Looking at Ekaterina Velmezova and Kalevi Kull’s Article (2017) “Boris Uspenskij…” (Part 15 of 19)
0594 On page 438, the question of translation takes a creepy turn.
What happens when the presence1b of the language2am of meaning1a produces a social interaction2bf that is obviously not substantiated by a cognition2am that makes sense?
0595 Say what?
Uspenskij proposes the following scenario.
When I say something to you, I can take into account that you may not understand me. You may not translate what I am saying2af according to the same… positivist intellect3a or meaning1a. As soon as I know that this is the case, I become silent, as Wittgenstein advised (after he had published a vast treatise that could not be translated into any establishment framework).
0596 Does this sound familiar?
This is not a scenario about translation between two people speaking different mother tongues.
This is a scenario about translation between two people engaging different languages2am of meaning1a.
0597 For example, I ask about a “tool2af“.
This raises the semasiological question of the meaning1a… er… language2am that gives the term meaning1b.
What meanings can one attach to the word, “tool2af“?
A handyman may translate that into a question about what instruments are needed to perform the task at hand2am.
A surveillance agent may translate that into a question about what type of weapons are you talking about?2am.
I suspect that the handyman that the agency sent is here to conduct surveillance because he does not appear interested in getting any work done2bm. Instead, he seems interested in figuring out where my weapons may be hiding.
0598 I immediately stop asking questions and fall silent, following Wittgenstein’s advice.
Why?
I do not want to send the wrong message1c.
0599 Uspenskij offers this scenario twenty-three years after the fall of the Berlin Wall.
Is he traumatized or what?
The interviewer is unfazed.
0600 On page 439, the next question (#8) concerns how Uspenskij feels about Saussure and Peirce.
Uspenskij says that, as a linguist, he subjectively appreciates Saussure and objectively understands what he says. As for Peirce, he is incomprehensible.
The interviewer states that one of the advantages of Peirce’s sign-relations is that they allow one to differentiate among plants, animals and humans, just like Thomas Aquinas does, following Aristotle.
Uspenskij replies (more or less), “That is bullshit.”
0601 The old man is correct.
How so?
Take a look at the ego interscope.

Does the history and the semiotics of the first iteration of the Tartu-Moscow School of Semiotics translate into this interscope?
0602 If so, then there is more to Peirce’s categories and semiotics than icons, indexes and symbols.
So, maybe, Peirce’s tradition will fare better in the second iteration of the TMS.
0603 Meanwhile, take a look at the above figure.
If Lotman is correct, then it is inevitable that there is something untranslatable in the translation2a that occurs in the content-level actuality2a of the ego interscope.
If entanglement is translation, then I wonder what the semiological3a structuralist3b model2c (SVi) stands for.






















