Looking at Ian Hodder’s Book (2024) “Entangled.” (Part 10 of 22)
0114 Here are diagrams of Hegel’s and Marx’s things.

0115 While onlookers may offer smelling salts to philosophers who swoon over these simplifications, allow me to refer to Razie Mah’s blogs for December 2025, which details the entanglement of the things of Karl Marx (1818-1883) and Juri Lotman (1922-1993). These two things, one materialist and one semiotic, also appear to be diametrically opposed.
They are not. They are entangled. Some of the implications are discussed by Razie Mah in four blogs posted on January 1, 2026 titled, Looking at Melinda A. Zeder’s Article (2025) “Unpacking the Neolithic”.
0116 As it turns out, Marx’s and Lotman’s things constitute a new Overton window for postmodern archaeology.
Does that mean that the above figure depicts the old Overton window?
I guess that depends how how one defines the term, “Overton window”.
Otherwise, the answer is “yes”.
0117 So how does Hegel’s thing end up entangling Marxist matter?
Here is a picture.

0118 Hegel’s and Marx’s things game the empirio-schematic judgment, in so far as they both consist of two contiguous real elements, which precisely fits Peirce’s category of secondness. Secondness is the realm of actuality.
In the empirio-schematic judgment, a disciplinary language (relation, thirdness) brings mathematical and mechanical models (what ought to be, secondness) into relation with observations and measurements of phenomena (what is, firstness). Note that mathematical and mechanical models are imbued with secondness, the realm of actuality. This makes sense, because there are real elements on either side of an equal sign for any equation. Mechanical models manifest cause and effect in truncated material and efficient manners.
Truncated?
The formal and final attributes of material and efficient causation go into the trunk.
The trunk ate it.
0119 Hegel’s and Marx’s things cannot be mechanically or mathematically modeled, even though anthropologists go to great lengths to imagine that they do. That is because they are not models (in the natural science sense of the term). They are expressions of what the noumenon must be.
0120 What does that imply?
If phenomena are observable and measurable facets of their noumenon, and if the noumenon is not as obvious for the social sciences as it is for the physical sciences, then social scientists measure phenomena on the basis of what the noumenon must be.
0121 What better way to assess what the noumenon must be than to theoretically structure a social-science noumenon according to the structure of Peirce’s secondness?
Aristotle’s hylomorphe is an exemplar of Peirce’s secondness.
So are Hegel’s and Marx’s things.

0122 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel is the first to propose a dyadic structure as a social noumenon. Hegel’s thing reifies his insight that the normal context of a spirit3 brings the actuality of a historical contradiction of any thesis by an antithesis2 into relation with the possibility of ‘synthesis’1.
History goes like this. First, there is a thesis. Then, contradictions within the thesis inspires an antithesis. Then, for the longest time, people attuned to the thesis battle people attuned to the antithesis. Then, the apparently insoluble conflict is put into context by a spirit3 operating on the potential of a synthesis1. That synthesis1 becomes the thesis2 as a new system3 constellates.
0123 Here is a picture of Hegel’s category-based nested form.
I should say “forms”, because there are two of them (U and L).

0124 Now, I depict the trajectory of a historical entanglement and its resolution.
0125 The upper category-based nested form (U) describes the civilizational changes that fascinated Hegel.
0126 How does this nested form pack into Hegel’s thing?
To me, the normal context of spirit3 and the potential of ‘synthesis’1 go into matter that substantiate the long-lived “human condition”, where thesis and antithesis are locked in contradiction2 as form.
0127 So, the overall picture of the human condition2 (as form) is that the spirit3 and its synthesis1, which created our Zeitgeist in a remarkable thesis, must be preserved (as matter), but is subject to disagreements about what this remarkable insight really means (as form, again).




























