Recall, an empedoclement (a noun derived from the name of the Neoplatonic philosopher, Empedocles) is the inverse of an impediment (see points 0329 through 0341). In this case, almost all institutional and personal interactions at the water fountain impede my boss (the macronucleus) from establishing a feedback to me (the contractile vacuole) that might mitigate my impulse to stir things up.
0526 For my reading of Empedocles, the SIs is strife. The SIe is love.
In strife, form (SVs) attracts matter, {SOs [salience] SOe}.
Okay, technically, matter is really {(SOs [&] SVe)2b [salience3c((1c))] (SOe)2c}.
The form2a of what is happening3a operating on the potential of ‘something’ happening1a appeals to matter2b[]2c, and that matter2b[]2c itself is a thing, coupling the situation and perspective levels, as matter2b and form2c.
The appeal comes in [strife]. The coupling, the empedoclement as thing, comes with [love].
0527 Obviously, my boss (the macronucleus) has greater wisdom than me (the contractile vacuole).
He has to wait, for the moment when preparation meets opportunity, to establish a feedback loop where my humor, instead of causing trouble, can improve morale.
0528 Yes, evolution is all about empedoclements, which are impossible to predict in advance.
Only in hindsight, does an empedoclement become clear.
0529 In section 10.4, the authors discuss many examples.
In each step of the progression of evolution on Earth, the emergent holobiont is more stunning to behold. At each step, the holobiont seems to have more and more of an identity. At the same time, the holobiont appears more susceptible to subagent malfunctions.
0530 With this in mind, I assess my own self-affirmation and self-awareness as the human version of contractile vacuole.
531 The text before me is chapter four of Semiotic Agency (2021). Details on the text may be found on point 0473. Chapter four covers pages 95-122.
0532 This chapter is an overview of both hierarchy and the evolution of living systems composed of hierarchies of sub-agents.
0533 Section 4.1 concerns a gradation of competence in semiotic agency. The gradation arises from the intuitively obvious structure of animals.
0534 The above picture suggests that each level of semiotic competence both encompasses and transforms the adjacent lower level.
0535 Does the adjacent lower level come under the control of the higher level?
It makes me wonder about the term, “control”.
Does “control” assume the functionality of adjacent lower-level subagents?
Does “control” indicate that the higher-level agent uses lower-level subagents in order to achieve its goal?
0536 Well, here is one way to diagram the relation between agent and subagent.
The agent relies on the subagent to behave like its supposed to behave.
Does that accord with the meaning, the presence and the message of the word, “control”?
Yes, the agent uses the subagent and assumes the functionality of the subagent.
But “control”?
0537 Is there any other term that applies to the metasystem transition implied by the above figure?
Take a look at the normal contexts.
The logics of thirdness are exclusion, complement and alignment.
How do these apply to the above figure?
Obviously, the relation between the agent and subagent is one of alignment. This implies that the possibility of ‘final causality’1 for the agent3 is included in the possibility of ‘final causality’1 for the subagent3. Otherwise, the subagent3would be excluded from the agent3.
0538 Well, what about the other two logics?
Surely, exclusion and complement must have roles to play.
They do, in an evolutionary schema.
Recall, biological evolution is a mystery, consisting of the intersection of adaptation and phenotype. If evolution starts with an agent, and ends up as agent with subagents, then the subagents differentiate (exclusion), specialize (complement) and then align (alignment). If evolution starts with an independent agent (exclusion), who ends up as a subagent within another agent, then maybe some sort of phenotypic change comes into play (compatibility), leading to incorporation (alignment).
0539 Here is a picture of both routes.
0540 Consider the domestication of the dog.
Can I imagine the logics of exclusion, complement and alignment in play?
The agent is like an Umwelt to the subagent. The subagent participates in the Innerwelt of the agent.
0541 In section 4.2, the authors discuss the prokaryotes. These single-celled organisms are independent and fierce. For the most part, they operate exclusively. But, they do have moments of compatibility, due to horizontal gene transfer.
I once got a bacterial infection after… you know… having fun in the foolish ways of a human contractile vacuole. My body did all it could to exclude the damn things. But, they won and… what is that?.. you call it “penicillin”?… then I was miraculously cured. But, I learned a lesson. No more having fun in ways that I can get bacterial infections.
0542 In section 4.3, the authors discuss the eukaryotic transition. Here, the second column comes into play, because eukaryotes look like big bags of specialized prokaryotes. The impediments to prokaryotic incorporation are enormous. So, empedoclements seem to be miraculous – not in the way that some people define “miracle” as “something that is not physically possible”, but in the way that a miracle is simultaneous foretold and unexpected. The empedoclement is the inverse of an impediment. It is as unlikely as an impediment is likely.
The eukaryotic cell is so complicated, compared to prokaryotes, that I find it hard to imagine how a transition from prokaryote to eukaryote could have happened. Certain prokaryotes, at first independent and great at doing one metabolic trick or another, found that they are compatible. Then, they incorporate and form an agent. The agent reproduces. Agents that are most capable of aligning of all the former prokaryotes, reproduce more successfully than others.
0543 Here is a picture that may look familiar.
0544 Even though the eukaryotic cell lives in the outside world, the cell as agent acts as though it is the outside world to all the organelles. The organelles end up fully domesticated. They all live in the big house… er… cell. And, they cannot leave.
Sometimes, a eukaryote will “ingest” a prokaryote and not “digest” it. The prokaryote turns out to perform a task that benefits the eukaryote. Mitochondria and chloroplasts come to mind. Once, ingested, the cell can exploit a compatibility, leading to incorporation, rather than digestion (which is a type of exclusion that um… when I think about it… is also an incorporation).
0545 In section 4.4, the authors discuss multicellularity within the eukaryotic tradition. At the beginning, this looks like the second column at play, at least to the point that when the multicellular organism dies, its subagent cells die with it.
When you think about it, the whole proposition is madness.
When a multicellular agent dies, every cell dies with it.
That is so unfair, unless every cell in a multicellular organism is fully “domesticated”.
It makes me think that maybe it may not be so awesome to be fully domesticated.
0546 So, perhaps it is only to be expected that a specialized organ would be tasked with keeping the animal alive by interacting with both the environment and the body. A nervous system allows the environment and ecology to um… “domesticate”… the animal as agent, in so far as an animal lives and reproduces in an environment (material world) and ecology (relational world). Both offer “affordances”, that is, actualities2a that can be exploited or need to be avoided1b.
0547 Section 4.5 discusses the nature of the nervous system in animals.
Yes, the nervous system specializes. Its goal is to keep the animal alive by interacting with environment, ecology and body. Consequently, the nervous system must behave as if it is an agent. But, it is really a subagent of the animal as an agent. Up to around seven million years ago, this was not a problem. Not even the chimpanzee really considers that there is a biological subsystem that behaves as if it is the whole system, even through it is not.
0548 It’s like my macronuclear boss, so keen on the inner workings of conflict and cooperation, strife and love, that he thinks that he is the institution… or is it?… the organization. Hmmm, institution sounds like agent. Organization sounds like a multitude of subagents, like myself.
0549 The authors do not dwell on the awkward position that the nervous system finds itself in.
The nervous system is like an institution. The body is like its organization. All the organs, tissues and cells are like individuals in community, who are not aware that… if the community goes… they go with it.
0550 Should the three logics of thirdnessfor the nervous system operate differently from earlier cases where an animal is the agent?
I suppose so, since the nervous system represents “the agent” within the environment and ecology. Here the logics of exclusion, complementarity and alignment sound like ways to survive where natural selection is the normal context. Exclusion goes with the fact that everyone is on the menu. Specialization associates to various tricks that a species masters in order to exploit the environment or ecology and to avoid… back to the menu business. Differentiation keys into a very funny innovation that the multicellular lineage discovers that gets around the problem of all the cells dying when the big house fails.
0551 Yes, I am talking about sexual differentiation.
Talk about empedoclements!
0552 But, I am talking about the nervous system, which has to take various urges into account, because it is also a subagent, even though it regards itself as “the agent”, and performs its duties reasonably well.
Exactly who (or what) is “the agent” in a multicellular organization?
0553 The nervous system represents the environment and the ecology to “the agent”. The nervous system moves “the agent” within the environment and the ecology. Plus, the nervous system represents all the subagents of the body to “the agent”. And, the nervous system monitors the subunits of the body for “the agent”. And, on top of all this, the nervous system is totally unaware that it is a subagent of “the agent” that it pretends to be.
0554 To me, it is hard to imagine that evolutionary processes would produce something so hilarious.
In section 4.5, the authors describe a simple reflex. A finger touches a hot ember that has rolled out of a fire located on a platform of stones. An innate reflex pulls the hand away from the hot thing. How do the logics of thirdness play out in this little drama?
0556 Here is a figure.
0557 The nervous system acts like an agent. For this simple reflex, the body is taken for granted as subagents (skin for touch and muscle for action). Also, sensory and motor neurons act as subagents.
0558 Now, let me think about the logics of thirdness: exclusion, complement and alignment.
In terms of exclusion, the body tissues (skin and muscle) are excluded from the reflex loop, except for the fact that they are… um… riddled with the termini of nerve cells. For the skin, the sensory nerve-cell termini are sensitive to all sorts of disturbances, such as pressure, temperature and all the features that go with touch. For the muscle, the motor nerve-cell termini are prepared to impart an impulse that causes muscle cells to contract.
In terms of complement, the sensory and motor neurons directly complement one another. One receives inputs. The other produces results. The skin and muscles complement one another indirectly. In this case, they complement one another through the mediation of a simple reflex.
In terms of alignment, the skin-embedded pain receptors immediately trigger pulling back from contact with the hostile thing.
0559 Ah, is this riddle some sort of trick?
In alignment, I return to the question of how one subagent influences another.
0560 What is the nature of the dotted line connecting the exemplar sign-object (SOe) for the sensory neural pathway to the specifying sign-vehicle (SVs) of the motor neural pathway?
0561 What about learning, the topic of section 4.6?
A renown form of learning is the conditioned “reflex”. It is not really a reflex. But, the conditioning make it look like one. Another label is “stimulus-response”.
0562 Figure 4.7 in the text has a picture of Pavlov’s famous experiment. A dog is positioned within an sling in order to measure the amount of drool that it slobbers while waiting for dinner.
If the experimental apparatus and the captive dog are subagents of an empirio-schematic inquirer, the subagents are working in parallel, not in sequence.
Here is a picture.
0563 Is that correct?
The dog is not really captive. Instead, the dog is so tame as to allow the pelvis to be put into a sling and the mouth attached to tubes that suck up saliva. The bell2a (SVs) stands for dinner2b (SOs) according to the self-governance3b of its neural system operating on possible courses of action1b (SIs).
According to the scientist, who is so clever as to devise a way to measure the volume that a dog drools using tubes to suck the drool as it spills between mouth and lips, the bell2a (SVs) stands for the expectation of food2b (SOs) in regards to scientific inquiry3b into the potential of ‘a rigorous conceptualization of anticipation’1b.
0564 Does Pavlov induce the dog to drool in anticipation?
Does the dog’s saliva fulfill Pavlov’s expectations?
What is it about dogs that allows them to go along with such foolishness?
0565 I think that dogs are adapted to believe that humans are their pack leaders. There is a motive for this belief. Humans are not as cruel as wolves. An alpha wolf is downright mean and expects to be… um… top dog all the time. A human pack-leader is wonderful in comparison. Not only do humans not bite back, although they occasionally hit and are nasty, they tend to share their food as if the dog is part of their pack… er… family.
It’s a nice gig, if you can get it.
0566 So, by instinct, the dogs know that Pavlov is pack leader. Pack leaders have expectations. So, the dogs go along with what Pavlov wants because, well, they want to please their pack leader.
05670 What do Pavlov’s dogs learn?
First, Pavlov’s dogs learn how to let themselves be hooked up to that stupid sling, which obviates the use of their hind legs. Totally awkward. Then, the dogs learn that the drool measuring apparatus hooked to their heads is not going to hurt them. Dogs that can not handle this lesson are cut from Pavlov’s pack. Finally, the dogs find out what the apparatus is all about. It is the way that master is going to feed me.
0568 So, Pavlov’s dogs learn far more than the business about conditioned response.
Indeed, the salivation is merely an exemplar sign-relation that is built into their subagency. If food is around, prepare to eat.
0569 Meanwhile, Pavlov achieves what he wants to achieve. Anticipation is a model that is associated to conditioned responses. The model soon replaces the noumenon of what those Pavlov-loving dogs endured. Today, the noumenal overlay of “anticipation” is objectified by the phenomena of psychological experiments conducted under the labels of “operant and instrumental conditioning”.
Today’s state educators perform these experiments on young children, completely unaware that the noumenon that the children experience is not quite the same as the model that substitutes for the noumenon.
0569 Does that mean that Pavlov is an subagent for something bigger, such as science as an institution?
I wonder. In the following figure, Pavlov’s semiotic agency touches base with all three elements of the empirio-schematic judgment.
0570 This raises a parallel between Pavlov, the scientist, and his dogs, the subjects of scientific inquiry.
0570 Okay, semiotic agency works as the noumenal overlay for both the dogs in Pavlov’s experiment and Pavlov himself. Or should I say, “Pavlov’s scientific self”?
0571 Why do I say this?
Recall the empirio-schematic judgment?
Disciplinary language (relation, thirdness) brings mechanical and mathematical models (what ought to be, secondness) into relation with observations and measurements of phenomena (what is, firstness).
0572 Surely, Pavlov’s semiotic agency manifests within each element in the empirio-schematic judgment.
0573 What is (firstness) corresponds to the experimental setup and goes into the methods section of the scientific publication. Ideally, Pavlov’s experiment can be performed independently by any scientist with dogs who will do anything to please their master.
In sum, the experimental apparatus and the resulting data go with the SVs and correspond to the methods and results sections in a scientific publication.
0574 What ought to be (secondness) corresponds to analysis of the data.
Pavlov models the fact that his dogs drool measurable amounts at the sound of the bell. The model is mechanical. The bell initially is sounded when the food arrives, so the nervous systemof the dog in the sling is conditioned to both bell and food arrival. Later, when the bell sounds, the dog drools.
Never mind the reality that the dog is only interested in the food, not the bell.
If the food fails to come, the dog will figure out ways to get out of that drool-collecting headgear and pelvis-suspending sling.
In sum, the data is crunched and a model is proposed in the analysis section of a scientific paper.
0575 Relation (thirdness) corresponds to a discussion of the analysis and results of the experiment.
That said, a label may be attached to the type of model that the data suggests. In this case, two labels apply. “Anticipation” is a label designed to capture the attention of non-scientific folk. “Operant and instrumental conditioning” is a label designed to hold the attention of scientific folk.
0576 Why two labels?
Science involves explicit abstraction. The terminology of explicit abstraction may change depending on the audience.
For the general public, the explicit term, “anticipation”, labels a wide range of um… phenomena. These observable and measurable behaviors are attributed to a noumenon, a thing itself, called “anticipation”.
0577 For scientists interested in psychology, the explicit term, “anticipation”, labels a suite of models for conditioned responses, produced through rigorous experiments on animals.
Here is a picture of Pavlov’s empirio-schematic judgment.
0578 In triumphalist psychology, the technical term, “anticipation”, should overshadow the common term, “anticipation”.
In the process, the application of the general term is narrowed and shifted towards the counter-intuitive.
I wonder whether Pavlov anticipates that?
Maybe he does, without even being conscious of that anticipation.
0579 Section 6.7 concerns consciousness and cognition in animals.
In this examination of Pavlov’s experiment, a question concerning consciousness and cognition arises within two agencies, that of Pavlov the scientist and that of Pavlov’s dogs.
0580 This suggests a parallel between Pavlov, the scientist, and his dogs, the subjects of scientific inquiry.
0581 Now, the above dyads represent matter where the form is a real initiating (semiotic) event.
0582 For the dogs, the form is a serving of meat while hearing a bell. Forget about all that apparatus business. That is for master to decide. The drool occurs when the bell rings2, in the normal context of Pavlov’s apparatus3, signifying the potential of dinner1. This fits the common person’s use of the world “anticipation”.
Indeed, the exemplar sign-relation depicts an innate expectation. The master feeding me2b (SVe) stands for my love for master and my master’s expectations of me2c (SOe) in regards to the rituals of being fed by master3c operating on the possibility that the master is pack leader1c (SIe). Or, something like that.
0583 For Pavlov, the event is an experiment, designed to produce data through measuring volumes of canine slobber. The measurements2a (SVs) stand for a conditioned response2b (SOs) in regards to the way that psychologists3b conduct experiments that mean ‘something’1b (SIs). Then, the conditioned response2b (SVe) stands for “anticipation”2c (SOe) in regards to making sense3c of this scientifically relevant ‘something’ by offering a label1c (SIe). This introduces a novel empirio-schematic term into the psychological lexicon.
0584 What does this have to do with consciousness and cognition?
0585 Obviously, I have two referents for the term, “anticipation”.
0586 So, a semiotic tool may be useful in sorting out this issue of labeling in a Lebenswelt of explicit abstraction.
0587 The Greimas square is a semiotic tool that turns out to be useful for ascertaining the location of a spoken word in a system of differences.
How does the Greimas square operate?
The Greimas square is a purely relational structure constructed of four locations. Each location corresponds to the corner of a square. The corners are labeled A, B C and D. Each label represents a rule. A is the focal spoken word. B is a spoken word that contrasts with A. C is a word that “speaks against” (contradicts) B and complements A. D is a word that contrasts with C, contradicts A and complements B.
0588 Here is a picture.
0589 I can apply the Greimas square to what Pavlov accomplishes.
The focal word (A) is the common use of the term, “anticipation”. The spoken word is an explicit abstraction. When the bell rings, the dog anticipates a bowl of meat. The bell brings the meat to um… consciousness.
The contrasting word (B) is the technical use of the term, “anticipation”. When the bell rings, the dog salivates. Salivation is not regarded as a subagent doing what it is supposed to do. Rather, salivation is evidence of an unconscious conditioned response. Is this where the word, “cognition”, fits in?
The word (C) that contradicts (B) and complements (A) is “consciousness”. For common use, anticipation entails conscious awareness or a process that leads to conscious awareness. For Pavlov’s dogs, the bell brings meat to consciousness.
The term (D) that contrasts with (C), speaks against (A) and complements (B) is “operant conditioning”. Operant conditioning is regarded as an unconscious process.
0590 Here is a picture.
0591 What does this have to do with consciousness and cognition?
Does Pavlov’s scientific breakthrough in psychology demonstrate that an explicit abstraction, that everyone applies to human consciousness, may be grounded in unconscious cognitive processing?
He is a modern scientist, who has adopted the precepts of the Positivist’s judgment.
0593 At the end of this chapter on non-human agency, the authors warn against anthropomorphic theories.
Clearly, that is not the only danger facing biosemiotics.
The fact that a word in common use is used as the label for a class of psychological models attests to the way that (for triumphalist science) models may be used to overshadow and occlude their noumena.
Pavlov’s experiment is widely regarded as foundational in psychological empirical science. Yet, this examination suggests that, even before designing his experiment, Pavlov might have imagined that “anticipation” is what the noumenon must be, when it came to animal behavior.
0593 If correct, Pavlov’s work demonstrates that phenomenology is practiced in the formation of social sciences long before Husserl develops an explicit methodology for arriving at what the noumenon must be. This is discussed in points 0120 to 0129.
The word, “anticipation” papers over the noumenon for a wide variety of psychological phenomena. But, some scientists treat the word as if it is only a technical term in the scientific discipline of psychology.
0594 This conclusion is far more difficult to grasp that any warning about anthropomorphic theories.
Why?
Today’s psychologists think that “anticipation” is the thing itself when it comes to operant and instrumental conditioning.
0596 On top of that, neither “anticipation as noumenon” nor models of conditioned responses are semiotic. They do not face the reality that the thing itself can only be recognized within a purely relational structure. The noumena for biology, psychology and sociology are not as obvious as the noumena of the empirical sciences. They are not obvious because they are actualities2 that only manifest in their proper normal contexts3 and potentials1.
Indeed, at some level of awareness, both social scientists and phenomenologists have always known this. Sharov and Tonnessen’s noumenal overlay may be the first attempt to ground noumena in the biological and social sciences in the realness of triadic relations.
0597 This brings me back to agency in non-human organisms. The interactions between agents and subagents, as well as between agents, has been a focus on dyadic research for the modern era. These interactions will need to be reframed for the postmodern era of triadic relations.
0598 Indeed, take a look at the following figure, depicting the semiotic agency of Pavlov and his dogs as if they are subagents in a scientific institution.
Both the apparatus and the dog in the sling cohere to the relational structure of semiotic agency (as formulated by the S&T noumenal overlay).
0599 But, look at that dashed line arrow.
I wonder, “Is that arrow dyadic? Or does it hide a triadic relation?”
So concludes this examination of chapter four of Semiotic Agency.
0227 The book before me is Semiotic Agency: Science Beyond Mechanism, by biosemioticians Alexei Sharov and Morten Tonnnessen. The book is published in 2021 by Springer and logs in at volume 25 of Springer’s Series in Biosemiotics. The editors of this series have Razie Mah’s permission for use of following disquisition, with attribution of said blogger.
The psychometric sciences have already been introduced in points 0159 through 0173 of this examination.
0228 The titular question is crucial, since biosemiotics culminates a century-long development, starting with Edmund Husserl developing a phenomenological method for intuitively articulating what the noumenon must be, for a wide variety of phenomena, where the noumenon is not absolutely obvious. Biosemiotics stands within the tradition of science as a search for truth.
0229 Similarly, the psychometric sciences constitute a century-long development, starting with Sigmund Freud discovering a psychoanalytic method capable of bringing unconscious wishes to consciousness in order that they may influence choices. The label, “psychometric sciences”, is coined by Joseph Farrell, and further fleshed out by Razie Mah in Looking at Joseph Farrell’s Book (2020) “The Tower of Babel Moment” (appearing in Razie Mah’s blog at the end of December 2023). The psychometric sciences stands within the tradition of science as a will to know… or is it… power?
0230 Both of these traditions lay claim to the Positivist’s judgment.
Judgment?
A judgment is a triadic relation containing three elements: relation, what ought to be and what is. When each of these elements is assigned to one of Peirce’s categories, the judgment becomes actionable. Actionable judgments unfold into category-based nested forms.
Here is a picture of the Positivist’s judgment for the natural sciences.
0231 As for what is, a noumenon is the thing itself. The thing itself cannot be fully objectified as its observable and measurable facets. A noumenon cannot be objectified as its phenomena.
As for what ought to be, disciplinary language (relation, thirdness) brings mathematical and mechanical models (what ought to be, secondness) into relation with observations and measurements of phenomena (what is, firstness). This is called the “empirio-schematic judgment”.
0232 Triumphalist scientists advocate that a noumenon be replaced with its model. When a successful model substitutes for the noumenon, then the model (overlaying the noumenon) can be objectified as its phenomena. In short, the tension within Kant’s slogan is mitigated when a model substitutes for its noumenon.
0233 As for the relation, the positivist intellect has a rule. Metaphysics is not allowed.
Of course, when investigating human behavior, metaphysics is necessary for models. Metaphysics includes formal and final causalities. Formal causes pertain to designs and their requirements. Final causes pertain to intentions, aims, goals, and the like.
I suppose that metaphysics (in the sense of two of Aristotle’s four causes) may be allowed in biosemiotics and the psychometric sciences, if they are not “metaphysical terms” (in the sense that theologians are always talking about “metaphysical” or “religious” stuff).
So, both biosemiotics and the psychometric sciences play word games. Metaphysics is okay as long as formal and final causes are regarded as material and efficient causes. Metaphysics is okay as long as it is not “religious”.
0234 Biosemioticians Alexei Sharov and Morten Tonnessen propose a noumenon that is derived from the specifying sign-relation. The triadic sign-relation is simplified into a dyadic formula. Dyads are characteristic of Peirce’s category of secondness. Secondness is the realm of actuality.
If I look at what is for the Positivist’s judgment, I notice that a dyadic structure is assigned to the category of firstness. Why is that so? The noumenon and its phenomena may be considered real elements. The issue is whether the two elements are really the same thing. A noumenon and its phenomena are not like matter and form, where matter is not the same as form. The thing itself and its observable and measurable facets are the same entity.
0235 This explains Kant’s slogan, reminding the scientist that the thing itself cannot be objectified as its observable and measurable facets, even though both labels apply to the same entity.
0236 So, what is for the Positivist’s judgment belongs to the category of firstness (the realm of possibility) because phenomena have the potential to be observed and measured and their noumenon has the potential of being the thing responsible for the phenomena.
What ought to be for the Positivist’s judgment belongs to the category of secondness (the realm of actuality).
0237 Triumphalist scientists propose to substitute a successful model for the noumenon because the substitution increases the potential that there is something real that is responsible for the phenomena. Indeed, to a laboratory scientist, the model (overlaying the noumenon) is objectified by its phenomena. Yes, the model is more “real” than its noumenon.
0238 The biosemioticians Sharov and Tonnessen propose to substitute their noumenal overlay, with similar results. Phenomena objectify their noumenal overlay.
0239 Notice how the noumenal overlay has a dyadic structure. Since the dyad characterizes the category of secondnessand since secondness is the realm of actuality, the dyadic structure increases the feeling that the the noumenal overlay is actual. Indeed, the dyad is so actual that Kant’s slogan seems to apply. This overlay has the feel that it is more than what it appears to be.
This is precisely what Sharov and Tonnessen claim. Their noumenal overlay is what all noumena in the biological sciences have in common. If the diverse noumena of the biological sciences (like the leaves on a tree) have one thing in common, it is the biosemiotic noumenal overlay (like the tree that bears the leaves).
0240 This includes the noumenon of the psychometric sciences.
Or, I should say, this applies to the model that the psychometric sciences aim to substitute for Sharov and Tonnessen’s noumenal overlay.
After all, their model is a simplification of the S&T noumenal overlay.