03/26/24

Looking at Michael Tomasello’s Book (2016) “A Natural History of Human Morality” (Part 1 of 22)

0389 The book before me published by Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts. The question? What makes humans unique? The approach is scientific. Humans think differently than great apes, their closest biological kin. One way to understand that difference is to observe and measure the cognitive capacities of human newborns and infants, as well as the cognitive abilities of adult great apes.

This book belongs to a decades-long arc of inquiry by the author. During much of this time, Michael Tomasello serves as co-Director of the Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology in Leipzig, Germany. I cover two decades in my examinations. Here is the fourth book in the list.

0390 What has this semiotician found so far?

First, from the very start of his journey, the content-level of Tomasello’s vision corresponds to the situation-level of Razie Mah’s hypothesis. The ultimate human niche consists of the potential of triadic relations.

Razie Mah’s hypothesis applies the two-level interscope for Darwin’s paradigm to human evolution.

0391 First, the general Darwinian paradigm looks like this.

0392 In The Human Niche (available at smashwords and other e-book venues), Razie Mah proposes that the ultimate human niche_1b is the potential of triadic relations.

Tomasello’s hypothesis that joint attention_2b and shared intentionality_2b are behavioral and cognitive adaptations to the niche of sociogenesis_1b reconfigures the situation-level of Darwin’s paradigm, resulting in what I call the “Tomasello-Mah synthesis”.

0393 Yes, fortune turns her wheel. Tomasello does not know Mah’s hypothesis. Tomasello’s arc of inquiry is underway in 1999. Mah’s hypothesis first appears online in 2018. So, Tomasello configures his insight, corresponding to the situation-level of the Darwinian paradigm, as the content-level of his vision.

Tomasello’s vision offers a way to bring a phenotype (of human ontogeny_2c’) into relation with a foundational adaptation (of joint attention_2a’). But, according to Mah, phenotype and adaptation are two independent fields of evolutionary inquiry. One does not situate or contextualize the other. Rather, the two intersect.

Consequently, Tomasello’s vision resolves the internal contradictions of the intersection of genetics and natural history,by assigning the phenotype to the category of thirdness and the adaptation to the category of firstness, while maintaining the actuality of both.

0394 Here is a picture of Tomasello’s vision.

0395 Of course, this examination appears precisely 25 years after Tomasello’s vision is cast in 1999 AD.

His vision is maintained throughout his arc of inquiry.

Consequently, his conclusions carry an awkward emptiness. The emptiness compares to the basement of a house. The basement is dark, cool, foundational and ignored, until of course, one must seek refuge in a storm.

0396 The previous examinations of Tomasello’s works demonstrate that the house, the abode of his vision, is furnished with morality.

Tomasello can ignore the basement, haunted by immaterial beings called, “triadic relations”. Yet, in that place, where a family might store potatoes, onions, smoked meat, along with luggage and Christmas ornaments, dwells something that Tomasello may safely ignore. I call that ghost, “religion”.

03/1/24

Looking at Michael Tomasello’s Book (2016) “A Natural History of Human Morality” (Part 22 of 22)

0588 The Tomasello-Mah synthesis shows the ghost in the basement of the house of Tomasello’s vision.

Indeed, as this version of Darwin’s paradigm begins to haunt the entire edifice of human evolution, then Tabaczek’s housebecomes more than a house with a basement. If sociogenesis_1b is the potential_1b of triadic relations_2a, then Tomasello’s arc of inquiry may be re-articulated using triadic relations.

0589 For example, Razie Mah’s Primer on Sensible and Social Construction may be used to re-label the eras of individual, joint and collective intentionality. Individual construction associates to the category-based nested form. Sensible construction associates to the two-level interscope, containing content and situation levels. Social construction associates to the three-level interscope, containing content, situation and perspective levels.

Here is a list of what that might look like.

0590 To continue, the re-labeled eras may be regarded in terms of the evolution of talk.

The evolution of talk is not the same as the evolution of language. Language evolves in the milieu of hand talk.

0592 Next, I would like to focus attention on the era of collective intentionality.

Here is a list depicting the timeframe.

0593 Before the era of collective intentionality, hand talk is confined team activities. Hand talk produces sensible constructions. Each team develops its own way of hand talking.

After the domestication of fire, team-tradition hand talk starts to be used generally, eventually producing fully linguistic hand talk.

The situation is very dynamic. Since cooking with fire increases the number of teams, fully linguistic hand-talk is re-appropriated for specialized use in more and more teams. Fully linguistic hand-talk influences all social circles. In some of these circles, grammatically correct, yet apparently nonsensible statements, generate social constructions that open new cognitive spaces. These novel cognitive spaces become sites for more sensible construction.

0594 The voice comes into play during community meetings (150), seasonal mega-band round-ups (500) and special occasion tribal pow-wows (1500). The voice is used for synchronization. Song brings a large gathering of hominins into synchronization. Once this cultural habit starts, then singing joins other traits in sexual selection. The voice comes under voluntary control.

0595 Most likely, the early speciations of late Homo erectus produced species that could sing and hand-talk. But, they could not speak.

Speech is added to hand-talk with Homo sapiens. Anatomically modern humans practice a dual-mode of talking, hand-speech talk, for the next two hundred-thousand years.

0596 Hand-speech talk would still be practiced by anatomically modern humans today, were it not for the Ubaid of southern Mesopotamia. The hypothesis of the first singularity proposes that the Ubaid is the first culture on Earth to practice speech-alone talk.

Here is a picture of the era of social construction.

0598 Today, all civilizations practice speech-alone talk.

This brings me to the limit of Tomasello’s vision. I open the door, and step out into the realization that our current Lebenswelt is not the same as the Lebenswelt that we evolved in. I step into the vision of Razie Mah.

0599 The arc of Tomasello’s inquiry, spanning from 1999 to 2016, opens onto three masterworks by Razie Mah. These electronic books are available at smashwords and other e-work venues. This examination relies primarily on The Human Niche, along with books contained in the series, A Course on The Human Niche. A related series is titled, Buttressing the Human Niche.

Here is a list of Mah’s masterworks.

Still, there is more.

A Commentary on Michael Tomasello’s Arc of Inquiry (1999-2019) is available at smashwords and other e-book venues. This commentary includes Mah’s blogs for January, February and March, 2024, along with an examination of Becoming Human (2019), the fifth book in a sequence of five books.

0600 My thanks to Michael Tomasello, who writes the books under examination while Co-Director of the Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology in Leipzig, Germany, for conducting a scientific inquiry, from which I have examined only several works.

02/29/24

Looking at Michael Tomasello’s Book (2014) “A Natural History of Human Thinking” (Part 1 of 22)

0187 In the preface, the author notes that this book is a prequel to The Cultural Origins of Human Cognition (1999, Harvard University Press). The question is the same. What makes humans unique? The answer is the same. Humans think differently than great apes, their closest biological kin.

In 1999, researchers in evolutionary anthropology could say, “Only humans think of other humans as intentional agents. Plus, my cat and my dog are intentional operators, as well, say nothing of the weather.”

Okay, I added the second sentence for dramatic effect.

Unfortunately, research conducted after 1999 introduces a problem. It turns out that great apes recognize intentionality in others.

Uh oh.

0188 This book is the third marker in Tomasello’s intellectual journey. I start following his trek with Looking at Michael Tomasello’s Book (1999) “The Cultural Origins of Human Cognition” (appearing in Razie Mah’s January 2024 blog). The second marker that I examine may be found in Looking at Michael Tomasello’s Book (2008) “Origins of Human Communication” (appearing later in the same blog for the same month).

0189 In the publication before me, A Natural History of Human Thinking (2014, Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts), Tomasello explicitly abstracts three cognitive processes in order to distinguish humans from apes. The processes are cognitive representation, inference and self-monitoring. He then proposes that all three components were transformed in two key steps during hominin evolution. He labels his claims, “the shared-intentionality hypothesis”.

0190 Does this follow the trajectory set by previous works?

Here is a theme that appears in the second marker, pre-emptively modified with the above propositions in mind.

0191 This modified picture allows me to offer slogans for movements zero and one.

For zero, the slogan is “I work for food.”

For one, the slogan is “We work for food.”

01/31/24

Looking at Michael Tomasello’s Book (1999) “The Cultural Origins of Human Cognition” (Part 1 of 12)

0001 In 1999 AD, Michael Tomasello, then co-director of the Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology in Leipzig, Germany, publishes the work before me (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts).

To me, this work marks the start of the author’s twenty year journey, culminating in a theory of human ontogeny, published in 2019. The word, “ontogeny”, refers to human development and associates to the human phenotype.

0002 What interests me in Tomasello’s journey?

As noted in Comments on Dennis Venema and Scot McKnight’s Book (2017) Adam and the Genome (available at smashwords and other e-book venues), “phenotype” and “adaptation” are not the same. Instead, these labels apply to distinct actualities that coalesce into a single actuality. One may call that single actuality, an individual, a species or a genus. One may also call that single actuality, “a mystery”.

I am interested in the natural history side of the mystery of human evolution. However, the genetic (or ontogenetic) side cannot be ignored. Plus, natural history cannot be reduced to genetics, or visa versa

0003 Chapter one of Tomasello’s book is titled, “A Puzzle and a Hypothesis”.

Of course, a puzzle is not a mystery. A puzzle can be resolved. A mystery cannot.

The puzzle starts with genetics. Geneticists have examined the DNA of chimpanzees, bonobos and humans and predict that the last common ancestor lives 6 or 7 Myr (six or seven million years ago).

In contrast, physical anthropologists (natural historians) propose the fossil record noted in the following figure. With terminological sleight of hand, they refer to human ancestors as “hominins”, even though the old term for any bipedal primate (ape or human) is “hominid”.

0004 Hmmm. Does the puzzle concern time?

According to genetics, the last common ancestor (LCA) between chimpanzees and humans lives 7 Myr (millions of years ago). But, little significant shows up in the fossil record until 4 Myr. Our lineage obviously evolves feet first. As it turns out, starting around 5 Myr, the extent of tropical vegetation in Africa decreases due to desiccation. Bipedality is an adaptation to mixed forest and savannah.

0005 The fossil record provides other clues, especially stone tools.

The first stone tools are Oldowan. Oldowan stones tools are constructed on site. They are used to scrape meat off of bone and to crack long bones (that are full of fatty marrow).

Acheulean stone tools appear later in the archeological record. Acheulean stone tools are made beforehand and carried with some intention in mind. They have the appearance of a giant tooth. Notably, Acheulean stone tool technology remains unchanged for over a million years. Innovations in stone-tools follow the domestication of fire.

0006 Surely, these two tables are puzzling. In the first, the fossil record pertains to changes in hominin phenotypes. In the second, the fossil record pertains to hominin adaptations, but these adaptations are not phenotypic. They are artifacts. Are these adaptive artifacts cultural? Are they behavioral? I wonder, “Do the words, ‘culture’ and ‘behavior’, capture the matter and the form of these artifacts?” It is as if an adaptation recognizes matter and generates form.

0007 What is the nature of the adaptation that maintains (and occasionally changes) artifacts, as if these artifacts are phenotypes?

Tomasello suggests that an adaptation is a novel form of social cognition. Our lineage adapts to a new way of thinking about one another, eventually allowing sociogenesis, new styles of learning and cultural evolution.

0008 Tomasello proposes that there is one adaptation that potentiates subsequent adaptations.

Razie Mah proposes that there is one ultimate niche for our lineage. The hypothesis is presented in the e-book, The Human Niche (available at smashwords and other e-book venues).

0009 Do Tomasello (in 1999) and Mah (in 2018) propose that our lineage is defined by the same adaptation… er… niche?

What is the difference between an adaptation and a niche?

To these questions, I next attend.

01/18/24

Looking at Michael Tomasello’s Book (1999) “The Cultural Origins of Human Cognition” (Part 12 of 12)

0072 Chapter five is titled, “Linguistic Construction and Event Cognition”. The perspective-level linguistic communication_2c participates in ongoing events_2a.

Tomasello claims that joint attention is the key adaptation from which subsequent adaptations proceed. Surely, the three-level interscope depicted above does not contradict this claim.

After all, the evolution of joint attention should precede the evolution of linguistic communication.

0073 However, there is a disjunction, because great apes show few (if any) tendencies that may be characterized by joint attention. Even the occasional monkey hunt by chimpanzees is best characterized by several individuals deciding to pursue the same thing at the same time. The monkey-prey is the focus of attention, but the attention is disjointed, not really coordinated.

So, there must be a period before the evolution of joint attention, where individual intentionality reigns, even when group action takes place.

0074 So, when are these eras happening?

Tomasello wants to place the evolution of joint attention before the time of Homo heidelbergensis, who appears in the fossil record between 800 and 400kyr (thousands of years ago).

To me, this makes sense only so far as this.

Homo heidelbergensis leaves traces of cultural behavior in the archeological record.

To me, such traces indicate that these hominins are in the subsequent build-on era.

So, Tomasello’s timeline may require clarification.

0075 Okay, now that I am nitpicking, I must ask, “Is there a problem with making joint attention_2a the foundation of an evolutionary theory?”

Allow me to return to Tomasello’s vision.

0076 According to Comments on Dennis Venema and Scot McKnight’s Book (2017) Adam and the Genome (by Razie Mah, available at smashwords and other e-book venues), adaptation₂ and phenotype₂ belong to two independent scientific disciplines: natural history and genetics. Since both belong to situation-level nested forms that rely on different potentials, one cannot situate or contextualize the other. However, this is precisely what occurs in Tomasello’s vision.

Of course, Tomasello’s vision remains a breakthrough in the framework of modern science. At least, the phenotype does not correspond to the adaptation. Instead, the phenotype_2c puts culture_2b into perspective. Then, culture_2b virtually situates the adaptation of joint attention_2a.

Yes, to repeat, the phenotype_2c does not directly situate the adaptation_2a. Tomasello’s vision leads upwards from joint attention_2a to human culture_2b and then to human cognitive development_2c. Cognitive development_2c puts culture_2b into perspective, just as culture_2b virtually situates joint attention_2a.

Tomasello’s vision is truly remarkable.

0077 And, it is difficult to achieve.

This book is the start of a twenty year journey.

0078 As noted in points 0055 through 0058, the last few chapters cover the cultural (situation) and ontogenetic (perspective) levels of Tomasello’s vision. As far as I can see, these chapters labor to show how human ontogeny_2c (the scientific study of human development) virtually contextualizes human culture_2b (a somewhat vaguely defined term that refers to all situations where joint attention_2a pertains). In the process, Tomasello must also explain how human culture_2b, especially spoken language and symbolic representation, virtually emerges from and situates joint attention_2a.

How ambitious is that?

0079 Here a picture of the virtual nested form in the realm of actuality (the vertical column in secondness in Tomasello’s vision, portrayed as a nested form).

The normal context of the behavior of newborns and infants_2c virtually brings the actuality of spoken language and symbolic representation_2b into the potential of a foundational adaptation_2a.

0080 Yes, this is very ambitious, and the final three chapters of this book strain to meet the challenge. They should be read with this in mind. The last three chapters are well composed. Tomasello is an excellent writer. He is very organized. But, his exposition is like lifting a two-hundred pound octopus out of the water. As soon as one arm is lifted, a different one slides back into the murk.

0081 Plus, there is the lingering issue of natural history.

Here is a picture with Tomasello’s guesses.

Tomasello makes two associations that make no sense at all, when considering joint attention_2b as an adaptation to sociogenesis_1b in the normal context of natural selection_3b. Sociogenesis_1b is the human niche_1b. The human niche_1b is the potential_1b of triadic relations_2a. Consequently, the adaptation of joint attention_2a should be marked in the archaeological record with the appearance of the Homo genus, around 1.8Myr (millions of years ago).

0082 With that in mind, I close this examination of the first step in Tomasello’s journey, scientifically exploring who we are. The next step is a book that expands and clarifies this first step. It is published nine years later.

01/17/24

Looking at Michael Tomasello’s Book (2008) “Origins of Human Communication” (Part 1 of 12)

0083 In 2008 AD, Michael Tomasello, then co-director of the Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology in Leipzig, Germany, publishes the work before me (MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts).

This book is the second marker in Tomasello’s intellectual journey. I start following his journey with Looking at Michael Tomasello’s Book (1999) “The Cultural Origins of Human Cognition” (appearing in Razie Mah’s January 2024 blog). That is the first marker.

0084 The second marker starts as an academic presentation in 2006. His Jean Nicod Lectures, in Paris, concerns his work on great ape gestural communication, human infant gestural communication and human children’s language development. These lectures attempt to construct one coherent account of the evolution of hominin communication.

Oh, that terminology. Where Tomasello inscribes, “human”, I say, “hominin”.

0085 From my examination at the first marker, I already have a guess about Tomasello’s vision.

Here is a picture.

0086 Note that the titles of the levels have changed.

Also note that human ontogeny_2c or models of child development currently built by psychologists_2c, associates to phenotypes and genetics. Joint attention_2a or models in evolutionary psychology concerning hominin cognition_2a,associates to adaptations and natural history.

0087 Tomasello uses the word, “origins”, in his title. Does this suppose that human communication may be regarded as a phenotypic trait or as an adaptation? Or maybe, the conjunction is “and”.

In the above figure, I get the idea that the phenotype virtually contextualizes the adaptation. But, that is not really the case. The phenotype_2b virtually situates a species’ or individual’s DNA_2a.

Here is a diagram.

0088 Not surprisingly, this diagram in genetics has the same two-level relational structure as Darwin’s paradigm for natural history.

0089 What does this imply?

A mystery stands at the heart of evolutionary biology.

The adaptation is not the same as the phenotype.

Yet, together, they constitute a single actuality, which may be labeled a genus, a species or an individual.

Two category-based nested forms intersect in the realm of actuality. It is like two streets that meet. The intersection is constituted by both streets. As far as traffic goes, intersections are sites of dangerous contradictions. Traffic from one street should not collide with traffic from the other street. I suppose that the intersection of adaptation and phenotypecarries irreconcilable contradictions as well.

0090 Perhaps, Tomasello’s vision may be resolved by considering both joint attention_2a and human ontogeny_2c as adaptations, even though the latter is technically, phenotypic.

I suggest this because selection is the normal context for all three levels in Tomasello’s vision. Since natural selection goes with adaptation, the vision is one of natural history.

0091 That implies that the potentials for all three levels are like niches.

Human ontogeny_2c is an adaptation that emerges from and situates the potential of human culture_2b, where human culture_2b is like an actuality independent of the adapting species of individuals undergoing development_3c.

Human culture_2b is like an adaptation that emerges from and situates the potential of joint attention_2a, where joint attention_2a is like an actuality independent of the adapting ways of doing things_3b.

Joint attention_2a is like an adaptation that emerges from and situates sociogenesis_1a, where sociogenesis_1a is the potential of… what?… I have run out of actualities independent of the adapting species.

0092 Here is where the foundational Tomasello-Mah synthesis enters the picture.

Ah, so here is a problem.

Tomasello’s vision of the origins of human communication conceals the actuality underlying sociogenesis_1a, the potential_1a giving rise to joint attention_2a. The human niche is the potential of triadic relations.

0093 What about the subscripts in the preceding paragraph?

They belong to Tomasello’s vision.

0094 This subscript business can be confusing.

To me, the concealment in Tomasello’s vision is not necessarily a drawback. Rather, it presents an opportunity to re-articulate Tomasello’s arc of inquiry using the category-based nested form and other triadic relations.

0095 In the prior series of blogs, examining a book published in 1999, I introduced an interscope for the way humans think that derives from work by medieval schoolmen, the so-called “scholastics” of the Latin Age.

Here is a picture of the scholastic version of how humans think, packaged as a three level interscope.

12/23/23

Looking at Daniel Dennett’s Book (2017) “From Bacteria To Bach and Back” (Part 1 of 20)

0001 Let me start with an admission. In this particular examination, I am not myself. I am someone who I am not. I own a dog named, “Daisy”.

The book before me is by Daniel C. Dennett and is titled, “From Bacteria to Bach and Back: The Evolution of Minds”. The book is published by W.W. Norton (New York, London). The book wrestles with issues both philosophical and scientific. How does our world come to be? How do we come to be?

Who are we? We are people with minds. Minds intelligently design artifacts using tools of production and tools of the intellect. The first tools are handy. The second are… well… not exactly the same as “handy”.

0002 The hand grasps a tool then uses it to manipulate things. The word, “prehensile” applies. Our hands are full of prehensions. We are aware of the heft and feel of material instruments.

The mind grasps an intellectual tool with its… um… brain. Is there such a word as “comprehensile”? How about the term, “comprehension”? Once we become competent using an intellectual tool, we comprehend. We become familiar with its heft and feel.

0003 The hand is unlike the appendages of other mammals.

For example, cats and dogs only have feet. The cat uses its front feet as “paws”, in a manner similar to the way humans use their hands. Not really, because the cat’s paws cannot hold anything. The cat cannot pick up a tool. May I say that the cat’s front paws are part of the feline toolkit? Evolution builds tools right into the cat’s body. Most mammals are fashioned this way. Tools are part of their bodies.

0004 The mind serves as a metaphorical appendage, because it grasps ‘something’, and in doing so, may manipulate it. The dog, whose practical toolkit includes feet and a formidable mouth, has an advantage over the cat, in this respect. The dog’s mind grasps ‘something’ and, in doing so, manipulates humans into serving as the leader of its pack.

To me, the dog is testimony to the inhospitality of wolf “culture”, in general, and the inadequacy of wolf “leadership”, in particular. Wolf pack-leaders often behave like aristocrats, always expecting deferential treatment. They are often filled with paranoia and treachery. Yet, their followers know that they need a leader. Otherwise, there is no pack. Without the pack, there is only death.

0005 Surely, a reasonable human would serve as a more hospitable leader, especially since humans know how to get food in surprising ways. Humans give dogs food. Until, of course, starvation fills the land.

04/6/23

Looking at Karatzogianni and Robinson’s Article (2017) “Schizorevolutions Versus Microfascisms” (Part 1 of 4)

0001 Last month, the Razie Mah blog presented the end of Comments on David Graeber and David Wengrow’s Book (2021) “The Dawn of Everything” (available at smashwords and other e-book venues). The blog is titled Looking at Graeber and Wengrow’s Chapter (2021) “The State Has No Origins”.

The question arises, “Does the weird confounded diagram developed in this commentary have relevance to other inquiries covering the human condition in our current Lebenswelt?”

0002 This blog offers an answer, by way of example.

Three years before the conjunction of Saturn and Jupiter in the constellation of Aquarius, Athina Karatzogianni and Andrew Robinson publish an article in the Journal of International Political Theory (2017, Vol. 13(3) 282-295). The British scholars are experts in communication and sociology. Thier article investigates the role of anarchy… er, “anarchy”… in state securitization.

0003 The weird and confounded diagram that appears in the commentary on Graeber and Wengrow’s book looks like this.

The goal of this blog is to briefly review Karatzogianni and Robinson’s article and to demonstrate that a derivation of this figure maps onto the topic.

0004 What is this article about?

The full title is Schizorevolutions versus Microfascisms: The fear of anarchy in state securitisation. Needless to say, the terms are specialized descriptors. But of what?

0005 According to the above figure, academics may confound the state_2b with sovereign acts and decrees_2bC. The “state”_2b is defined. What is defintion? Definition₃ is the normal context bringing the actuality of a spoken word₂ into relation with the potential of meaning, presence and message₁.

The state_2b‘ is a term arising from the presence of domination_1b‘. But, domination_2a must also be defined. The term, “domination”_2a, emerges from (and situates) the possibilities inherent in the sole legitimate use of violence (similar to presence)_1a’, the administration of information (like meaning)_1a and the promotion and guidance of charismatic influence(like message)_1a. I call policing, bureaucracy and maintaining reputation, “the three imperatives_1a“. The three imperatives_1a underlie domination_2a.

0006 Here is a picture of the way that Graeber and Wengrow define “state”. This is the path of definition (P).

0007 The way of differentiation is developed in the chapter on presence in Razie Mah’s masterwork, How To Define The Word “Religion” (available at smashwords and other e-book venues). Even though the differentiation of an originary, undifferentiated, social world follows the logic of Peirce’s categories, the process is also historic. Since the start of our current Lebenswelt, the society_C, organization_B and individuals in community_A have historically differentiated into three tiers of interscopes. As a result, realization of the two types of religion, corresponding to organizational objects_2aC and a relational object_2cC, follows the logic of the differentiation of category-based nested forms and occurs in history.

Here is a picture of the three-level interscope for the society_C tier. This is the path of differentiation (Q).

0008 Needless to say, neither Graeber and Wengrow nor Karatzogioanni and Robinson are aware of the the path of differentiation. So, they are not aware that they confound P and Q.

For example, in the introduction, the latter authors suggest that the securitisation discourse (the administration of information, P2_1a) by the state_2b’ arises from the perception of “new threats” (charismatic influence outside of state supervision, P3_1a) and attempts to fix network flows (through violence, P1_1a). This also means that the normal context of sovereign power_3bC brings the actuality of sovereign acts and decrees_2bC into relation with the potential for ‘order’_1bC. However, now sovereign power_2bC is confounded with definition_3b. The state_2b is mixed up with sovereign acts and decrees_2bC. Plus, ‘domination’_1b is entangled with ‘order’_1bC.

0009 Here is a picture of how the confounding seems to play out.

0010 Karatzogianni and Robinson immediately go on to say that their argument is based on a distinction between states and networks. Furthermore networks divide into two forms, such as affinity-active and non-affiliating-reactive, as well as between schizoid (non-affiliating active) and paranoic (non-affiliating reactive). Then, they discuss the ramifications in detail.

To me, the distinction between the state_2b and its domination_2a of organizational objectives_2aC of insitutions_3aCredefines_3b institutions_3aC as networks_3a. Order_1bC melds with efforts to control the content level_1b. While “order” sounds legitimate. “Control” does not.

Order_1bC establishes peace among instituions_3aC working_2aC independently based on their own righteousness_1aC. Plus, that righteousness_1aC does not pay tribute to the perspective level actuality_2bC of fear.

Control_1b envisions threats emanating from the open space of active desire_1aC and aims to moderate these through domination_2a (using P1, P2 and P3 of the three imperatives underlying the definition_3a of domination_2a). Consequently, attempts_2b to supervise_2b and narrow the space_1b of righteousness_1aC, sanction_2b and outlaw_2b objects^org_2aC, and wage war_2b on institutions_3aC that do not conform to state_2b control_1b expand into the fabric of everyday life.

0011 The state’s_2b acts and decrees_2bC are not oriented to protecting civilians or non-state actors. So, the normal context is not sovereignty_3bC, but a defining power_3b (responsible to a higher loyalty_2cC, so to speak). Yet, this defining power_3bspeaks the language of sovereignty_3bC, just as Graeber and Wengrow do.

0012 But, who is doing the defining here?

Look at the perspective-level actuality_2cC.

Fear_2cC is not an emotion. Fear_2cC is a demiurge, a relational object, an object that brings everyone into relation.

Fear_2cC defines_3b the securitisation state_2b.

04/1/23

Looking at Karatzogianni and Robinson’s Article (2017) “Schizorevolutions Versus Microfascisms” (Part 4 of 4)

0028 This article appears in the Journal of International Political Theory (2017, vol 13(3), 282-295). So far, my examination describes how the weird confounded diagram developed in the commentary on David Graeber and David Wengrow’s Book (2021) “The Dawn of Everything” is relevant to Karatzogianni and Robinson’s argument. This blog retells the story.

The weird diagram confounds two independent paths of articulation. The path of Graeber and Wengrow is the way of definition (P). After all, they are academics. Academics are devoted to defining their terms. The path of Razie Mah is the way of differentiation (Q). The differentiation of a nested form into the society_C, organization_B and individual in community_A tiers takes place in the chapter on presence in the masterwork, How To Define the Word “Religion”.

Here is a picture of the situation and content levels of definition (P) confounded with the same levels of the society_C tier (Q).

0029 The above diagram does not include the perspective_c level of the society_C tier (Q). Karatzogianni and Robinson open by describing the securitisation state as exploiting and promoting an atmosphere of fear. Fear is the object that brings everyone into relation_2cC.

Consequently, this confounding (P and Q) is put into perspective by a demiurge_2cC, an entity standing above sovereign power, and this demiurge_2cC defines the state_2b.

0030 This configuration produces a split in the content level of defined_3a institutions_2aC.

Some institutions_3b’ attempt to work with the state_2b. These conforming institutions_3b’ bring sanctioned organizational objects_2b’ into relation with the potential_1b’ of the three imperatives of domination_1c’ as well as the institution’s original righteousness_1b. This is useful for the state_2c’, which relies on conforming institutions_3b’ to situate institutions_3a’ that (for whatever reason) cannot or will not conform.

Conforming institutions_3b’ perform microfascist activities for the state_2c’, increasing the possibility of state control_1c’through forcing choices, limiting and misleading information, as well as protecting reputations. These activities are built into sanctioned organizational objectives_2b’ that presumably emerge from (and situate) the potential of the institution’s original righteousness_1b’. According to my reading this article, Karatzogianni and Robinson do not clearly ideate this side of the splitting.

Other institutions are downgraded (often, by state interference) into networks_3a’. Nonconforming networks_3a’ bring unsactioned organizational objectives_2a’ into relation with the potential of ‘unsupervised righteousness’_1a’. Conforming institutions_3b’ are ofted viewed by the anarchy level as state apparatuses_3b’ whose organizational objectives_2b’ are compromised by the fact they follow the rules, even when not necessary, lie and cover up_1b’.

0031 How do nonconforming networks_3a’ respond?

Not as the state_2c’ would like them do. The state_2c’ now occupies the perspective level of an interscope that expresses the path of definition. Remember, the perspective level typically comes into play on;y when there is a failure on the situation level. In other words, the perspective level is taken for granted, until something goes wrong.

Here is the interscope of securitisation_2cC.

0032 Once again, what about the response of noncomforming networks_3a’ on the anarchy level?

Unsupervised righteousness_1a’ inspires organization objectives_2a’ that appear schizophrenic (they are listening to the voices in thier heads instead of the state) or paranoid (they think that the state is the one to fear, rather than the demiurge that defines the state). Consequently, the two actors of importance in Karatzogianni and Robinson’s article belong to the state and the anarchy levels.

0033 So, what is lacking in this article?

Situation-level institutions_b’ end up being drained of their original righteousness_1b’ due to their compromise with the defining power_3c’. Conforming institutions_3b’ lose respectability by enforcing the three imperatives that underlie the word, “domination”_1b’. Conforming institutions_3b’ lose respectablity by sacrificing their original righteousness_1b’ in the process of enforcing the three imperatives_1b’. Yet, conforming institutions_3b’ maintain respectablility by being the only ones whose organizational objectives_2b’ are sanctioned by state decree_2c’ and therefore less likely to suffer capricious state action_2c’.

0034 It makes me wonder what the word, “respectable”, really means.

The sociological and psychological dynamics of the compliant level are ripe for exploration.

Coloration tells the story.

0035 So much for the political theory aspect of Karatzogianni and Robinson’s article, what about the “international” aspect?

After all, the article appears in the Journal of International Political Theory.

Well, in the introduction and the conclusion, the authors speculate that the security state may be a response to the anarchy generated by… or may be a strategy to control the wealth and innovations produced by… or may aim to wrest control from…

… global capitalism.

Which makes me wonder, “Could global capitalism be a demiurge, just like securitisation?”

If so, then Graeber and Wengrow’s weird confounding diagram is relevant.

And, the prior steps should apply to the following perspective-level nested form.

0036 The rest is left as an exercise for the intrepid inquirer.

03/31/23

Looking at David Graeber and David Wengrow’s Chapter (2021) “Why The State Has No Origin” (Part 1 of 13)

0180 If David Graeber and David Wengrow’s recent book, subtitled, A New History of Humanity, is a breakthrough in postmodern anthropology, then it is so because it displays a semitic textual structure, instead of a greek textual structure.

These two styles are discussed in An Instructor’s Guide to An Archaeology of the Fall. Rather than eliminating possibilities in order to arrive at the most likely correct interpretation, these authors play literary tricks, coupling chapters one and twelve, A:A’, chapters two and eleven, B:B’, and chapters three through nine and chapter ten, C:C’.

0182 The semitic structure is A:B:C:C’:B’:A’. In Comments on David Graeber and David Wengrow’s Book (2021) The Dawn of Everything (by Razie Mah, available and smashwords and other e-book venues), the work is discussed in the pattern A:A’, B:B’ and C:C’. Notably, the bulk of the book covers the last layer, C:C’, and balances seven chapters (three through nine, C) against one chapter (ten, C’). Chapter ten is twice as long as any other chapter.

0183 Plus, chapter ten stands on its own, allowing me to place an examination in Razie Mah’s blog, with the title Looking at David Graeber and David Wengrow’s Chapter (2021) “Why The State Has No Origin”. If the reader first encounters the blog, the commentary is available. If the reader first purchases the commentary, then the reader can call the blog to the attention of others.

An Archaeology of the Fall

A Horror Story by Razie Mah

Tag Archives: psychology

Looking at Karatzogianni and Robinson’s Article (2017) “Schizorevolutions Versus Microfascisms” (Part 1 of 4)

Looking at Karatzogianni and Robinson’s Article (2017) “Schizorevolutions Versus Microfascisms” (Part 4 of 4)