should capture basic structural interactions between a living organism and its environment. Jacob von Uexkull (1864-1944 AD) coins the term, “Functionkreis”. Functionkreis may be regarded as systems of reflexive loops (vortexes) generating a network of biological codes(ontolons).
0464 Codes?
Yes, the concept of codes is already discussed in points 0409 through 0433.
0465 The high-energy, hard work of Functionkreis is investigated in biological laboratories throughout the world. What are the truncated material and efficient causalities that go into… say… whether a mitochondria is operating properly or malfunctioning? Laboratory scientists aim for mechanistic answers, but the terminology that frames their research questions betray the biosemiotic reality that they cannot allow to infect their methodologies.
The low-energy, epistemologically relevant work of codes is investigated by biosemiotics, as shown in the following figure.
0466 In section 12.4, Igamberdiev introduces the term, “codepoesis”.
Codepoesis contrasts with autopoesis.
“Codepoesis” labels an intrinsic property of biological entities, where the holistic living system maps out onto a finite set of constituent… um… semiotic agents. Yes, the organism maps (through codepoesis) onto its organs and systems as semiotic agents. Then, organs and systems as semiotic agents map onto tissues and anatomical arrangements.
0467 The list continues downwards towards physical poesis.
Upwards, the list ends with a holistic terminus that exhibits the rewards of codepoesis, but itself is not so bound by a superior level of code. In autopoesis, the “soul” is the kinetic perfection (substitute the word, “completion”, for “perfection”) of the body and the body is the holistic terminus of codepoesis. The levels of codepoesis may also be called “subagencies”.
0468 In section 12.5, Igamberdiev adds one more level of poesis. The autopoesis of the individual human occurs within a super-organism that has its own autonomy.
0469 Here, at the end of Part II of Pathways to the Origin and Evolution of Meanings in the Universe (2024, edited by Alexei Sharov and George E. Mikhailovsky, pages 187-278), the value of the category-based nested form comes to the fore as a style of semiotic inquiry within the category of sociopoesis.
Igamberdiev lays out a hierarchy as well as a frame for that hierarchy.
Sharov and Tonnessen’s semiotic agency captures what is common in all biological processes.
Sharov and Tonnessen propose their noumenal overlay within the hierarchy of sociopoesis.
So, Abir Igamberdiev seems to get the last word.
0470 This concludes my examination of Part II of Pathways, containing chapters nine through twelve titled and “Meanings in the Evolution of Life”. My thanks to each author and the editors for publishing these challenging essays.
0471 I have, under examination, two texts that bring the inquirer to the door of a truly postmodern discipline of biosemiotics. Biosemiotics adheres to the relational structure of the Positivist’s judgment, but with a caveat. Metaphysics is allowed. The positivist intellect must accept metaphysics in order to understand semiotic agency2, in the normal context of an agent3 operating on the potential of final causality1. Final causality is necessarily metaphysical.
0472 Here is a picture of the category-based nested form for semiotic agency2 as an actuality2 that requires understanding3((1)).
0473 The first book is Semiotic Agency: Science Beyond Mechanism, by biosemioticians Alexei Sharov and Morten Tonnessen. The book is published in 2021 by Springer (Switzerland) and logs in at volume 25 of Springer’s Series in Biosemiotics. Series editors are Kalevi Kull, Alexei Sharov, Claude Emmeche and Donald Favareau. These authors and editors have Razie Mah’s permission for use of the continuing disquisition, with attribution of said blogger.
0474 The second book is Pathways to the Origin and Evolution of Meanings in the Universe, edited by Alexei Sharov and George Mikhailovsky. Each chapter has its own author(s). The book is published in 2024 by Scrivener Press (Beverly, MA) and logs in as volume 1 in Scrivener’s Series on Astrobiology Perspectives on Life in the Universe. Series editors are Martin Scrivener and Phillip Carmical. Chapter authors and book editors have Razie Mah’s permission for use of the continuing disquisition, with attribution of said blogger.
0475 Now, I look back.
The examination starts by examining Parts I and III of Semiotic Agency. This covers historical development and theory of the discipline of biosemiotics. The discussion covers points 0001 to 0270 and will be packaged under the title Biosemiotics As Noumenon 1: Semiotic Agency. The package, by Razie Mah, should be available at smashwords and other e-book venues.
The examination continues by looking at the end of Part II of Semiotic Agency (chapter 5) along with Part II of Pathways(chapters 9-12). The discussion covers points 0271 to 0470 and will be packaged under the title Biosemiotics as Noumenon 2: Origins of Life.
478 The text before me is chapter 10 of Semiotic Agency (2021). Details on the text may be found on point 0473. Chapter 10 covers pages 291-312.
0479 The authors’ claim?
A multiplicity of subagents is a typical feature of agency and is necessary for a higher-level agent’s reliable self-construction, robustness and adaptability.
Subagents are semi-autonomous. The co-exist in partially cooperative and partially antagonistic manners. In many cases, semiogenesis occurs when one subagent provides the scaffolding that facilitates, represses or redirects the development of another subagent.
0480 Subagents characterize anatomy and physiology in animals.
Animals are subject to natural selection.
Plus, some parasites play the game of subagency very well.
0481 So, let me start with the Sharov and Tonnessen noumenal overlay.
0482 Obviously, subagents are employed in the specifying and exemplar sign-interpretants.
0483 The authors’ first example is a single-celled paramecium. The length of the cell in 300 micrometers. Is that one third of a millimeter? Subagents include a macronucleus, micronucleus, pellicle, gullet, food vacuoles, anal pore and so forth. None of the subagents are truly self-governing. Each plays a role in various courses of action, depending on what the paramecium is going to do (SOe).
Here are my associations for a paramecium’s semiotic agency.
0484 If this is the noumenon, then what are the phenomena?
In order to find out, I take the paramecium into my laboratory (actually, it’s an academic biology lab) and vary its environmental conditions (SVs). The paramecium is a holobiont (a whole, living organism). At any given moment, it acts as an agent3, whose main motivation seems to be ‘staying alive’1.
That is where semiotic agency2 comes in.
Some conditions produce responses (SOe) that indicate that the paramecium responds to something in its environment (SOs and SVe). Sign-vehicles and sign-objects give rise to phenomena. Indeed, these sign-elements are objectified by my observations and measurements of those phenomena.
Recall, an empedoclement (a noun derived from the name of the Neoplatonic philosopher, Empedocles) is the inverse of an impediment (see points 0329 through 0341). In this case, almost all institutional and personal interactions at the water fountain impede my boss (the macronucleus) from establishing a feedback to me (the contractile vacuole) that might mitigate my impulse to stir things up.
0526 For my reading of Empedocles, the SIs is strife. The SIe is love.
In strife, form (SVs) attracts matter, {SOs [salience] SOe}.
Okay, technically, matter is really {(SOs [&] SVe)2b [salience3c((1c))] (SOe)2c}.
The form2a of what is happening3a operating on the potential of ‘something’ happening1a appeals to matter2b[]2c, and that matter2b[]2c itself is a thing, coupling the situation and perspective levels, as matter2b and form2c.
The appeal comes in [strife]. The coupling, the empedoclement as thing, comes with [love].
0527 Obviously, my boss (the macronucleus) has greater wisdom than me (the contractile vacuole).
He has to wait, for the moment when preparation meets opportunity, to establish a feedback loop where my humor, instead of causing trouble, can improve morale.
0528 Yes, evolution is all about empedoclements, which are impossible to predict in advance.
Only in hindsight, does an empedoclement become clear.
0529 In section 10.4, the authors discuss many examples.
In each step of the progression of evolution on Earth, the emergent holobiont is more stunning to behold. At each step, the holobiont seems to have more and more of an identity. At the same time, the holobiont appears more susceptible to subagent malfunctions.
0530 With this in mind, I assess my own self-affirmation and self-awareness as the human version of contractile vacuole.
531 The text before me is chapter four of Semiotic Agency (2021). Details on the text may be found on point 0473. Chapter four covers pages 95-122.
0532 This chapter is an overview of both hierarchy and the evolution of living systems composed of hierarchies of sub-agents.
0533 Section 4.1 concerns a gradation of competence in semiotic agency. The gradation arises from the intuitively obvious structure of animals.
0534 The above picture suggests that each level of semiotic competence both encompasses and transforms the adjacent lower level.
0535 Does the adjacent lower level come under the control of the higher level?
It makes me wonder about the term, “control”.
Does “control” assume the functionality of adjacent lower-level subagents?
Does “control” indicate that the higher-level agent uses lower-level subagents in order to achieve its goal?
0536 Well, here is one way to diagram the relation between agent and subagent.
The agent relies on the subagent to behave like its supposed to behave.
Does that accord with the meaning, the presence and the message of the word, “control”?
Yes, the agent uses the subagent and assumes the functionality of the subagent.
But “control”?
0537 Is there any other term that applies to the metasystem transition implied by the above figure?
Take a look at the normal contexts.
The logics of thirdness are exclusion, complement and alignment.
How do these apply to the above figure?
Obviously, the relation between the agent and subagent is one of alignment. This implies that the possibility of ‘final causality’1 for the agent3 is included in the possibility of ‘final causality’1 for the subagent3. Otherwise, the subagent3would be excluded from the agent3.
0538 Well, what about the other two logics?
Surely, exclusion and complement must have roles to play.
They do, in an evolutionary schema.
Recall, biological evolution is a mystery, consisting of the intersection of adaptation and phenotype. If evolution starts with an agent, and ends up as agent with subagents, then the subagents differentiate (exclusion), specialize (complement) and then align (alignment). If evolution starts with an independent agent (exclusion), who ends up as a subagent within another agent, then maybe some sort of phenotypic change comes into play (compatibility), leading to incorporation (alignment).
0539 Here is a picture of both routes.
0540 Consider the domestication of the dog.
Can I imagine the logics of exclusion, complement and alignment in play?
The agent is like an Umwelt to the subagent. The subagent participates in the Innerwelt of the agent.
0227 The book before me is Semiotic Agency: Science Beyond Mechanism, by biosemioticians Alexei Sharov and Morten Tonnnessen. The book is published in 2021 by Springer and logs in at volume 25 of Springer’s Series in Biosemiotics. The editors of this series have Razie Mah’s permission for use of following disquisition, with attribution of said blogger.
The psychometric sciences have already been introduced in points 0159 through 0173 of this examination.
0228 The titular question is crucial, since biosemiotics culminates a century-long development, starting with Edmund Husserl developing a phenomenological method for intuitively articulating what the noumenon must be, for a wide variety of phenomena, where the noumenon is not absolutely obvious. Biosemiotics stands within the tradition of science as a search for truth.
0229 Similarly, the psychometric sciences constitute a century-long development, starting with Sigmund Freud discovering a psychoanalytic method capable of bringing unconscious wishes to consciousness in order that they may influence choices. The label, “psychometric sciences”, is coined by Joseph Farrell, and further fleshed out by Razie Mah in Looking at Joseph Farrell’s Book (2020) “The Tower of Babel Moment” (appearing in Razie Mah’s blog at the end of December 2023). The psychometric sciences stands within the tradition of science as a will to know… or is it… power?
0230 Both of these traditions lay claim to the Positivist’s judgment.
Judgment?
A judgment is a triadic relation containing three elements: relation, what ought to be and what is. When each of these elements is assigned to one of Peirce’s categories, the judgment becomes actionable. Actionable judgments unfold into category-based nested forms.
Here is a picture of the Positivist’s judgment for the natural sciences.
0231 As for what is, a noumenon is the thing itself. The thing itself cannot be fully objectified as its observable and measurable facets. A noumenon cannot be objectified as its phenomena.
As for what ought to be, disciplinary language (relation, thirdness) brings mathematical and mechanical models (what ought to be, secondness) into relation with observations and measurements of phenomena (what is, firstness). This is called the “empirio-schematic judgment”.
0232 Triumphalist scientists advocate that a noumenon be replaced with its model. When a successful model substitutes for the noumenon, then the model (overlaying the noumenon) can be objectified as its phenomena. In short, the tension within Kant’s slogan is mitigated when a model substitutes for its noumenon.
0233 As for the relation, the positivist intellect has a rule. Metaphysics is not allowed.
Of course, when investigating human behavior, metaphysics is necessary for models. Metaphysics includes formal and final causalities. Formal causes pertain to designs and their requirements. Final causes pertain to intentions, aims, goals, and the like.
I suppose that metaphysics (in the sense of two of Aristotle’s four causes) may be allowed in biosemiotics and the psychometric sciences, if they are not “metaphysical terms” (in the sense that theologians are always talking about “metaphysical” or “religious” stuff).
So, both biosemiotics and the psychometric sciences play word games. Metaphysics is okay as long as formal and final causes are regarded as material and efficient causes. Metaphysics is okay as long as it is not “religious”.
0234 Biosemioticians Alexei Sharov and Morten Tonnessen propose a noumenon that is derived from the specifying sign-relation. The triadic sign-relation is simplified into a dyadic formula. Dyads are characteristic of Peirce’s category of secondness. Secondness is the realm of actuality.
If I look at what is for the Positivist’s judgment, I notice that a dyadic structure is assigned to the category of firstness. Why is that so? The noumenon and its phenomena may be considered real elements. The issue is whether the two elements are really the same thing. A noumenon and its phenomena are not like matter and form, where matter is not the same as form. The thing itself and its observable and measurable facets are the same entity.
0235 This explains Kant’s slogan, reminding the scientist that the thing itself cannot be objectified as its observable and measurable facets, even though both labels apply to the same entity.
0256 The book before me is Semiotic Agency: Science Beyond Mechanism, by biosemioticians Alexei Sharov and Morten Tonnnessen. The book is published in 2021 by Springer and logs in at volume 25 of Springer’s Series in Biosemiotics. Series editors have Razie Mah’s permission for use of the ongoing disquisition, with attribution of said blogger.
0257 At this juncture, I have covered Parts I and III of Semiotic Agency.
0258 These sections cover tremendous territory, in a sweeping fashion. By far and away, the diagram of Sharov and Tonnessen’s noumenal overlay is the most striking accomplishment of this examination. The S&T noumenal overlayframes biosemiotics as a historical branch of phenomenology. The S&T noumenal overlay is what the noumenon should be if the biosemiotic noumenon is what all biological systems and processes have in common. Finally, the S&T noumenal overlay embodies the specifying sign-relation.
0259 The task before me?
How am I to delineate a path forward?
0260 Plus, as always in such matters, a new development cannot be ignored. Alexei Sharov publishes a new book in 2024.
0261 So, let me first attend to the remainder of Semiotic Agency.
0262 Part II consists in three chapters. I list these chapters in reverse order.
Part IV consists in three chapters that complement the chapters in Part II. I list these chapters in forward order.
0263 The last chapter anticipates the recent book, Pathways to the Origin and Evolution of Meanings in the Universe,edited by Alexei Sharov and George Mikhailovsky, published in 2024 by Scrivener Publishing (Beverly, MA) as a contribution to Astrobiology Perspectives on Life in the Universe Series (under the auspices of Wiley Press).
Here is a list of the four parts of this substantial book.
By the time that the authors finish Parts II and IV of Semiotic Agency, the range of applications expands into Parts I-IV of Pathways to the Origin and Evolution of Meanings of the Universe.
0265 Is such an expansion warranted?
From my examination of Parts I and III of Semiotic Agency, I may say, “Yes. Biosemiotics entails a re-articulation of biology and the social sciences. Biosemiotics also reveals the nature of phenomenology, cybernetics and the psychometric sciences.”
0266 The re-articulation of biology and the social sciences in the light of biosemiotics is just beginning. In looking at Part I and III of Semiotic Agency, I could sense the breadth of the project.
0267 The problem concerns the status of the noumenon.
Natural scientists never worry about the noumenon, because the noumenon should be obvious. Indeed, triumphalist scientists want to paper over each natural noumenon with a successful model. Social scientists observe and measure social phenomena then pull the associated noumena from holes in the ground. Phenomenologists promote intuitive methods for guessing what a noumenon must be. Sharov and Tonnessen re-format the triadic specifying sign-relationinto a dyadic structure amenable to empirio-schematic inquiry. I call their discovery, “the Sharov and Tonnessen noumenal overlay”.
0268 The authors call it “semiotic agency”.
0269 Semiotic agency, depicted as a dyad (agency) within a dyad (semiotic agency), forces scientists to re-examine all that has gone before.
And, that is quite an accomplishment.
0270 The task before me remains. A sea of biosemiosis lies before me. The question is how to traverse the waters. How to set sail?
In order to examine Parts II and IV of Semiotic Agency (2021) and Parts I, II, III and IV of Pathways (2024) I plan to take certain steps, listed in the following script.
This script allows me to examine here and there, like a bumbling bee in a spring field, not certain about a proper path, and inadvertently pollinating along the way.
I begin by looking at the chapters on the origins of life.
