0001 Phenomenology situates science.

Three commentaries flesh out the above statement.

All are available at smashwords.

Just search for key words, in addition to the commentator, Razie Mah.

0002 These e-works are:

Reverie on Mark Spencer’s Essay (2021) “The Many Phenomenological Reductions”

Comments on Joseph Trabbic’s Essay (2021) “Jean-Luc Marion and … First Philosophy”

Comments on Richard Colledge’s Essay (2021) “Thomism and Contemporary Phenomenology”

0003 The originating articles are published in the American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly.

None mention science.

0004 Two questions arise.

First, why are Catholic philosophers interested in phenomenology?

Second, why do none of these originating essays mention science?

0005 Why are Catholic philosophers interested in phenomenology?

In Reverie on Mark Spencer’s Essay (2021) “The Many Phenomenological Reductions”, one incentive is proposed.

0006 The positivist intellect has a rule.  No metaphysics is allowed.

Catholic anti-reductionism is metaphysical.

Phenomenology is not.

Consequently, the phenomenologist is tolerated in our scientific Age of Ideas, but the Thomist is not.

0007 So, the Christian realist has an incentive to speak through the mouthpiece of phenomenology.

0008 Why are Catholic philosophers interested in phenomenology?

In Comments on Joseph Trabbic’s Essay (2021) “Jean Luc Marion and … First Philosophy”, a second incentive is proposed.

0009 If phenomenology situates science, then what puts phenomenology into perspective?

0010 In 1995, the French Catholic phenomenologist, Jean-Luc Marion, comes very close to naming that “what”.  “What” coincides with the givenness of things themselves.

0011 Marion’s identification of givenness offers an opportunity for Catholic philosophers.  But, the concerns of the positivist intellect remain.  The positivist intellect rules out metaphysics.

As far as science is concerned, givenness is irrelevant.

0012 But, there is a twist.

The naming of givenness illuminates the potential underlying phenomenological reduction.

The noumenon_1a, the thing itself_1a, is a mind-independent being.

The noumenon_1b, what the thing itself_1a must be_1b, is a mind-dependent being, that one can take to be mind-independent.

0013 Does that reflect the awkward nature of givenness?

One can give, with no expectation for return.

Can one take, with no expectation of reciprocity?

Can the gift be given, even when the giver and the recipient are nowhere to be found?

0014 Why are Catholic philosophers interested in phenomenology?

In Comments on Richard Colledge’s Essay (2021) “Thomism and Contemporary Phenomenology”, a third incentive is proposed.

0015 Colledge reads a 2006 book by German phenomenologist, Gunter Figal, entitled Objectivity, The Hermeneutical and the Philosophical. 

Colledge wonders, “Is this a phenomenological realist open to Christian anti-reductionism?”

Can we talk?

0016 Figal admits that the thing itself_1a should be mind-independent.  If this is the case, then metaphysics should be allowed.  Aren’t the mathematical and mechanical models of the empirio-schematic judgment mind-dependent beings?  Don’t mind-dependent beings transcend (while entangling) physics?  Doesn’t that fit the definition of metaphysics.

Well, yes, this becomes apparent when phenomenology reveals what the thing itself_1a must be_1b and then a novel empirical science_2a arises to investigate its_1a(1b) phenomena_1a.

0017 Why do Catholic philosophers (who are curious about phenomenology) not mention science?

This is a very good question, since Aristotle’s and the Positivist’s judgments are structurally similar.

Well, they are different, because the three elements of judgment are imbued with different categories.

0018 The similar structures, along with different categorical assignments, benefit phenomenology.  Phenomenology can sneak Aristotelian metaphysical constructs into the laboratory by reifying hylomorphes into what the thing itself_1a must be_1b.  Phenomenology appropriates illicit metaphysical constructs then cleans them of metaphysical terminology.

0019 For example, in terms of physics, a one Euro coin may be reduced to its constituent metal and minted shape.  To me, this looks like matter and form.

At the same time, in terms of phenomenological reduction_2b, a one Euro coin_1a is money_1b.  Money_1b is what the Euro coin itself_1a must be.

0020 What happens when what the thing itself_1a must be_1b is not the thing itself_1a?

Is phenomenological reduction at work?

0021 If the one Euro coin as money is a mind-independent (formerly mind-dependent) being, then novel laws of “physics” apply.  The coin_1a(1b) now exhibits the phenomena of value_1a and fiat currency_1a.

The novel “social” science of modern economics investigates the phenomena_1a that objectify this noumenon_1a(1b).