0331 My sudden turn to semiotics does not occur in Tabaczek’s text.
Such is the examiner’s prerogative.
At this point, I stand at the threshold of section 1.3.4, almost precisely in the middle of the book.
My commentary on this book is significant.
Shall I review?
I represent the Positivist’s judgment as a content-level category-based form and discuss how it might be situated (points 0155 to 0184).
I suggest how reductionists can game emergent phenomena. Plus, I follow Tabaczek back to the four causes (points 0185 to 0239).
I present a specific example of an emergent phenomenon, building on the prior example of a hydrogen-oxygen fuel cell. Then, I return to Deacon’s general formula for emergence (points 240 to 0276).
Finally, I examine Tabaczek’s “philosophical history of panentheism” up to the section on Hegel (points 0277 to 0330).
0332 These are notable achievements.
But, my commentary is not more significant than Tabaczek’s text.
At this point, it is if I look through Tabaczek’s text and see something moving, something that catches my eye. It is not for me to say whether it is an illusion or a registration. It is enough for me to articulate what I see.
0333 At this point, I draw the veil on Razie Mah’s blog for April and May of 2024 and enter the enclosure of Comments on Tabaczek’s Arc of Inquiry (2019-2024), available at smashwords and other e-book venues. Comments will cover the rest of Part Two of Divine Action and Emergence. June 2024 will look at the start of Tabaczek’s next book, Theistic Evolution and Comments will complete the examination.
My thanks to Mariusz Tabaczek for his intellectual quest.
0334 But, that is not to say that I abandon Tabaczek’s text.
No, my slide into sign-relations is part of the examiner’s response.
This occurs in Comments.
There is good reason to wonder whether the response is proportionate.
0001 Philosophers enamored of Aristotle and Aquinas tend to make distinctions. So, what happens when such philosophers wrestle with modern science as it confronts the realness of apparently irreducibly complex systems, such as um… hydrogen-fuel cells and the Krebs cycle, which serves as the “fuel cell” for eukaryotic cells?
On the surface, Tabaczek fashions, yet does not articulate, a distinction between… hmmm…
0002 Consider a sentence, found on page 273 of Emergence, midway in the final chapter, seven, saying (more or less), “I hope that my re-interpretation of downward causation and emergent systems, in terms of old and new Aristotelianism, will help analytical metaphysicians sound more credible to scientists and philosophers of science, who employ, analyze and justify methodological reductionism.”
….what?
Philosophers of science and analytialc metaphysicians?
0003 Philosophers of science attempt to understand the causalities inherent in the ways that each empirio-schematic discipline applies mathematical and mechanical models to observations and measurements of particular phenomena. In terms of Aristotle’s four causes, their options are few. Science is beholden to material and efficient causalities, shorn of formal and final causation. So, they end up going in tautological circles. What makes a model relevant? Well, a model accounts for observations and measurements of phenomena. What are phenomena? Phenomena are observable and measurable facets of their noumenon. What is a noumenon?
Ugh, you know, the thing itself.
If I know anything about the Positivist’s judgment, then I know this. Science studies phenomena, not their noumenon.
Everybody knows that.
Except, of course, for those pathetic (analytical) metaphysicians.
0004 …what?
A noumenon and its phenomena?
0005 Tautologies are marvelous intellectual constructions.
In a tautology, an explanation explains a fact because the fact can be accounted for by the explanation. For modern science, mathematical and mechanical models explain observations and measurements because observations and measurements can be accounted for by mathematical and mechanical models.
Scientific tautologies are very powerful. Important scientists ask for governments to support their empirio-schematic research in order to develop and exploit such tautologies… er… technologies. Philosophers of science tend to go with the flow, so they end up employing, analyzing and justifying the manners in which mathematical and mechanical models account for observations and measurements, along with other not-metaphysical pursuits. One must tread lightly. First, there is a lot of money on the line. Second, the positivist intellect has a rule. Metaphysics is not allowed.
0006 …hmmm…
Does Tabaczek offer a way out of the rut of not-metaphysics, without noticing that the rut is what distinguishes scientific inquiry from experience of a thing itself? Aristotle will tell me that the rut is not the same as the world outside the rut. The scientific world is (supposedly) full of mind-independent beings. Ours is a world of mind-dependent beings.
0007 …aha!
Now, I arrive at the yet-to-be-articulated distinction between what science investigates and what we experience.
For the modern philosopher of science, models are key. Disciplinary language brings mathematical and mechanical models into relation with observations and measurements of phenomena.
For the estranged modern metaphysician, the thing itself is key. The thing itself, the noumenon, gives rise to diverse phenomena, facets that are observable and measurable.
Consequently, the distinction that Tabaczek does not name looks like this.
0149 In chapter five, Tabaczek starts to develop the noumenal side of his mirror, beginning with dispositions and powers. Tabaczek wants to use these terms interchangeably. Perhaps, it is better to regard them as two contiguous real elements, where the contiguity is [properties].
Disposition [property] power is a hylomorphe that is slightly different than Aristotle’s hylomorphe, matter [substance] form. Even though they differ, they both belong to Peirce’s category of secondness.
To me, Peirce’s secondness opens the door to expressions of causality that reflect Aristotle’s hylomorphe in so far as they have the same relational structure.
Currently, no modern philosopher views Aristotle’s hylomorphe as a prime example of Peirce’s category of secondness.
How so?
As soon as a modern philosopher recognizes the point, then he or she becomes a postmodern philosopher.
Labels can be slippery.
0150 In chapter six of Emergence, Tabaczek introduces forms and teleology (that is, formal and final causes). The operation of these causes within the category-based nested form has already been presented.
0151 In chapter seven, Tabaczek labors to apply his dispositional metaphysics to Deacon’s formulation of dynamical depth. Perhaps, the results are not as coherent as the application found in this examination, but his efforts are sufficient to earn him his doctorate in philosophy.
Amen to that!
0152 Overall, Emergence is a testimonial to the resilience of a graduate student who completes his doctorate in philosophy of science without knowing that the model and the noumenon are two (apparently competing) illuminations within the Positivist’s judgment.
0153 Why doesn’t he know?
Well, no one knows, because philosophers of science are not paying attention the traditions of Charles Peirce or of Jacques Maritain. As noted in Comments on Jacques Maritain’s Book (1935) Natural Philosophy, Maritain uses the scholastic tool of three different styles of abstraction to paint a picture of science displaying the structure of judgment. Peirce’s semiotics and categories clarify Maritain’s painting by resolving two integrated yet distinct judgments: the Positivist’s judgment and the empirio-schematic judgment.
Plus, another reason why no one knows is because philosophers of science still think that the positivist intellect is alive. All laboratory scientists obey the dictate of the positivist intellect. Metaphysics is not allowed. So, if well-funded scientists are correct, then philosophers of science must project what is for the Positivist’s judgment from science into their own image in Tabaczek’s mirror. They do not realize that Tabaczek inadvertently de-defines the positivist intellect by not getting the Positivist’s memo and regarding a noumenon as the thing itself and its phenomena as manifestations of dispositions [properties] power.
0154 Say what?
Tabaczek’s “dispositional metaphysics” disposes with the positivist intellect by vaporizing the relation of the Positivist’s judgment and condensing what ought to be (the empirio-schematic judgment) and what is (the noumenon [cannot be objectified as] its phenomena) as two distinct illuminations. Both enter secondness. Two hylomorphes stand juxtaposed. In Tabaczek’s mirror, each hylomorphe sees its own image in the other.
0001 In late 2022, Americans loathe the Russian civilization because the Soviet Union was a existential enemy during the Third Battle Among the Enlightenment Gods: The Cold War Among Materialist Ideologies (1945-1989 AD).
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, not much has been done to alter Americans’ fears, even though lots of water has passed beneath the bridge of history. Indeed, much has been done expressly to conceal those waters, full of greed, ambition, illusion and delusion. The modern intelligensia is guilty of sins of omission.
0002 Here is a brief remediation of that sin, which, unfortunately, may itself be a transgression.
When the Cold War ends in 1989, many difficult to comprehend events follow. Boris Yeltsin supervises a firesale of Russian state property. Maybe, “firesale” is not the right word. “A mind-bending transfer of ownership” may be better. Soon, oligarchs corral entire industries and markets. Russian GDP falls like no tomorrow.
Then, before the wholesale transfer of Russian commodity wealth is fully consummated, Vladimir Putin steps from under the wings of Yeltsin’s weakness and corruption. Following a series of explosive events, Putin manages to secure leadership of the listing ship of the Russian State. He rights the boat, sending many overboard (so to speak).
The predatory wolves of the American Empire do not forget. They lick their wounds. They plan their revenge.
0003 Oh, so that is the reason why nearly every mouthpiece of the American Regime denounces Russia, as if it is still the Soviet Union of old. When the Americans win, they want total surrender. So, the American citizen remains informed that the Cold War never really came to a conclusion.
Just as America once looked to the East and saw an “iron curtain”, Russia now looks West and experiences a “word curtain”.
0004 Of course, this brief transgression into history is required to introduce the tragic philosopher, Alexander Dugin. From 1989 on, Dugin formulates and proposes new ideas concerning the fact that Russia did not totally surrender to America’s empire religion. His struggles culminate in a book that finally breaks through the Western word-curtain about how bad Russia is. That book is titled, The Fourth Political Theory. First published in Russian, an English translation comes out in 2012.
Three years later, Razie Mah electronically publishes Comments On Alexander Dugin’s Book (2012) The Fourth Political Theory. This commentary is available at smashwords and other e-book venues.
0005 Simultaneously, as well as more amazingly, Michael Millerman decides to make the philosophical work of Alexander Dugin the topic of his doctorate in philosophy. Oh, that does not go well. How dare this young intellect challenge the current narrative. Dugin should go into a box. He is a fascist. Or rather, a communist. Or something similarly unsavory, like a Eurasianist. Yes, that box should never be opened.
0006 Michael Millerman, like Pandora, opens the box. And the last monstrosity to emerge is hope.
He actually graduates with his doctorate.
The subsequently blacklisted Millerman starts his own school. The cancelled Millerman publishes the book that I currently examine: Inside Putin’s Brain: The Political Philosophy of Alexander Dugin (2022: Millerman School). Yes, Millerman starts a school. Look and see.
0007 In these blogs, I comment on chapter two, titled, “The Ethnosociological and Existential Dimensions of Dugin’s Populism”. This chapter is originally published in Telos (Winter, 2020).
In order for the reader gain an acquaintance with the Greimas square, I recommend blogs appearing at www.raziemah.com for January 2023. These blogs include Looking atAlex Jones’s Book (2022) The Great Reset and Notes on Daniel Esterlin’s Book (2020) 2045 Global Projects At War.
0050 Eden, the Lebenswelt that we evolved in, is where we, in our current Lebenswelt, come from, but cannot return to. The myth of Adam and Eve says it all.
The ethnos is where the narod comes from and cannot return to.
Figure 17
0051 The implications weave together psychology, sociology and biology.
How can the ethnos (D), the Lebenswelt that we evolved in, serve as the transit between the narod, emerging in our current Lebenswelt (C), and the person as objectified subject (B)?
Does each -ism appeal to our innate imaginations by offering an explicit abstraction, a forbidden fruit, that is desirous to the eyes, tastes sweet, and is desired to make one wise?
Does a narod (C) accepts the Luciferian suggestions (B) in the process of becoming a people (A)?
0052 Dugin proposes his fourth political theory in a world broken by our appetites for explicit abstractions. We have been sold tickets (B) back to Eden (D). Where do our travels bring us? Our travels meet a flaming sword that turns in all directions. A cherubim blocks the way.
Dugin speaks to the people.
His proposal has ethnosociological and existential dimensions.
We are more than individuals, class members, citizens and role-bearers.
We are a narod, on a quest to find who we are supposed to be.
Who do you say that we are?
0053 My thanks to Michael Millerman for his excellent summary of these two dimensions of Alexander Dugin’s political philosophy.
0128 Millerman’s essay would make Leo Strauss proud.
Millerman’s argument is exoteric. Strauss and Dugin share an interest in Heidegger. That is not the only feature that they have in common. Therefore, a Straussian should not dismiss Dugin’s political philosophy out of hand.
0129 The centerpiece turns out to be a translation, by Millerman, of a list of what needs to be done, according to Dugin, in order to establish the possibility of a Russian philosophy.
0130 The three tasks involve…
…dismantling Russian archeomodernity. Ironically, for Americans and western Europeans, the task is precisely the opposite. For western Europe, the archeomodern groove is a receptor. For Russia, the archeomodern groove is a trap.
…correctly comprehending the West. Ironically, the West may not be comprehending itself. The modern West is all about science. But, what is science? Is science a purely relational structure composed of the Positivist’s and empirio-schematic judgments? Plus, is there something vulnerable within this relational structure? Does phenomenology exploit that vulnerability? Does Heidegger’s Sein correspond to the noumenon? What happens to the West if noumena take on lives of their own?
….elaborating a philosophy of chaos. The narod harbors cautionary wisdom that is ignored by modern political movements, who imitate the practices of the empirio-schematic judgment. Chaos is not necessarily the absence of order. Chaos may be the order that cannot be situated by sovereign power.
0131 The placement of Millerman’s translation, along with its surprising content, offers an esoteric message.
0132 All the blogs for February 2023 at www.raziemah.com examine selected chapters from Michael Millerman’s book (2022) Inside “Putin’s Brain”: The Political Philosophy of Alexander Dugin. Millerman has been studying Dugin’s works for over a decade. If there is to be a truly philosophical underpinning to Eurasianism, then Dugin begins the quest.
As for this reviewer, my first endeavor to read Dugin, Comments on Alexander Dugin (2012) Fourth Political Theory, may be found at smashwords and other e-book venues. I ask the question, “If I were to say what Dugin is saying, using triadic relations, then how would that work?” The answer intrigues.
Obviously, I am not interested in whatever box the literati of modern political philosophy want to put Dugin in. I am interested in the purely relational structures that Dugin reveals.
0133 So far, I reviewed chapters two and six. In this blog, I will briefly touch on chapter nine. Well, less that that. I see a Greimas square in the seventh section of chapter nine. Its title is “Theologico-Political Implications”.
In this section, Millerman hones down on the difference between the Heideggerian Left (HL) and Heideggerian Right (HR) in regards to the theological-political issue of the returning of the religious and the receding of the secular.
0134 Recall, Dugin’s formulation of “the people” associates to the following Greimas square.
Figure 01
0135 A is the focal term, “the people”. What is the political expression of the people? In America, the Declaration of Independence starts with “we, the people”. So the answer is involved. Suffice to say that, until recently, the political expression is the democratically elected representative. Until recently? Mailing out unsolicited ballots is unconstitutional. It makes me wonder, what do modern intellectuals mean when they say the word, “democracy”.
B contrasts with A. Here, the three political theories (of liberalism (1), communism (3), fascism (2) and big government (il)liberalism (1, again)) model phenomena of a prepolitical world in terms of the individual (1, 1-again), class membership (3) and citizenship and noncitizenship (2).
C contradicts B and implicates A. Dugin uses the Russian word, “narod”, for prepolitical people that various schools of modern political philosophy regard as noumenon. The people (A) are political. The narod (C) is the people before being objectified by explicit political theories. For me, the narod (C) is humanity in our current Lebenswelt.
D contrasts with C, contradicts A and implicates B. Dugin uses the Russian word, “ethnos“. The narod (C) comes out of the ethnos (D) and cannot return. To me, the ethnos (D) is us in the Lebenswelt that we evolved in. Our current Lebenswelt (narod (C)) is not the same as the Lebenswelt that we evolved in (ethnos (D)). The hypothesis of the fist singularity contributes an evolutionary dimension that complements Dugin’s theologico-political analysis.
0136 Dugin is an example of the Heideggerian Right (HR). HR philosophers are few in number and for good reason. They are considered to be the enemies of the Heideggerian Left (HL), who want to co-opt Heidegger for their theological-political convictions.
Millerman poses this question (more or less), “How does the HL view the theological-political issue of receding secularism and returning religiosity?”
0137 Here is how I associate the discussion to the Greimas square.
Figure 02
0138 According to the HL, A, democracy is under threat because…
0139 …B, democracy must be secular.
Even though secular is an adjective and democracy is a noun and therefore B contrasts with A, secular is a necessary qualifier. A democracy cannot be a democracy unless it is secular. Hence, when HL-friendly pundits on public-private partner television say the word, “democracy”, they actually mean “secular democracy”.
0140 C contradicts B and complements A. C is religious. Non-secular means religious, just as secular means “not religious”. But, this too is wordplay, since religions are not “non-secular”, they are believers in an ultimate foundation, D. However, from the HL Greimas square, C is nonsecular.
At this point, secular institutions take on a scientific glow. The secular (B) use theoretical disciplinary languages to model observations and measurements of social phenomena. Naturally, these models end up defining the options available for ballots in… um… a democracy (A). Thus, the ultimate foundation (D) complements the secular (B) because it (D) does not exist.
0141 D contrasts with C, contradicts A and complements B. Already, I know how D complements B. The fact that an ultimate foundation fills the slot for (D) yet does not exist, according to HL, reveals the nature of the way the ultimate foundation (D) is itsown lacking.
Surely, this sounds like a contradiction in terms. But, that is the way HL rolls.
There is no God. There is no ethnos. The possibility that these statements (D) are wrong contradict (A), “democracy”, which, according to HL, must be godless (B). If these statements are incorrect, then the political system would not be a “democracy”, but a “theocracy”.
0142 Okay, HL is into wordplay.
The Heideggerian Right takes the Heideggerian Left’s wordplay at face value, producing the following remake of the HL Greimas square.
Figure 03
0143 As before, A, the focal word, is “democracy”.
0144 B contrasts with A, in the way that an adjective contrasts with a noun. The secret handshake allows HL pundits to indicate a secular democracy when they use the word, “democracy”, and use the word, “theocracy”, when religious folk take to the ballot box.
0145 C contradicts B because the word, “radical” (C), means “rooted”, and “secular” (B) means not religious. This implies that the radical (C) adheres to emptiness (D) with the same conviction that the religious, er… non-secular (C) adheres to an ultimate foundation (D). No wonder the radical (C) strives to eradicate the ontological and theological facets (phenomena) of the narod. The radical (C) creates conditions where other social phenomena (such as the individual, class membership, the roles of citizen and noncitizen) can be observed and measured by modern scientifically minded theoreticians (B).
0146 Emptiness (D) entails the absence of (1) an ultimate foundation encompassing both God and humans, (2) the ethnos, (3) what we evolved to be and (4) the Lebenswelt that we evolved in.
D contrasts with C, contradicts A and complements B.
Emptiness (D) contrasts with radical (C) because it (C) is rooted in ‘something’ (however ephemeral, such as an act of will).
Emptiness (D) contradicts democracy (A) because the implementation of secular policies (B) reveals the root (C) to be a pure act of will, rather than a product of say… philosophical inquiry.
Emptiness (D) complements the secular (B) because the secular knows that its politics will undermine whatever traditions that they are rooted in (C).
0147 In sum, the HL diagram celebrates democracy (A) and the secular (B) while denying the religious (C) and the possibility of an ultimate foundation (D). The HR view of the HL diagram positively labels the negative attitude towards religion as “radical” (C) and the denial of an ultimate foundation (D) as “emptiness”.
0148 To me, the Greimas square for the HL and for what the HR thinks of the HL’s views must be regarded as funny. Perhaps, hilarious.
How so?
The ethnos is where our sense of humor evolves. The narod is where people formulate jokes. The secular is where people lose their sense of humor . Democracy is where the comedy of the humorless plays out on the world stage.
0149 I do not know whether Heidegger’s “fourfold” or “das Geviert” can be re-articulated as a Greimas square. It might be worth trying. Perhaps, use of the Greimas square will allow the HL to take themselves less seriously and the HR to chuckle under their beards. The problem, of course, is that Dugin is no longer laughing, because the ones who take themselves seriously have designated him, not as a philosopher, but as a threat.
Pray for the soul of Alexander Dugin’s daughter.
0150 My thanks to Millerman for his excellent book. Please check out the Millerman School and dugin.com.
